Crockett v. Mid-America Health Services

• Decision Date: 10 October 1989
• Docket Number: No. WD,MID-AMERICA,WD
• Citation: Crockett v. Mid-America Health Services, 780 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. App. 1989)
• Parties: 115 Lab.Cas. P 56,294, 4 IER Cases 1470 Greta E. CROCKETT, Appellant, v.HEALTH SERVICES, d/b/a Two Rivers Psychiatric Hospital, Inc., Respondent. 41942.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 656

780 S.W.2d 656

115 Lab.Cas. P 56,294, 4 IER Cases 1470

Greta E. CROCKETT, Appellant, v. MID-AMERICA HEALTH SERVICES, d/b/a Two Rivers Psychiatric Hospital, Inc., Respondent.

No. WD 41942.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Oct. 10, 1989.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court

Denied Nov. 28, 1989.

Bert S. Braud, Popham, Conway, Sweeny, Fremont, & Bundschu, P.C., Kansas City, for appellant.

E.J. Holland, Jr., Amy L. Peck, Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, Kansas City, for respondent.

Before NUGENT, C.J., and CLARK and FENNER, JJ.

CLARK, Judge.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered against plaintiff-appellant, Greta E. Crockett, on her petition for damages brought against respondent, the operator of a psychiatric hospital in Jackson County. The issue presented in the case is whether Crockett's petition pleaded a cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee under the public policy exception to the Missouri doctrine of employment at will.

Appellant contends in two points of error that the trial court was not entitled to award summary judgment because the petition stated a cause of action for a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and because the deposition given by appellant demonstrated the existence of material disputed facts. The public policy argument relies on a contention that appellant was discharged because of her refusal to commit a criminal act of forgery.

We first confront the problem of determining what relief was within the scope of the issues presented to the trial court. Although respondent's motion was entitled a motion for summary judgment, several requirements for summary judgment are lacking. Under Rule 74.04(c), summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Respondent's motion made no allegation that the material facts of the case were undisputed and the court's order made no finding to this effect. There were no answers to interrogatories or admissions on file and no affidavits were submitted. The parties do make reference to a deposition containing appellant's testimony, but the record on appeal does not show the deposition was ever filed. It is not a part of the case record here. No entry by the trial court indicates all or any part of the deposition testimony was taken into account in the decision to enter summary judgment.

On this record, it can only be concluded that if respondent was entitled to judgment, it is because the well pleaded facts of plaintiff's petition demonstrate no cause for relief. Thus, the judgment in the case would more appropriately be characterized as a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action rather than summary judgment. We review the petition in this light giving appellant the benefit of all facts her petition alleges.

Appellant's brief serves to explain the nature of her petition claim. She relies on the doctrine announced in Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.App.1985), described as a public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine. As an employee not engaged for a term of service under a contract, appellant asserts that she is entitled to damages for wrongful discharge because the reason for her dismissal was her refusal to commit an act constituting a violation of the public policy of the state embodied in a statute, particularly § 570.090.1(1), RSMo 1986, prohibiting forgery. The question is whether the petition states a cause of action under that theory of recovery.

Appellant alleges she was employed by respondent on September 2, 1986 as director of admissions and on March 9, 1987, she was promoted to director of nursing. She was terminated from her employment on February 25, 1988. During the previous week, respondent's facility had been inspected by investigators from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. Appellant was told that her dismissal was based, at least in part, on the JCAH review.

The only allegations of the petition touching at all on the public policy theory are as follows:

* * * In addition, the JCAH required the meeting of an infection control committee. Because the management of defendant hospital refused to appoint a medical doctor to head the committee, such a committee never met, all contrary to accreditation policies and standards. Additionally, other committees required by the JCAH, outside the responsibilities of plaintiff, also had not met. These committees had been told by management at defendant hospital to nevertheless prepare bogus minutes of the "meetings" for review by the JCAH.

The long-standing adherence of Missouri courts to the employment at will doctrine was restated by the Missouri Supreme Court in Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. banc 1985), and most recently by this court in Krasney v. Curators of University of Missouri, 765 S.W.2d 646, 651-52 (Mo.App.1989). As stated in Dake, the rule in Missouri is that an employer can discharge, for cause and without cause, an at will employee who does not otherwise fall within the protective reach of a contrary statutory provision, and still not be subject to liability for wrongful discharge. Unless there is a contrary statutory provision on which to...