Crone v. Gill

• Decision Date: 24 August 1999
• Docket Number: SC 16007
• Citation: 250 Conn. 476
• Parties: LEONARD M. CRONE ET AL. v. CHARLES GILL ET AL.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

250 Conn. 476

LEONARD M. CRONE ET AL. v. CHARLES GILL ET AL.

SC 16007

Connecticut Supreme Court

Argued April 27, 1999

August 24, 1999

Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and McDonald, Js.

Leonard M. Crone, the named plaintiff in error.

Carolyn K. Querijero, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the named defendant in error.

Eileen M. Geel, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was John A. Connelly, state's attorney, for the defendant in error Eve Lenczewski.

Opinion

PALMER, J. This case is before us on a writ of error brought by the named plaintiff in error, Leonard M. Crone (plaintiff), an attorney, who seeks reversal of an order of the trial court disqualifying him from any further representation of his client, the plaintiff in error, Alvin Lopes, in Lopes' pending criminal case. We conclude that the plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the disqualification order and, accordingly, we dismiss the writ of error.¹

The relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed. In 1993, the plaintiff instituted a civil action on behalf of Dana Crim in Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury (Waterbury Superior Court). The plaintiff represented Crim through the completion of the trial of that matter in November, 1995.

Subsequently, in an unrelated criminal case, Lopes was charged with the May 11, 1997 assault and stabbing of Crim. The plaintiff thereafter filed an appearance on behalf of Lopes in that criminal case, which was pending in Waterbury Superior Court.

On June 12, 1998, assistant state's attorney Eva Lenczewski moved to disqualify the plaintiff from representing Lopes in light of the plaintiff's prior representation of Crim. The named defendant in error, Judge Charles Gill (trial court), held a hearing at which he canvassed both Crim and Lopes. Lopes expressed his desire to have the plaintiff continue as his attorney despite the plaintiff's prior representation of Crim. Crim, however, expressed discomfort at having his former attorney represent Lopes, and refused to waive the plaintiff's duty of confidentiality. In recognition of a serious potential for a conflict of interest, the trial court, on June 16, 1998, issued an order disqualifying the plaintiff from representing Lopes in the pending criminal matter.

Seeking a reversal of the trial court's order, the plaintiff brought this writ of error,² naming both Judge Gill and Lenczewski as defendants in error.³ Both defendants filed motions to dismiss⁴ the writ of error for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The dispositive question, as formulated by this court and briefed by the parties, is: "Does [the plaintiff] lack standing to contest the order disqualifying him, or does an attorney have a right to represent a particular client that gives him standing to file a writ of error seeking review of an order disqualifying him from such representation?"⁵ We conclude that the plaintiff lacks standing to contest the disqualification order.

The plaintiff contends that he has standing to challenge the trial court's disqualification order because he has suffered both a loss of income and harm to his reputation. The plaintiff contends that, because the trial court's disqualification order impaired his protected right to engage in the practice of law, he is entitled to appellate review of that order. The defendants concede that an attorney has a generalized "interest" in practicing law, and that such an interest vests an attorney with certain due process protections. The defendants contend, however, that an attorney's interest in practicing law does not include the right to represent a particular client or to hold a particular position. The defendants caution that, in order to ensure that an attorney's personal interest in challenging a disqualification order does not trump the client's best interests, the right to appeal from a disqualification order must vest in the client alone. We agree with the defendants that an attorney has no cognizable right to represent a particular client and, therefore, lacks standing to challenge a disqualification order.

"Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stamford Hospital v. Vega, 236 Conn. 646, 657, 674 A.2d 821 (1996). "Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved." Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 235 Conn. 572, 579, 668 A.2d 688 (1995). The fundamental test for establishing classical aggrievement is well settled: "[F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Med-Trans of Connecticut, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 242 Conn. 152, 158-59, 699 A.2d 142 (1997); accord Connecticut State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn. 295, 299-300, 524 A.2d 636 (1987). Second, the "party claiming aggrievement also must demonstrate that its asserted interest has been specially and injuriously affected in a way that is cognizable by law." United Cable Television Services Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 235 Conn. 334, 343, 663 A.2d 1011 (1995).

The plaintiff maintains that he has satisfied the first prong of the aggrievement test because he has a specific personal and legal interest in his continued representation of Lopes. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that he has a financial interest in lost fee income and an interest in his reputation that allegedly has been damaged by the trial court's disqualification order. The plaintiff has offered no specific proof, however, as to how, or to what extent, his reputational or pecuniary interests have been affected by the disqualification order. "Allegations and proof of mere generalizations and fears are not enough to establish aggrievement." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Water Pollution Control Authority v. Keeney, 234 Conn. 488, 496, 662 A.2d 124 (1995). Moreover, even if the plaintiff's allegations of harm had been more specific, we have doubts about whether the injury that he allegedly has suffered as a result of his disqualification would be sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the aggrievement test.⁶ We need not decide whether these alleged injuries satisfy the first prong of the aggrievement test, however, because we conclude that they do not meet the second prong.

The plaintiff asserts that he has satisfied the second prong of the aggrievement test because his alleged reputational and financial interests are protected under his general right to engage in the practice of law. We disagree. The plaintiff cites no authority, and we have found none, for extending the general right to practice law to include the right to represent a particular client in a particular case or to hold a particular job. In fact, the relevant precedent is to the contrary. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-96, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230 (1961) (denial of opportunity to work at one place "most assuredly" does not implicate "right to follow a chosen trade or profession"); Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 131-32 (7th Cir. 1987) (statute precluding attorneys from participating in one aspect of practice of law does not limit any right attorneys may have to earn livelihood and practice their profession); cf. Johnson v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 248 Conn. 87, 106-107, 726 A.2d 1154 (1999) (suggesting that investigation and administrative review of attorney's alleged professional misconduct, although potentially harmful, did not constitute denial of attorney's right to practice law); Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, 207 Conn. 346, 372-73, 542 A.2d 672 (1988) (same for investigation and review of alleged professional misconduct by physician).

The defendants argue that we should follow the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 105 S. Ct. 2757, 86 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1985), in which that court concluded that the right to contest a disqualification order should rest solely with the client, and not with the disqualified attorney. See id., 435. In Richardson-Merrell Inc., the plaintiff challenged an order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia disqualifying her attorneys for misconduct. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the District Court's disqualification order; Koller ex rel. Koller v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1984); relying in part on the attorneys' "interest . . . in correcting what they [claimed was] an erroneous finding of misconduct." Id., 1053. In thereafter reversing the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court concluded that an order disqualifying an attorney is not subject to immediate appeal under the "collateral order" exception to the federal final judgment rule.⁷ Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, supra, 472 U.S. 440. In reaching its conclusion, the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the Court of Appeals' emphasis on the disqualified attorneys' "personal desire for vindication as an independent ground for interlocutory appeal." Id., 434-35. The court then went on to say that: "An attorney who is disqualified for misconduct may well have a personal interest in pursuing an immediate appeal, an interest which need not coincide with the interests of the client. As a matter of professional ethics, however, the decision to appeal should turn entirely on the client's interest." (Emphasis added.) Id., 435.

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District...