Croker v. Clegg

• Decision Date: 26 January 1938
• Docket Number: No. 241.,241.
• Citation: 197 A. 13,123 N.J.Eq. 332
• Parties: CROKER v. CLEGG et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

197 A. 13

123 N.J.Eq. 332

CROKER

v. CLEGG et al.

No. 241.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Jan. 26, 1938.

DONGES, Justice, and WELLS, Judge, dissenting.

Appeal from Court of Chancery.

Action by Emily Croker against Helen M. Clegg and others to set aside a gift of realty. From an adverse decree, the named defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Edward J. Inglesby, of Camden (Carl Kisselman, of Camden, of counsel), for appellant. C. Richard Allen, of Camden, for resppndent Emily Croker. Endicott & Endicott, of Atlantic City, for respondent John Thees.

HEHER, Justice.

The question at issue is the validity of a gift of a parcel of real estate in the city of Camden, whereon a dwelling house is erected, made by Frank A. Thees —three weeks before his death when he was eighty years of age and in failing health —to Helen M. Clegg, with whose parents he boarded at the monthly rate of $25. She also resided with her parents. Thees was a widower. His occupation for some years before his death was that of an industrial insurance solicitor and collector. He had three children who maintained their own homes. There was no proof of the value of the subject matter of the gift; it was free of encumbrances, and rented for $24 per month.

The conveyance stripped the donor of practically all his property, for he had but a short time before given all his securities —of the value of $2500 —to this donee's father; and the learned Vice Chancellor ruled that, while the evidence did not warrant a finding of undue influence, and the question of the existence of a confidential relation "is doubtful," the "circumstances" were such that the donor "should have had the benefit of independent advice." These circumstances were stated to be his age and ill health and the disposition of "practically all his remaining property." The conveyance was set aside; and the donee appeals.

The basic inquiry is whether a confidential relationship existed between the donor and donee, with dependency in the former. If it did, the applicancy of the doctrine of independent advice is beyond question. Peppier v. Roffe, 122 N.J.Eq. 510, 194 A. 548.

The proofs satisfy us that the relationship subsisted. It obtains where the parties occupy "relations, whether legal, natural or conventional in their origin, in which confidence is naturally inspired, or, in fact, reasonably exists" —where the parties "hold positions in which one is more or less dependent upon the other." Haydock v. Haydock's Ex'rs, 34 N.J.Eq. 570, 38 Am. Rep. 385; Hall v. Otterson, 52 N.J.Eq. 522, 28 A. 907, affirmed 53 N.J.Eq. 695, 35 A. 1130; Slack v. Rees, 66 N.J.Eq. 447, 59 A. 466, 69 L.R.A. 393; Siebold v. Zieboldt, 93 N.J.Eq. 327, 115 A. 577, affirmed 93 N.J.Eq. 500, 116 A. 926; Albert v. Haeberly, 68 N.J.Eq. 664, 61 A. 380, 111 Am.St.Rep. 652; Groff v. Stitzer, 75 N.J.Eq. 452, 72 A. 970, affirmed with modification not here pertinent 77 N.J.Eq. 260, 77 A. 46; Hunt v. Naylor, 84 N.J.Eq. 646, 95 A. 138; Dyer v. Smith, 112 N.J.Eq. 126, 164 A. 21; In re Fulper's Estate, 99 N.J.Eq. 293, 132 A. 834. More particularly, the test is whether the relations between the parties are "of such a character as to render it certain that they do not deal on terms of equality but that either on the one side from superior knowledge of the matter derived from a fiduciary relation, or from overmastering influence, or on the other from weakness, dependence, or trust justifiably reposed, unfair advantage * * * is rendered probable." Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91, 99, 31 Am.Rep. 428.

At the time of the making of the conveyance the donor was an old man on the verge of dissolution. He suffered from an organic disease requiring constant medical attention. He was estranged...