Croft v. Croft

• Decision Date: 29 January 1914
• Citation: Croft v. Croft, 77 Wash. 620, 138 P. 6 (Wash. 1914)
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: CROFT v. CROFT.

138 P. 6

77 Wash. 620

CROFT v. CROFT.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 29, 1914

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County.

Action by Lizzie Croft against L. Floyd Croft. From an order declaring defendant guilty of contempt of court for failure to pay support money, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Gates & Emery, of Seattle, for appellant.

Tucker & Hyland, of Seattle, for respondent.

ELLIS J.

This is an appeal from an order of the superior court declaring the defendant in contempt and imposing an imprisonment in the county jail for 30 days, unless he sooner pay the sum of $986. The parties to this action were formerly husband and wife, and were divorced by decree of the superior court on June 17, 1908, which decree awarded to the plaintiff, the wife, the custody of the two minor children, then aged respectively seven and eight years. On September 2, 1908, the decree was modified, on petition of the plaintiff, so as to require the defendant to pay to her for the support of these children $20 each month. On October 4, 1909, $146 being due from the defendant under the decree so modified, the court on proceedings had upon the plaintiff's motion, ordered the defendant to pay this sum and $20 every 30 days thereafter, and, in default of such payments, that he be proceeded against as for contempt. In the latter part of September, 1908, the defendant left Seattle, remaining away except at rare intervals, until his arrest. On January 26 1910, the defendant having failed to make any further payments, an order of arrest was issued by the court. On April 23, 1913, he was arrested under this order, and was, at the same time, served with a summons and a petition, setting up the fact that neither the $146 nor any of the subsequent installments of the support money had been paid, and praying that the defendant be punished as for contempt. On being arrested, the defendant answered this petition and the court ordered that this answer stand as his answer to the order of arrest. Upon the hearing, the court announced that he would consider that the defendant had testified to all of the facts set forth in his answer. The defendant was cross-examined thereon, the plaintiff's testimony was taken and thereupon the court made the order from which this appeal is taken.

It is first contended that the court erred in refusing to consider the allegations of the answer to the effect that the appellant, prior to the divorce decree, had conveyed to his wife their home in Seattle, of the value of more than $5,000. We think the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider matters antedating the decree and antedating the order of September 2, 1908, modifying the decree, since all such matters were presumably considered by the court at the time of the entry of the original decree and of the order modifying the decree and directing the appellant to pay $20 a month for the support of his children.

It is next claimed that the court erred in that he failed to make any findings of fact or to recite in the order that the appellant has, or has had, during the term of the delinquency, financial ability to pay the sum required of him. Authorities from other jurisdictions, all of them relating to punishment for failure to pay alimony, are cited to the effect that formal findings of ability and contumacious refusal to pay are a prerequisite to punishment for contempt. It may be conceded that, where findings are requested, the failure of the court to make them would constitute reversible error, but in this case the appellant is in no position to raise the point, since, at the time of his hearing and commitment, he neither requested any findings, nor made any objection or took exception to the failure of the court to make findings. Dyer v. Dyer, 65 Wash. 535, 118 P. 634.

It is also urged that the appellant is now being punished for a violation of several distinct orders and for a failure to pay arrears of support money not due when the order of arrest of January 26, 1910, was made. In all matters relating to the custody and support of minor children contained in any decree of divorce, the jurisdiction of the trial court is a continuing one, so long as there are minor children to be provided for. Poland v. Poland, 63 Wash. 597, 116 P 2; Fickett v. Fickett, 39 Wash. 38, 80 P. 1134; Dyer v. Dyer, supra. The accumulation of arrears all relate back to the original order of September 2, 1908, modifying the decree so as to require the appellant to pay $20 a month for the support of his children. The order of arrest was made in aid of this decree so modified. The...