Crockett v. Dist. of Columbia, 12–CT–810.

• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: McLEESE
• Citation: Crockett v. Dist. of Columbia, 95 A.3d 601 (D.C. 2014)
• Decision Date: 24 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–CT–810.,12–CT–810.
• Parties: Michael Anthony CROCKETT, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.

95 A.3d 601

Michael Anthony CROCKETT, Appellant,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.

No. 12–CT–810.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued Jan. 23, 2014.

Decided July 24, 2014.

Sarah A. Stockwell for appellant.

John J. Woykovsky, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Rosalyn C. Groce, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the motion for summary affirmance and the supplemental briefs, for appellee.

Before GLICKMAN and McLEESE, Associate Judges, and RUIZ, Senior Judge.

McLEESE, Associate Judge:

Appellant Michael Crockett seeks reversal of his conviction for fleeing from a law-enforcement officer, arguing that he was prosecuted by the wrong governmental entity and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence at trial established the following. In August 2011, Metropolitan Police Department Officer Brian Hallahan was driving north on Kansas Avenue NW, in a marked police cruiser. Officer Hallahan saw Mr. Crockett make an illegal U-turn and continue north onto Kansas Avenue. Officer Hallahan veered into the oncoming-traffic lane in order to avoid a collision with Mr. Crockett. After Mr. Crockett sped past Officer Hallahan from the parking lane on the right, Officer Hallahan was driving directly behind Mr. Crockett on Kansas Avenue.

Officer Hallahan turned on his cruiser's emergency lights and sirens. Although Mr. Crockett saw the police lights and knew that the police wanted him to pull over, he did not stop immediately, instead speeding up slightly and then making a right turn, onto Webster Street NW. Mr. Crockett slowed down his car, bailed out, and fled—leaving the car running and the keys in the ignition. Mr. Crockett's car did not stop until its tires hit the curb. Officer Hallahan pursued Mr. Crockett on foot, eventually finding Mr. Crockett crouched behind a garbage can in a dead-end alley. Mr. Crockett fled again, but Officer Hallahan and another officer caught Mr. Crockett. Mr. Crockett was driving the car without a valid driver's license.

The Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia (“OAG”) charged Mr. Crockett with fleeing from a law-enforcement officer, in violation of D.C.Code § 50–2201.05b (b)(1) (2012 Repl.). The trial court found Mr. Crockett guilty in a bench trial, concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Crockett had knowingly refused to bring his car to an immediate stop and had attempted to elude Officer Hallahan. The trial court recognized that it is an affirmative defense to a charge of fleeing “if the defendant can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the failure to stop immediately was based upon a reasonable belief that the defendant's personal safety is at risk.” D.C.Code § 50–2201.05b (c). The trial court rejected that defense, explaining that there had been no evidence that Mr. Crockett had failed to stop based on a reasonable fear for his personal safety. Rather, the trial court found that Mr. Crockett refused to stop immediately because he wanted to get the car back to his mother, from whom he had borrowed it, and because he wanted to avoid getting in trouble for driving without a license.

II.

The District of Columbia Code expressly authorizes the OAG to prosecute fleeing charges. D.C.Code § 50–2201.05b (e). Nevertheless, the parties agree that the fleeing charge in this case should have been prosecuted by the United States Attorney'sOffice (“USAO”), not the OAG, because the District of Columbia Council lacked authority under the Home Rule Act, D.C.Code § 1–201.01 et seq. (2012 Repl.), to grant authority to the OAG to prosecute that offense. SeeD.C.Code § 23–101 (2012 Repl.) (governing respective authority of USAO and OAG to prosecute violations of D.C. criminal laws). See generally In re Crawley, 978 A.2d 608 (D.C.2009). Mr. Crockett argues that the OAG therefore lacked standing to prosecute this case. Mr. Crockett further argues that the judgment must be reversed, despite his failure to raise this issue in the trial court, because standing is a jurisdictional issue. Finally, Mr. Crockett contends that in any event reversal is required under the plain-error standard. We find no basis for reversal.

We have recently held that prosecution of a fleeing charge by the OAG rather than the USAO is a procedural rather than a jurisdictional defect. Pelote v. District of Columbia, 21 A.3d 599, 602 (D.C.2011) (per curiam) (prosecution of fleeing charge by OAG rather than USAO is “procedural” error that is “without effect upon the court's jurisdiction”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. In re Marshall, 467 A.2d 979, 980 (D.C.1983) (per curiam) (OAG's involvement in contempt proceedings, in violation of D.C.Code § 23–101, did not deprive court of subject-matter jurisdiction). Although Mr. Crockett argues that Pelote was incorrectly decided, even if that were true we would be bound by Pelote, at least in the absence of contrary authority from the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 10 A.3d 646, 658 n. 7 (D.C.2010) (“even if we were to disagree with our prior holdings ..., we are bound by those decisions”); Teoume–Lessane v. United States, 931 A.2d 478, 494 (D.C.2007) (“a panel cannot blindly follow a prior ruling in the face of clearly controlling doctrine later enunciated by the Supreme Court”) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

We acknowledge that the Supreme Court has treated as jurisdictional the question whether the petition for a writ of certiorari was filed by a proper representative of a party. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 706, 108 S.Ct. 1502, 99 L.Ed.2d 785 (1988) (dismissing writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction, because petition for writ was filed on behalf of United States by special prosecutor who was not authorized to represent United States in Supreme Court, and petition therefore was not filed by party, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012)). Providence Journal is distinguishable, however. The Superior Court has jurisdiction over “any criminal case under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia.” D.C.Code § 11–923(b)(1) (2012 Repl.). Thus, the Superior Court's jurisdiction is not explicitly tied to the identity of the party bringing the criminal action. In addition, this court has jurisdiction over this appeal under D.C.Code § 11–721(b) (2012 Repl.), because the notice of appeal was filed by Mr. Crockett, who indisputably is a proper party. More generally, Providence Journal was decided before the recent emphasis, in both the Supreme Court and this court, on greater precision in the use of the term “jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Gatewood v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 82 A.3d 41, 46–49 (D.C.2013). It is unclear whether Providence Journal establishes that the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari by a person who lacked statutory authority to file the petition is a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal even if the issue is not raised in a timely fashion. For these reasons, we are bound by the holding in Pelote notwithstanding the decisionin Providence Journal.¹

Mr. Crockett also argues that Pelote is factually distinguishable, because in that case the USAO filed the original charge, whereas in this case the OAG handled the entire prosecution. If the issue were one of standing, however, then the further conduct of the prosecution by the OAG in Pelote would seemingly have required dismissal even though the prosecution had been properly initiated by the USAO. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2661, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (“Most standing cases consider whether a plaintiff has satisfied the requirement when filing suit, but Article III demands that an ‘actual controversy’ persist throughout all stages of litigation.”). See generally Padou v. District of Columbia, 77 A.3d 383, 389 n. 6 (D.C.2013) (“Although Congress did not establish this court under Article III of the Constitution, we generally adhere to the case and controversy requirement of Article III as well as prudential principles of standing.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore do not agree that Pelote's jurisdictional holding can be distinguished on this basis. ²

Mr. Crockett further suggests that Pelote did not explicitly consider whether the OAG has standing to prosecute an offense that the OAG lacks statutory authority to prosecute. Thus, Mr. Crockett suggests, a division of this court would be free to reverse in this case on the ground that the OAG lacked standing. Assuming that we are free to consider the issue notwithstanding Pelote, we conclude that the OAG had standing.

The District of Columbia Council enacted the fleeing provision under which Mr. Crockett was prosecuted. Fleeing Law Enforcement Prohibition Amendment Act of 2004, D.C. Act 15–528, § 2(b), 51 D.C.Reg. 9600, 9600–01 (2004) (codified at D.C.Code § 50–2201.05b). The Mayor of the District of Columbia is responsible, among other things, for “the proper execution of all laws relating to the District ....” D.C.Code § 1–204.22 (2012 Repl.). See generally, e.g., Williams v. United States, 293 A.2d 484, 487 (D.C.1972) (noting that “the executive [has] responsibility for the enforcement of the criminal laws”). The Attorney General for the District of Columbia is responsible for “all law business of the ... District” and for “upholding the public interest.” D.C.Code § 1–301.81(a)(1) (2012 Repl.). The Attorney General is also authorized to “intervene in legal proceedings on behalf of this public interest.” Id. In our view, these provisions establish that the Attorney General has an interest, sufficient to confer standing, in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the District of Columbia. Cf., e.g., Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2010) (...