Cronemillar v. Duluth-Superior Milling Co.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1908
• Citation: 114 N.W. 432,134 Wis. 248
• Parties: CRONEMILLAR v. DULUTH-SUPERIOR MILLING CO.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

134 Wis. 248

114 N.W. 432

CRONEMILLAR

v.DULUTH-SUPERIOR MILLING CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. 8, 1908.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Douglas County; A. J. Vinje, Judge.

Action by Fred Cronemillar against the Duluth-Superior Milling Company. From a judgment of nonsuit in the circuit court on appeal from a judgment in justice court, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

This is an action to recover $75 as damages for breach of a contract of employment. It was commenced in justice court, where the plaintiff recovered a judgment, from which defendant appealed, and the action was tried de novo in circuit court, in which court a nonsuit was granted at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. The plaintiff in 1906 was a stationary engineer, and the defendant was a foreign corporation operating a mill at Superior, of which one Scott was chief engineer, with authority to employ assistants. Early in April, 1906, Scott made an oral arrangement with Cronemillar that he, Cronemillar, was to go to work as assistant engineer at the mill on the 9th day of said month. It appears that Cronemillar had previously worked in the same capacity at the mill for three years and had quit September 18, 1905. When plaintiff reported for work on the morning of the 9th, Scott, under instructions from his superior officer, refused to allow him to go to work, and he was without employment for some six weeks. The substantial controversy of fact between the parties was whether the plaintiff was employed for an entire month, or whether his contract was indefinite as to time, so that he could quit or be discharged at any time. This question depends entirely on the proper construction of the testimony of Scott and the plaintiff, both of whom detailed the conversation constituting the contract. It is undisputed that Cronemillar's wages during his previous employment were at the rate of $75 per month. Scott testified that it was said between them that plaintiff was to go to work as assistant engineer on the 9th, and that he was to have the same wages and under the same conditions that he was there before, and nothing was said about how long he was to work; that he understood that all men were hired at the mill for indefinite periods, and that he also understood that the plaintiff's previous employment was for an indefinite period at the rate of $75 a month, and that he might quit or be discharged at any time, and that he did, in fact, quit in the middle of the month and got his pay; that he understood, further, that his re-employment was on the same conditions as before. Cronemillar on his direct examination testified that Scott told him he was to come down and go to work Monday morning at $75 a month, and he said all right, and nothing was said as to how long he was to work. On cross-examination he testified, however, that he heard the testimony of Scott as to the conversation, and that it was true; that, when he previously worked, he was hired for an indefinite time, and had the right to quit whenever he was dissatisfied, and the mill company had the right to discharge him whenever it was dissatisfied, and that he actually quit in the middle of the month and got his pay; that, as he understood it, he supposed that under the new hiring Scott had the privilege of discharging him at any time; that he supposed he had the right to quit at any time if he had reasons, but that if he had a reason in his mind that would be sufficient without disclosing it to the company if it did not ask, and the company had the same privilege to discharge for reasons.Grace & Hudnall, for appellant.

C. H. Crownhart, for respondent.

WINSLOW, C. J. (after stating the facts as above).

The appellant rightly claims that, where wages are payable by the month, such circumstance is evidence of a hiring for that period which will be sufficient, in the absence of any evidence impairing its weight, to sustain a finding that there was a hiring for that period. Kellogg v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 94 Wis. 554, 69 N. W. 362. The difficulty in the present case is that the plaintiff, after testifying that he was hired at $75 a month, freely admitted that Scott's testimony was true, to the effect that he was employed upon the same conditions as upon his previous...