Crittindon v. Gusman

• Decision Date: 13 April 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION 17-512-SDD-EWD
• Parties: JESSIE CRITTINDON, et al. v. MARLIN GUSMAN, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

JESSIE CRITTINDON, et al. v. MARLIN GUSMAN, et al.

CIVIL ACTION 17-512-SDD-EWD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

April 13, 2020

RULING

This matter is before the Court on the following Motions:

• The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment¹ filed by Plaintiffs Jessie Crittindon ("Crittindon"), Leon Burse ("Burse"), Eddie Copelin ("Copelin"), Phillip Dominick III ("Dominick"), and Donald Guidry ("Guidry")(collectively, "Plaintiffs"). There are three Oppositions to the Motion: one by Defendants Marlin Gusman ("Sheriff Gusman") and Corey Amacker ("Amacker") of the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office ("OPSO")(collectively, "the OPSO Defendants");² one by Defendants Wydette Williams ("Sheriff Williams"), Johnny Hedgemon ("Hedgemon"), and Edward Knight ("Knight") of the East Carroll Parish Sheriff's Office ("ECPSO")(collectively, "the ECPSO Defendants");³ and another by Defendants James LeBlanc ("Secretary LeBlanc"), Angela Griffin ("Griffin"), and Perry Stagg ("Stagg") of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("DPS&C" or "DOC")(collectively, "the DPS&C Defendants");⁴• The Motion for Summary Judgment⁵ filed by the DPS&C Defendants. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition,⁶ to which the DPS&C Defendants filed a Reply.⁷ Plaintiffs also filed a Sur-Reply;⁸

• The Motion for Summary Judgment⁹ filed by the OPSO Defendants, to which Plaintiffs filed an Opposition;¹⁰

• The Motion for Summary Judgment¹¹ filed by the ECPSO Defendants, to which Plaintiffs filed an Opposition.¹²

For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the motions shall be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are former prisoners who allege that they were "incarcerated for months beyond the date when each was legally entitled to release."¹³ Their individual cases played out in similar fashion: Plaintiffs were all arrested and initially placed in the custody of the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office (OPSO) before being transferred to the River Bend Detention Center ("River Bend") in Lake Providence, Louisiana, where they were held by the East Carroll Parish Sheriff's Office (ECPSO) as Orleans pretrial detainees.¹⁴ Later, each Plaintiff was transported back to Orleans Parish to enter a plea in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court. Once the plea was entered and a sentence handed down, each Plaintiff was transported back to River Bend, where, they allege, they remained in custodyeven though they were entitled to immediate release, having been sentenced to time served (in the case of Plaintiffs Crittindon, Burse, Copelin, and Dominick).¹⁵ Plaintiff Guidry was not entitled to immediate release upon sentencing, but he alleges that he was entitled to release on September 4, 2016, and was not actually released from River Bend until January 24, 2017.¹⁶ All five Plaintiffs were no longer pretrial detainees but DOC-sentenced inmates when, they allege, they were held in custody beyond their lawful sentences.

In their Complaints,¹⁷ Plaintiffs bring four claims against Defendants, in both their individual and official capacities: (1) violation of their federal due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of their state due process rights under Article 1, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution; and (3) and (4), state law claims for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, however, Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on a narrow subset of the claims at issue:

Plaintiffs seek partial summary judgment from this Court on three issues of liability: (1) whether, as a matter of law, Defendants violated the due process rights guaranteed to Plaintiffs by the federal and state constitutions; (2) whether, as a matter of law, Defendants falsely imprisoned Plaintiffs; and (3) whether the liability of OPSO, ECPSO, and the DPS&C Defendants is solidary. . .¹⁸

Notably, Plaintiffs' Motion seeks summary judgment against the OPSO Defendants and the ECSPO Defendants in their official capacities only; as to the DPS&CDefendants,¹⁹ Plaintiffs seek summary judgment against them in their individual capacities.²⁰

Plaintiffs argue that the OPSO Defendants had "a practice of 'releasing' newly-sentenced DOC prisoners from Orleans Parish" directly to River Bend, "without proper completion and provision of the paperwork and documentation required by state law and necessary to ensure their release from custody."²¹ Similarly, they argue that the ECPSO Defendants are liable because, "[d]espite promulgating a written policy that requires documentation of 'the legal basis for commitment' for the intake of prisoners," the ECPSO Defendants allegedly had an "official practice of accepting persons into [River Bend] without obtaining this information."²² The OPSO and ECPSO Defendants counter that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their official capacity § 1983 claims because they have "failed to establish that there was a specific policy or a pattern of similar overdetention incidents which arose out of specifically similar circumstances, sufficient to put" them on notice that their practice was constitutionally deficient.²³ Further, both OPSO and ECPSO Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they "acted with the requisite deliberate indifference necessary to find the parties liable in their official capacity."²⁴

As for the individual capacity claims against the DPS&C Defendants, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary judgment based on these Defendants' "directparticipation in the acts which caused the deprivations of Plaintiffs' due process rights," as well as summary judgment on

three separate theories of supervisory liability: (1) failure to adopt policies that could have prevented the Plaintiffs' injuries; (2) failure to train and supervise department employees, resulting in the Plaintiffs' injuries; and (3) direct participation in DPS&C intolerably slow response to the discovery of scores of DOC-sentenced prisoners held at River Bend without having been pre-classified, resulting in the Plaintiffs being held even longer than if DPS&C had taken swift action.²⁵

The DPS&C Defendants counter that summary judgment is improper because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Specifically, they argue that there is no evidence that they acted with deliberate indifference; instead, they claim, they "promptly processed" Plaintiffs' release paperwork "after receiving the necessary documentation"²⁶ from the other Defendants. Because DPS&C "is dependent upon the Sheriff to provide necessary paperwork to calculate an offender's time," Defendants argue that they cannot be liable for the overdetention of Plaintiffs based on the Sheriffs' failure to provide that paperwork. Additionally, the DPS&C Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot show a failure to adopt effective policies, explaining that "there is no indication of a pattern or practice of DOC staff wholly failing to reach to local official to obtain paperwork. Indeed, DOC staff remained in communication with Orleans Parish throughout December 2016 and into January 2017."²⁷

According to Plaintiffs, all Defendants are also liable for false imprisonment under Louisiana law based on their constitutionally deficient practices. Plaintiffs ask this Court to find that all Defendants are solidarily liable for the harm to Plaintiffs, explaining that:

The OPSO, ECPSO, and DPS&C Defendants each played a role in preventing each Plaintiff from going free on his respective lawful release date. None of the Plaintiffs' releases could be 'partially executed.' The obligation owed to Plaintiffs, therefore, is a joint, indivisible obligation and OPSO, ECPSO, and the DPS&C Defendants are solidarily liable.²⁸

The Defendants disagree, noting that in 1996, the Louisiana Civil Code "was amended to eliminate solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, except for intentional or willful acts."²⁹

For their part, the ECPSO Defendants move for summary judgment on the claims against them for the following reasons: (1) because "Plaintiffs' claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey and should be dismissed on that basis";³⁰ (2) because "plaintiffs fail to state a claim against either Sheriff Williams, in his individual capacity, or the East Carroll Defendants collectively in their official capacities";³¹ (3) because the ECPSO Defendants "are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities";³² and (4) because the "plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Louisiana law."³³

Similarly, the OPSO Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment posits that they are entitled to summary judgment on the claims against them for the following reasons: (1) because "Plaintiffs' claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey and should be dismissedon that basis";³⁴ (2) because "Plaintiff [sic] has failed to state facts which support an official capacity claim against the Sheriff";³⁵ and (3) because the "Sherriff and Amacker are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities."³⁶

Lastly, the DPS&C Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that "(1) the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the principles set forth in the United States Supreme Court case Heck v. Humphrey and its progeny, (2) the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, (3) the DPS&C Defendants are not the 'jailers' for purposes of the state law false imprisonment analysis, and (4) the DPS&C Defendants did not intentionally inflict emotional distress upon the Plaintiffs."³⁷

Having reviewed the parties' memoranda and the applicable law, the Court finds that all of the motions before the Court shall be DENIED. The Court will address the parties' arguments in turn below.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."³⁸ "When...