Crittenden v. Chrysler Corp.
| Decision Date | 16 August 1989 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 103880 |
| Citation | 178 Mich.App. 324,443 N.W.2d 412 |
| Parties | Hewitt CRITTENDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. 178 Mich.App. 324, 443 N.W.2d 412 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[178 MICHAPP 325] Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C. by Patrick Burkett, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellant.
Dickinson, Wright, Moon, VanDusen & Freeman by Robert E. Kinchen, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.
Before SAWYER, P.J., and MAHER and BRENNAN, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the September 25, 1987, order of the Wayne Circuit Court which granted defendant's motion for summary disposition and dismissed plaintiff's claim for handicap discrimination. We reverse.
During plaintiff's employ with defendant, which began in 1953, he was involved with the United Auto Workers, serving as a union steward and committeeman for several years. In October of 1974, plaintiff was granted a leave of absence to work full-time with the International UAW. His position was funded through a CETA program and entailed job training and placement services for disadvantaged workers. In February of 1982, he [178 MICHAPP 326] was laid off from that position because cutbacks in the federal budget eliminated the CETA grant.
After his layoff, plaintiff sought reemployment with defendant pursuant to a provision in the International Collective Bargaining Agreement which provided that "[u]pon return from any such leave of absence, the employee shall be re-employed at work generally similar to that which he did last prior to the leave of absence and with seniority accumulated throughout his leave of absence." Prior to his leave of absence, plaintiff worked at defendant's Hamtramck plant. However, that plant was closed in January of 1980, while plaintiff was still on leave with the union. At the time of the closing, a merger of sorts occurred between the employees of the Jefferson assembly plant and those of the Hamtramck plant, i.e., high seniority workers at Hamtramck were sent to work at Jefferson and the rest were laid off. A Memorandum of Understanding on Plant Closures was executed by defendant and the union which defined the rights of the laid-off employees. The memorandum provided in pertinent part:
WHEREAS, the Corporation and the Union wish to provide work opportunity to employees laid off as a result of the phasing-out of operations prior to a plant closing and those laid off as a result of the closing itself; and
WHEREAS, due to the plant closing such laid off employees have no recall rights to any Corporation plant.
* * * * * *
Employees laid off from a plant the Corporation has announced its intention to close and who are not expected to be recalled due to the closing will be placed on a list in the order of their seniority at the closed plant. As work they are qualified to do becomes available at other plants of the Corporation[178 MICHAPP 327] in the United States and Canada as a result of attritional openings, employees on the list will be eligible for placement in such jobs insofar as reasonably practicable in the order of their seniority at the closed plant.
Such employees will be placed at the new plant with the seniority they had at the closed plant, and their seniority at all other plants shall terminate.
An employee placed pursuant to this Paragraph II will be placed only when his seniority is greater than the seniority of a laid off employee of the plant in which the attritional opening occurs and who otherwise would be recalled to the attritional opening.
* * * * * * The Corporation shall not incur any liability for claimed violations or errors in administration of this Memorandum, and employees will not accumulate seniority or other rights by reason of this Memorandum.
Because plaintiff was still employed with the union in 1980, he did not participate in the selection process which occurred at that time.
On March 1, 1982, plaintiff reported to the Jefferson plant and indicated his availability to work to John Kotes, an employee of defendant who was charged with caring for the records of the Hamtramck plant. Plaintiff requested that he be reinstated to a job suitable to his classification and seniority. Kotes allegedly placed him on the active rolls to reactivate benefits but then almost immediately listed him as a Code 31 layoff (i.e., no work available). Kotes told plaintiff that he would be eligible for supplemental employment benefits until such time that a job could be located for him. Plaintiff was purportedly never told at this time that reemployment was conditioned upon passing a physical examination.
[178 MICHAPP 328] In April of 1982, plaintiff contacted Kotes to again inquire about the possibility of employment. He was told that nothing was yet available. In May of 1982, plaintiff visited Kotes and asked about returning to work. Kotes referred him to a company physician, Dr. Lorenzo, for a physical examination.
During the examination, Dr. Lorenzo questioned plaintiff about his medical history and a nurse checked his blood pressure and other vital signs. Plaintiff indicated that he had hypertension which was being controlled by medication. The entire examination lasted only ten to fifteen minutes.
On the basis of the information obtained at the physical examination, plaintiff was placed on "PDX 40-51-60" medical restriction status, which restricted the following activities:
40. No climbing. Permits ground level or platform work and ordinary stair climbing.
* * * * * *
51. Lifting or carrying 20 lbs. or less.
* * * * * *
60. Minimal stooping, squatting, bending, or twisting of body.
Dr. Lorenzo assigned the above PDX codes to plaintiff on a temporary basis due to his high blood pressure and taking of medication.
Because of the physical restrictions placed on plaintiff, he was placed on indefinite layoff and became ineligible for employment at the Jefferson plant. On March 31, 1983, at age 59, plaintiff was forced to accept early retirement from defendant.
On March 27, 1983, plaintiff instituted this suit against defendant, alleging age and handicap discrimination for refusing to reemploy him after he returned from the leave of absence. Subsequent to [178 MICHAPP 329] filing its answer wherein it denied the discrimination allegations, defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Defendant asserted that plaintiff's age discrimination claim should be dismissed because there was no genuine issue of material fact and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As to the handicap discrimination claim, defendant argued that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because his alleged handicap did not fall within the parameters of the Handicappers' Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. Sec. 37.1101 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 3.550(101) et seq. The trial court granted defendant's motion in full, stating:
An order granting defendant's summary disposition motion and dismissing plaintiff's discrimination claims was entered on September 25, 1987. Plaintiff appeals from the order as of right, challenging only the court's dismissal of his handicap discrimination claim.
Plaintiff's handicap discrimination claim was brought under subsection 1 of Sec. 202 of the HCRA [178 MICHAPP 330] M.C.L. Sec. 37.1202(1); M.S.A. Sec. 3.550(202)(1), which provides, in pertinent part, that an employer shall not:
(a) Fail or refuse to hire, recruit, or promote an individual because of a handicap that is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position.
* * * * * *
(c) Limit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for employment in a way which deprives or tends to deprive an individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affects the status of an employee because of a handicap that is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position.
(d) Fail or refuse to hire,...
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