Crockett v. Andrews
| Decision Date | 24 February 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 12844,12844 |
| Citation | 172 S.E.2d 384,153 W.Va. 714 |
| Parties | Jennings C. CROCKETT and Tommy E. Young v. Larry W. ANDREWS et al., Members of the Police Civil Service Commission of theCity of Charleston, etc., et al. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Rules and regulations promulgated and adopted by a police civil service commission pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect of law and are therefore subject to the usual rules of statutory construction.
2. Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation.
3. While long standing interpretation of its own rules by an administrative body is ordinarily afforded much weight, such interpretation is impermissible where the language is clear and unambiguous.
Paul J. Kaufman, Stanley H. Sergent, Jr., Charleston, for appellant.
Bernard D. Horan, Cleo S. Jones, Charleston, for appellees.
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County in a declaratory judgment proceeding instituted by Jennings C. Crockett, a sergeant in the Charleston Police Department, against the members of the Police Civil Service Commission and the Mayor of the City of Charleston. In that action the petitioner sought a construction of certain provisions of the Police Civil Service Laws of West Virginia and the Rules and Regulations of the Police Civil Service Commission of the City of Charleston and a declaration of his rights thereunder. The petition was subsequently amended to add Tommy E. Young as a petitioner. Also, certain members of the police department were impleaded as defendants in their individual rights and as representatives of a class composed of members of the department who had participated in the examination held by the Police Civil Service Commission for promotion to the positions of sergeants, lieutenants and captain of the Charleston Police Department.
The latter defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which motion was granted and the petition was dismissed. It is from this judgment that this appeal is prosecuted. Petitioner Crockett is not involved in this appeal, it having been determined in the trial court that even with the requested relief he would not have been eligible for promotion.
The appellant, Tommy E. Young, is a patrolman in the Charleston Police Department, having been originally appointed in November, 1949. He served with the police department continously from the date of his appointment until September 16, 1963, when he voluntarily resigned. On October 23, 1963, approximately five weeks after his resignation, he applied for and was granted reinstatement in the police department. He has served continuously as a patrolman since that time.
In February, 1967 Mr. Young and other members of the police department took an examination for promotion to the rank of sergeant. This examination was offered by the Police Civil Service Commission of the City of Charleston, the conduct of which is provided for in Rule VIII of the rules and regulations of that commission. According to an exhibit filed with the petition, Mr. Young placed forty-ninth on the list of scores of the examination. The top four applicants on the list were promoted to the rank of sergeant. In arriving at the final score received by an applicant for promotion his seniority with the department is a material consideration. The Police Civil Service Commission credited Mr. young with prior service, or seniority, only from the date of his reappointment, October 23, 1963. The appellant contends that, in accordance with the provisions of Rule VIII, Section 3(e), he would be entitled to seniority from the date of his original appointment in November, 1949, less the year 1963 when he left the department for approximately five weeks. The commission rejected the appellant's contention, as did the circuit court.
In the trial of this matter the defendants relied on three grounds, namely, that there was no justiciable controversy, that the petitioner did not follow the administrative remedies prescribed by the rules and that Rule VIII, Section 3(e) contains a latent ambiguity which has been resolved by the commission consistent with the spirit of the statute and that such interpretation should not be disturbed by the courts. The trial court ruled against the defendants on the first two grounds and they are not now before this Court. It is the third ground with which this appeal is concerned.
Rule VIII, Section 3(e) of the Rules and Regulations of the Police Civil Service Commission of the City of Charleston provides:
The sole issue on this appeal is whether said Rule VIII, Section 3(e) is subject to the interpretation placed upon it by the commission or whether the commission should be required to apply the language thereof without interpretation.
The appellant takes the position that the language of the above quoted section is clear and unambiguous and should be applied, not construed. The appellees, on the other hand, assert that, this being a reasonable interpretation of said rule and one placed thereon by the commission over the years, such interpretation should be permitted to stand. Furthermore, says the appellees, Code, 1931, 8--14--12, as amended, relating to reinstatement of officers to the police force, must be read together with the above rule.
The rule with which we are concerned was promulgated and adopted by the Police Civil Service Commission of the City of Charleston pursuant to the authority given in Code, 1931, 8--14--11, as amended. (Formerly Code, 1931, 8--5A--6, as amended) It, therefore, has the force and effect of law. 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, Section 292. That being so, the rules of statutory construction are applicable and must be employed to resolve this controversy.
It is basic in our law and universally accepted that where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation. As stated in 17 N.J., Statutes, Section 31, ...
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