Cronan v. Cronan

Decision Date05 December 2022
Docket NumberC. A. PC-2022-01255
PartiesLAURIE A. CRONAN, Plaintiff, v. JOHN J. CRONAN, Defendant.
CourtSuperior Court of Rhode Island

For Plaintiff: John R. Mahoney, Esq.

For Defendant: Stacey P. Nakasian, Esq.

William J. Lynch, Esq.

DECISION

TAFT-CARTER, J.

Before the Court for decision is Laurie A. Cronan's (hereinafter Plaintiff) Motion to Disqualify Attorney William J. Lynch his law firm WJ Lynch Law, Attorney Stacey P. Nakasian, and her law firm Duffy &Sweeney, Ltd. from representing her former husband, John J. Cronan (hereinafter Defendant) in the instant lawsuit. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-214 and Rules 1.9, 1.10, and 1.18 of the Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct.

I Facts and Travel

In the instant motion, Plaintiff seeks to disqualify Defendant's counsel-Attorney Lynch and Attorney Nakasian-alleging that each attorney has a conflict of interest. The Plaintiff alleges that the attorneys' prior interactions with her constitute an attorney-client relationship requiring mandatory disqualification. Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify is based on three alleged interactions involving Attorney Lynch and one involving Attorney Nakasian. These instances are discussed in greater detail in the Analysis section, infra. The general facts and travel of this case are as follows.

The Defendant became a client of Attorney Lynch in the mid-1990s, when he represented the Defendant in the context of a divorce from his first wife. (Hr'g Tr. (Sept. 22 Tr.) 6:13-15, Sept. 22, 2022.) Attorney Lynch did not represent Defendant again until 2017, when he represented him in a petition to terminate the alimony payments. Id. at 7:2-13. In the interceding years, Defendant married Plaintiff on July 4, 2006, and, until 2017, the couple was happily married. (Hr'g Tr. (Sept. 13 Tr.) 12:6-22, Sept. 13, 2022.)

In late 2017, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant began to withdraw from the relationship and became verbally abusive toward the Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶¶ 4-5.) She further alleges that this verbal abuse escalated into physical abuse in 2019. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. As a result, Plaintiff asked Defendant for a divorce in July 2019. (Sept. 13 Tr. 38:14-15.)

The parties attempted to negotiate a property settlement agreement in an effort to avoid the involvement of attorneys and to save money in the divorce. Id. at 38:18-23. They eventually agreed that in return for Plaintiff's discretion regarding the reasons for the divorce, the couple would divide their assets equally. Id. at 39:9-40:12. Defendant suggested that Attorney Lynch prepare the property settlement agreement on their behalf. Id. at 40:11-12. Shortly thereafter, the parties attempted reconciliation. Id. at 40:21-24.

The attempted reconciliation failed, and, in February 2020, the Plaintiff asked Defendant for a divorce. Id. at 40:25-41:11. The parties again attempted to reach a property settlement in order to avoid costs and save time. Id. at 42:1-7. To that end, Defendant retained Attorney Lynch to reduce their agreement to writing and file the divorce pleading. Id. at 42:24-43:16. This time the parties were unable to reach an agreement, and, on July 7, 2020, Defendant, represented by Attorney Lynch, filed a complaint for divorce. See Sept. 22 Tr. 53:12-23; 62:4-5.

From that point, the divorce quickly became contested. (Sept. 13 Tr. 67:2-7.) Plaintiff retained Attorney Timothy Conlon, see id. at 28:9-10, who, by letter, requested that Attorney Lynch withdraw from the case due to his alleged conflict of interest. See Sept. 22 Tr. 70:9-16. Attorney Lynch declined to withdraw. Id. at 70:13. A motion to disqualify Attorney Lynch was not filed. Id. at 70:19-23. Nevertheless, in November 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Rhode Island Supreme Court Disciplinary Board (Disciplinary Board), pro se, requesting that Attorney Lynch be disqualified from representing Defendant in the parties' divorce proceeding. See Def.'s Mem. Ex. A; Sept. 22 Tr. 72:2-11. Attorney Lynch filed an answer to her complaint denying he represented Plaintiff. See generally Pl.'s Ex. 12. While this disciplinary complaint was pending in the spring of 2021, Plaintiff obtained new counsel, Attorney Evan Kirshenbaum. (Sept. 13 Tr. 28:17-19.) On August 11, 2021, the screening panel of the Disciplinary Board voted to dismiss the ethics complaint. (Def.'s Mem. Ex. H.) Following the dismissal, Plaintiff again filed a complaint with the Disciplinary Board. (Def.'s Mem. Ex. C; Sept. 22 Tr. 72:2-11.) This complaint was dismissed on January 14, 2022. (Def.'s Mem. Ex. G.)

The divorce eventually culminated in a trial that spanned several days. (Sept. 13 Tr. 67:1215.) During the trial, Plaintiff testified extensively regarding details of Defendant's alleged abuse. See Cronan v. Cronan, No. PC-2020-2673, May 3, 2022, Ballirano, Mag. She further testified that she disclosed the alleged abuse to at least three journalists. See id. On May 3, 2022, General Magistrate Ballirano issued a decision in the divorce. See id. Plaintiff is currently appealing that decision. (Sept. 13 Tr. 12:15-17.)

In January 2022, before the parties' divorce was finalized, Plaintiff contacted Attorney Nakasian seeking to retain her to instigate legal action against Defendant, her former financial advisors, and Attorney Lynch for fraud. See Pl.'s Ex. 13. During their initial phone call on January 20, 2022, Attorney Nakasian discovered a conflict of interest preventing her from representing Plaintiff, and all communication ended. (Hr'g Tr. (Sept. 14 Tr.) 14:5-11; 15:2-3, Sept. 14, 2022.)

On March 3, 2022, Plaintiff initiated the instant action against Defendant alleging assault, battery, and false imprisonment based on the abuse that occurred in their marital home between 2019 and 2020. See Compl. ¶¶ 8-16. In the spring of 2022, Attorney Lynch and Attorney Nakasian entered their appearances on behalf of Defendant in the instant action. See Docket. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved to disqualify both attorneys. See generally Pl.'s Mem. The Court subsequently held an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify that spanned four days. The Court now renders its decision.

II Standard of Review

There is no express standard of review in Rhode Island for a motion to disqualify an attorney. The proponent, however, has a high burden to overcome. In re Yashar, 713 A.2d 787, 790 (R.I. 1998). Furthermore, the appearance of impropriety alone is "too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order except in the rarest of cases." Olivier v. Town of Cumberland, 540 A.2d 23, 27 (R.I. 1988) (internal quotation omitted). When considering the disqualification of counsel, courts must balance a party's right to choose its counsel against the need to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Buonanno v. Village at Waterman Lake L.P., No. PC-2006-5797, 2010 WL 2024916, at *6 (R.I. Super. May 17, 2010). Furthermore, motions to disqualify are viewed with disfavor. Jacobs v. Eastern Wire Products Co., No. PB-2003-1402, 2003 WL 21297120, at *2 (R.I. Super. May 7, 2003). In analyzing a motion to disqualify, courts begin by determining whether counsel has violated a rule of professional conduct. See, e.g., Audette v. WD & Associates, Inc., No. PC-2021-03737, 2021 WL 5492866, at *3 (R.I. Super. Oct. 29, 2021); Quinn v. Yip, No. KC-2015-0272, 2018 WL 3613145, at *3 (R.I. Super. July 20, 2018).

III Analysis

Plaintiff is seeking to disqualify Attorneys Lynch and Nakasian based on their alleged violations of Rules 1.9 and 1.18 of the Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct. She is also seeking to disqualify their respective law firms based on alleged violations of Rule 1.10 of the Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct.

A Rule 1.9: Duties to Former Clients

Plaintiff argues that the continued representation of Defendant in this action by Attorney Lynch and Attorney Nakasian violates Rule 1.9. Rule 1.9 states in pertinent part:

"A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing." Sup. Ct. R Prof. Conduct 1.9(a).

To establish a violation of Rule 1.9, Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she was a former client; (2) the current action is substantially related to the prior representation; and (3) Defendant's interests in this matter are materially adverse to Plaintiff's interests. See Sup. Ct R. Prof. Conduct 1.9; Audette, 2021 WL 5492866, at *3. A former client is one who formed an attorney-client relationship with the attorney against whom they are asserting a conflict. Ageloff v. Noranda, Inc., 936 F.Supp. 72, 75 (D.R.I. 1996). The Court therefore must first examine whether the interactions between Plaintiff and Attorney Lynch and Attorney Nakasian, respectively, were sufficient to establish an attorney-client relationship.

An attorney-client relationship is contractual in nature. Church v. McBurney, 513 A.2d 22, 24 (R.I. 1986). Consequently, the relationship generally arises from an agreement between the parties, but where no express agreement is made, it may be implied by the parties' conduct. DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body, Inc., 755 A.2d 757, 766 (R.I. 2000). The existence of such a relationship is a "particularly fact-driven inquiry." Credit Union Central Falls v. Groff, 966 A.2d 1262, 1270 (R.I. 2009).

Here because there is no express agreement between Attorney Lynch and Plaintiff or Attorney Nakasian and Plaintiff, the Court must analyze whether an attorney-client relationship may be implied. An attorney-client relationship may be...

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