Cromeans v. Morgan Keegan & Co.
Decision Date | 01 December 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 2:12–CV–04269–NKL.,2:12–CV–04269–NKL. |
Parties | John W. CROMEANS, Jr., Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MORGAN KEEGAN & CO., INC., et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Andrew P. Campbell, Caroline Smith Gidiere, John C. Guin, Stephen D. Wadsworth, Campbell, Guin, Williams, Guy & Gidiere LLC, J. Timothy Francis, James L. North & Associates, Birmingham, AL, Richard E. McLeod, The McLeod Law Firm PC, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff.
Bernard Suter, Lisa Bertain, Elyse Whitehead, San Francisco, CA, Charles W. Hatfield, Jeremy A. Root, Stinson Leonard Street LLP, Dale C. Doerhoff, Heidi Doerhoff Vollet, Timothy W. Van Ronzelen, Cook, Vetter, Doerhoff & Landwehr, P.C., Jefferson City, MO, for Defendants.
Bruce Alan Cole, Capistrano Beach, CA, pro se.
The Court previously granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendant Armstrong Teasdale, LLP on Plaintiff John Cromeans' claims for legal malpractice and negligent misrepresentation. See [Docs. 93 and 170]. Cromeans filed a motion to vacate the order [Docs. 455 and 545] which the Court denied. Upon further consideration, the Court grants the motion to vacate, in part. It finds that summary judgment should be granted on the malpractice claims, but should not be granted on Cromeans' negligent misrepresentation claim.
In granting summary judgment to Armstrong Teasdale on the legal malpractice claim, the Court recognized that an attorney-client relationship must ordinarily exist before a plaintiff can recover for legal malpractice against an attorney. But this element of a legal malpractice claim may be satisfied if a non-client plaintiff can show that the attorney performed services specifically intended by a client to benefit the plaintiff. Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Mo. banc 1995). If specific intent is established, a six-factor balancing test is then used to determine, as a separate matter, the question of legal duty of attorneys to non-clients. Id. Because Cromeans' evidentiary submissions failed to show that Morgan Keegan specifically intended Armstrong Teasdale's services to benefit the bond purchasers, the Court granted summary judgment to Armstrong Teasdale on the legal malpractice claim.
In his motion to vacate, Cromeans argues that demonstrating the client's specific intent is not a necessary element of a legal malpractice claim when the attorney has actual knowledge that the clients' representations in offering documents are false or misleading, or when the attorney falsely states that he or she is not aware of any facts that contradict the offering statement. But Donahue contained no such exception and none of the cases cited by Cromeans1 involved malpractice claims. Because Cromeans has not produced evidence to show that Morgan Keegan intended to benefit the bond purchasers when it retained Armstrong Teasdale to prepare the offering statement, his claim for malpractice must fail.
Therefore, the Court denies Cromeans' motion to vacate the grant of summary judgment in favor of Armstrong Teasdale on the legal malpractice claim.
Justifiable reliance is a necessary element of all negligent misrepresentation claims. Ryann Spencer Grp., Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 275 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Mo.Ct.App.2008). In granting summary judgment to Armstrong Teasdale on Cromeans' negligent misrepresentation claim, the Court found that Cromeans could not prove reasonable reliance. Because Morgan Keegan did not hire Armstrong Teasdale to investigate the facts contained in the offering statement and Armstrong Teasdale disclaimed any responsibility for the accuracy of those facts, the Court concluded that justifiable reliance could not be shown. When making its decision, however, the Court overlooked evidence that Armstrong Teasdale made an affirmative misstatement of fact when it said “no facts have come to our attention which lead us to believe that the Official Statement contains” misrepresentations or omitted material facts. [Doc. 456, p. 5].
In his motion to vacate, Cromeans cites evidence that Armstrong Teasdale had a contract with the Missouri Department of Economic Development (DED) to assist DED in attracting Chinese businesses to Missouri. [Id., pp. 3–4; Doc. 492, pp. 4–5]. When DED wanted a background check on a Chinese company, Mamtek, it contacted Armstrong Teasdale's agent, Mr. Li, to obtain whatever information he could about Mamtek. Mr. Li is a non-lawyer based in China, who was retained by Armstrong Teasdale to fulfill Armstrong Teasdale's contract with DED. Mr. Li made a phone call and did an internet search. In April 2010, Mr. Li reported to DED and to Maria Desloge, who was Armstrong Teasdale's Associate Director of the China Trade and Investment Office, that Mamtek's plant in Fujian Province, China, never started to manufacture, and that it could not because it did not meet the “zoning” requirements for that location. The offering statement, however, stated that the plant was operational.
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 552, Cromeans argues that Armstrong Teasdale is liable to the bond purchasers because Armstrong Teasdale knew that some statements in the offering statement were false. Section § 552 provides, in relevant part:
The national trend is to recognize a cause of action by non-clients for negligent misrepresentations by professionals, including lawyers, if the requirements of § 552 of the Restatement are satisfied. See Rest. (Second) of Torts, § 552, Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others (and cases cited therein); and McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792–93 (Tex.1999) ( ). Cf. Ronald E. Mallen and Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice (2014 ed.), § 7.14, Recurring Issues—Negligent Misrepresentation () ; and Paul C. Peterson and Ryan Myers, Will the Real Intended Third–Party Beneficiary Please Stand Up?, 80 Def. Couns. J. 11, 19 (Jan.2013) ( ).
See also, Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472, 655 A.2d 1354, 1361–62 (1995) ( ); Banco Popular North America v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 876 A.2d 253, 267–68 (2005) ( ); Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Central Bank Denver, N.A., 892 P.2d 230, 236–37 (Colo.1995) ( ); Lappostato v. Terk, 143 Conn.App. 384, 71 A.3d 552, 567–68 (2013) ( ); DeLuca v. Jordan, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 126, 781 N.E.2d 849, 856–58 (2003) ( ); J.M.K. 6, Inc. v. Gregg & Gregg, P.C., 192 S.W.3d 189, 202–4 (Tex.App.2006) ( ); Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d...
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