Cromwell v. Williams
| Decision Date | 18 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2020-CA-00742-COA |
| Citation | 333 So.3d 877 |
| Parties | William Jody CROMWELL, Appellant v. Nancy WILLIAMS and Woodrow Brand III, Appellees |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JIM WAIDE, Tupelo
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: MARK NOLAN HALBERT, WILLIAM MICHAEL BEASLEY JR., Tupelo
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND EMFINGER, JJ.
LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. William Cromwell, a certified registered nurse anesthetist (CRNA), was employed as an independent contractor with Monroe Regional Hospital (Monroe Regional) when his contract was terminated on January 5, 2018. Cromwell subsequently sued Dr. Woodrow Brand III, the chief surgeon, and Nancy Williams, the operating-room manager, for tortious interference with his contract. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted the Defendants’ motion. Cromwell appealed. After review, we find that Dr. Brand and Williams are immune from tort liability because they acted in the course and scope of their employment when relaying information to their hospital administrator, and there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether either party was acting in bad faith. See Shaw v. Burchfield , 481 So. 2d 247, 255 (Miss. 1985). Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
¶2. Cromwell worked as a CRNA for over forty years in various hospitals throughout northern Mississippi. Prior to working at Monroe Regional in Aberdeen, Mississippi, Cromwell had worked with both Defendants at Gilmore Hospital in Amory, Mississippi, for over fifteen years. In 2014, a company named Pioneer Health Services (Pioneer) hired Cromwell as an independent contractor. After Cromwell signed his contract, he learned Pioneer had also hired Williams, a former surgical nurse, to manage the hospital's operating room. Pioneer hired Dr. Brand as the chief of surgery. Dr. Brand performed most of the surgeries and all the complex surgeries at the hospital. In May 2015, Chris Chandler became the hospital administrator. As the hospital administrator, Chandler supervised Cromwell, Williams, and Dr. Brand. Pioneer was purchased by Boe Vida in 2017, and the hospital was later renamed Monroe Regional. Chandler, as the hospital administrator; Dr. Brand, as the chief surgeon; Williams, as the operating-room manager; and Cromwell, as a nurse anesthetist, all continued to work at the hospital without signing new contracts.
¶3. After Chandler became the hospital administrator, Dr. Brand, Williams, and other members of the surgery team raised several concerns regarding Cromwell's ability to provide quality anesthesia
services. The four primary complaints were (1) insufficient anesthesia, which caused some patients to begin to move during surgery; (2) difficult intubations; (3) hearing issues; and (4) mobility issues. Chandler investigated those complaints and concluded that Cromwell's quality in anesthesia was "deteriorating." As a result, Chandler informed Dr. Brand that he planned to consult the president and owner of the hospital, Dr. Kirnjot Singh. Chandler recommended to Dr. Singh that the hospital exercise its ninety-day notice-of-termination-without-cause provision in Cromwell's contract with Pioneer. Dr. Singh ultimately authorized Chandler's recommended action. Chandler met with Cromwell on January 5, 2018, and gave him his termination letter with his effective date of termination being April 6, 2018. During that meeting, Chandler explained to Cromwell that the termination decision was between him, Dr. Brand, and Dr. Singh.
¶4. On August 15, 2018, Cromwell filed suit against Dr. Brand and Williams for tortious interference with his contract. Specifically, he claimed that both Defendants "entertained personal animosity and hostility towards [him]" and that his contract would not have been terminated if not for the "influence" of the Defendants. The Defendants subsequently filed an answer and affirmative defenses and argued that Cromwell's claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). Both parties conducted discovery and deposed Cromwell, Chandler, Dr. Brand, Williams, Dr. Singh, and several other employees who had worked at Monroe Regional with Cromwell.
¶5. On January 22, 2020, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In essence, the Defendants argued that Cromwell's claim failed as a matter of law because he was unable to show that Dr. Brand or Williams acted outside the course and scope of their employment, acted with malice, or that their actions proximately caused his termination. In regard to Williams, the Defendants also argued there was no evidence that Williams caused the hospital to terminate Cromwell's contract. The Defendants highlighted the fact that Williams never recommended Cromwell's termination and that she had no knowledge of his termination until afterward. On February 27, 2020, Cromwell filed a response in opposition to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In relevant part, Cromwell argued that his claim should survive summary judgment because there was "overwhelming evidence" that both Dr. Brand and Williams acted in bad faith in reporting concerns to Chandler. To support his argument, Cromwell provided depositions of other co-workers who testified they had never had any issues with Cromwell's performance.
¶6. On June 16, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and heard arguments from counsel. Following the hearing, the court entered an order granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Cromwell appeals from that final judgment.1
¶7. This Court reviews an appeal from summary judgment de novo. Venture Inc. v. Harris , 307 So. 3d 427, 431 (¶14) (Miss. 2020) (quoting Double Quick Inc. v. Moore , 73 So. 3d 1162, 1165 (¶7) (Miss. 2011) ). Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." " ‘The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made[,]’ " and "[t]he moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material facts exists, [giving] ... the non-moving party ... the benefit of the doubt concerning the existence of a material fact." Duckworth v. Warren , 10 So. 3d 433, 436-37 (¶9) (Miss. 2009) (quoting One S. Inc. v. Hollowell , 963 So. 2d 1156, 1160 (¶6) (Miss. 2007) ). Even so, "[t]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties ... will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; ‘[t]he dispute must be genuine, and the facts must be material.’ " Smith v. City of Southaven , 308 So. 3d 456, 461 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Williams v. Bennett , 921 So. 2d 1269, 1272 (¶10) (Miss. 2006) ). "To be exact, the content of summary-judgment evidence must be admissible at trial although the evidence may be in a form, such as an affidavit, that would not be admissible." Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Jackson , 179 So. 3d 1037, 1043 (¶14) (Miss. 2015) ; accord 1 Jeffrey Jackson et al., Mississippi Civil Procedure § 16:22 (updated May 2021). "Thus, hearsay statements that would not be admissible at trial are incompetent to support or oppose summary judgment." Id . (citing Harris ex rel. Harris v. Pontotoc Cnty. Sch. Dist ., 635 F.3d 685, 692 (5th Cir. 2011) ).
¶8. Cromwell claims there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Brand and Williams are liable for tortious interference with his contract. Tortious interference with contract is the "malicious or intentional interference with a valid and enforceable contract by a third party which causes one contracting party not to be able to perform and the failure to perform results in a monetary loss for the other contracting party." Courtney v. Glenn , 782 So. 2d 162, 164-65 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Cenac v. Murry , 609 So. 2d 1257, 1268 (Miss. 1992) ). To establish a claim for tortious interference, a plaintiff must show "[(1)] that the [defendant's] acts were intentional and willful; [(2)] that they were calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their lawful business; [(3)] that they were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendant (which constitutes malice); and [(4)] that actual damage and loss resulted."
Cenac , 609 So. 2d at 1268-69 ; see also Irby v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Meridian , 239 Miss. 64, 67, 121 So. 2d 118, 119 (1960). Further, the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that the element of proximate cause is an "additional element impliedly required by Mississippi courts." Scruggs, Millette, Bozeman & Dent P.A. v. Merkel & Cocke P.A. , 910 So. 2d 1093, 1099 (¶26) (Miss. 2005).
¶9. In this case, Cromwell signed a contract with Pioneer, which was later bought by Boe Vida and renamed Monroe Regional. Cromwell never signed a new contract with Monroe Regional. His original contract specified that it was an at-will employment relationship. The supreme court has recognized the viability of a claim for tortious interference with contracts even when the contractual relationship is an at-will employment. See Levens v. Campbell , 733 So. 2d 753, 760 (¶27) (Miss. 1999).
¶10. Dr. Brand and Williams argue that because they were employees and agents of Monroe Regional, they could not be considered "third parties" and interfere with a contract between their employer and Cromwell. The State takes a similar position in its amicus brief. In 1985, Mississippi added the bad-faith component to the agency...
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