Crockett v. Davis
| Decision Date | 27 March 1895 |
| Citation | 31 A. 710,81 Md. 134 |
| Parties | CROCKETT ET AL. v. DAVIS ET AL. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from superior court of Baltimore city.
Proceeding by Samana Crockett and others against Harry B. Davis individually and as executor of the will of Catharine Davis deceased, and others, to contest the will. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.
Argued before ROBINSON, C.J., and McSHERRY, FOWLER, BRISCOE ROBERTS, and BOYD, JJ.
John F Gontrum, Saml. Register, and S. S. Field, for appellants.
Bernard Carter and D. Meredith Reese, for appellees.
Upon a caveat to a will of Catharine Davis issues were framed by the orphans' court of Baltimore city, and sent to the superior court for trial. They presented the following questions: (1) As to the formal execution of the will; (2) as to her knowledge of its contents; (3) whether it was procured by undue influence exercised and practiced upon her; (4) whether it was executed by her when she was of sound and disposing mind, and capable of executing a valid deed or contract. Four daughters of Catharine Davis by her former marriage, and the husbands of those who were married, were made the plaintiffs, and her children by her second marriage, together with the husband of a married daughter, were made defendants. At the trial the defendants produced the will, and examined the two subscribing witnesses for the purpose of proving the execution of it. The plaintiffs then called a number of witnesses to show undue influence and want of testamentary capacity on the part of Mrs. Davis. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, the defendants offered three prayers, which were granted by the court, instructing the jury to find for the defendants on all four issues. From these rulings this appeal was taken.
The first prayer referred to the first and second issues, and as there can be no doubt about the correctness of the rulings of the court below in reference to them, excepting so far as the second issue may be affected by the questions raised by the third and fourth, we will proceed at once to the consideration of the other two prayers. By the third the jury was instructed that no sufficient evidence had been offered to show that the will was procured by undue influence, and therefore their verdict must be for the defendants on the third issue; and the fourth instructed them that no sufficient evidence had been offered to show that Catharine Davis was not of sound and disposing mind, capable of executing a valid deed and contract, at the time she executed the will, and therefore their verdict must be for the defendants on the fourth issue.
We will first consider the fourth prayer, as that involves the foundation of all valid wills,--testamentary capacity. The burden was on the caveators to overcome the presumption of law that Mrs. Davis was of sufficient mental capacity to make a will. They having undertaken this, it is incumbent on us to examine the record to see whether the evidence offered by them was legally sufficient to fairly support a verdict if the jury found for them. As has often been said by this court, if the facts proved are such that a rational mind might, in reason and fairness, from them draw the conclusion sought, it is the duty of the court to submit the case to the jury. In the case of Hiss v. Weik (decided by this court, but not yet officially reported) 28 A. 400, the question was stated thus: "Was the evidence offered by the caveators assuming it all to be true (as must be done when weighing its legal sufficiency upon a prayer of this character), so utterly inconclusive or devoid of probative force as not to enable an ordinarily intelligent mind to draw a rational conclusion therefrom in support of the proposition sought to be maintained by it?" Cases often arise in which plaintiffs have so signally failed to sufficiently prove some material fact upon which their right to recover depends that there can be no doubt about the duty of the court to determine the question without leaving it to the jury, as the court is the exclusive judge of the legal sufficiency of the evidence. But the difficulty sometimes is, particularly in cases of this character, to distinguish between the weight of evidence and its legal sufficiency. The trial judge may differ from the jury as to the former, and may think they should have found differently, or, if sitting as a juror or in some case where he is authorized to determine the facts, he may reach a different conclusion from what a jury might have done. In this case the plaintiffs may not have offered such evidence as would convince the learned judge below that Mrs. Davis was not capable of making the will in controversy, but the question is whether there was not sufficient evidence to require him to submit it to the jury, under the principle of law governing such cases, established by this court. The evidence shows that Mrs. Davis was married twice,--the first time to a Mr. Jenkins. The female plaintiffs are the surviving children of that marriage. Mr. Jenkins died in 1861, and his widow married Thomas D. Davis in 1862. Shortly before the death of Mr. Jenkins, the property accumulated by his wife was lost through some of his financial troubles. She was an industrious, hard-working woman, and it was not long before she commenced to recover from her losses, and to acquire more property. Mr. Davis was at the time of their marriage receiving a salary of $150 per month, and continued to do so for about 18 months, when he lost his place by reason of the establishment with which he was connected suspending work. He was out of his regular employment for about eight years, during which time his wife worked hard to support the family. She was assisted by those of her children of her first marriage who were still at home, and there is testimony tending to show that Mr. Davis did very little towards supporting the family or accumulating any property during that time. He died on April 25, 1890, and at the time of his death there was considerable property in his name, a part of which he left to his children by his former marriage, and the rest to his wife. She also received some twelve or fifteen thousand dollars from insurance on his life. She died on February 9, 1892, leaving about seventeen thousand dollars of personal (including leasehold) property, and six houses and lots in fee, situated in Canton, worth probably eight or ten thousand dollars, as stated by the judge below. How much of this property she received from her husband is not shown, but it is evident that a considerable part of it came through his will and insurance on his life. The record does not show what amount of property she had on August 13, 1890, the date of the execution of her will. She left to her three children (Davis' children) all of the above-mentioned property, excepting four pieces of leasehold property valued at $3,200, personal chattels valued at $908, and cash on hand amounting to $2,653.44. Her children by Mr. Jenkins are not mentioned in the will, but, as there was no residuary clause in it or other disposition made excepting as to those properties specifically devised to the three Davis children, the Jenkins children would be entitled to their shares in the residuum. The evidence shows conclusively that her relations with the Jenkins children were of the most pleasant character, and no good reason has been assigned why they were not mentioned in the will, excepting the contention by the appellees that it was because most of the property came from Mr. Davis, and hence she may have felt under obligations to leave it to his children. But the evidence does certainly tend to show that, whatever may have been the facts as to how the property was held when Mr. Davis died, his wife was entitled to the credit of being largely instrumental in acquiring it, and that she paid at least some of the life insurance premiums. If it be conceded, then, that most of the property stood in his name when he died, that fact of itself could not wholly account for the omission of the Jenkins children from their mother's will. Of course, it is not sufficient to avoid a will to show that a...
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