Cronin v. City of Hazel Park

• Decision Date: 06 February 1979
• Docket Number: Docket No. 77-2362
• Citation: 88 Mich.App. 488,276 N.W.2d 922
• Parties: Mary K. CRONIN and James M. Cronin, her husband, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CITY OF HAZEL PARK, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 922

276 N.W.2d 922

88 Mich.App. 488

Mary K. CRONIN and James M. Cronin, her husband, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CITY OF HAZEL PARK, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 77-2362.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Feb. 6, 1979.

Released for Publication March 29, 1979.

Pianin, Graber & Paull by Michael P. Pianin and Samuel A. Graber, Southfield, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Martin J. Beres by Paul Abbo, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before DANHOF, C. J., and BASHARA and CYNAR, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Coplaintiff Mary Cronin was injured while participating in a roller skating activity conducted by the defendant's recreation department at a community center building in Hazel Park. The injury allegedly occurred when another skater collided with Mrs. Cronin. Plaintiffs claim that negligent supervision of the event caused that collision and resultant injury. By motion for accelerated judgment, under GCR 1963, 116.1, defendant claimed governmental immunity. Upon grant of that motion the trial court dismissed the suit. Plaintiffs appeal as of right.

Since the common law doctrine of governmental immunity has been abrogated in this state, Pittman v. City of Taylor, 398 Mich. 41, 247 N.W.2d 512 (1976), defendant's claim is controlled by the governmental immunity act of 1964, M.C.L. §§ 691.1401-691.1415; M.S.A. §§ 3.996(101)-3.996(115). Thomas v. Department of State Highways, 398 Mich. 1, 247 N.W.2d 530 (1976).

The basic provision of the governmental immunity act is section 7. It provides that "all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function". M.C.L. § 691.1407; M.S.A. § 3.996(107).

Until the most recent Supreme Court decisions on the topic the term "governmental function" has been defined by reference to the common law as it stood at the time of the statute's enactment. Thomas v. Department of State Highways, supra. In Parker v. Highland Park, 404 Mich. 183, 273 N.W.2d 413 (1978), the Court changed its approach. Four Justices, Fitzgerald, Kavanagh, Levin and Moody, agreed that the term "governmental function" was subject to judicial refinement.

Exercising that newly pronounced power of refinement, Justices Fitzgerald, Kavanagh, Levin and Moody seem to agree that the basic guideline for determining whether a particular function is governmental is whether it is "of essence to governing". There is a three to one split among those four justices, however, as to the scope of governmental essence.

Thus, in Parker all four agreed that the day-to-day operation of a general hospital is not governmental. Whereas, in Perry v. Kalamazoo State Hospital, 404 Mich. 205, 273 N.W.2d 421 (1978), they disagreed whether the operation of a mental hospital is governmental. Justice Moody found that it is governmental. Justices Fitzgerald, Kavanagh and Levin found it to be nongovernmental.

As described by Justice Moody, the basic line of distinction between his approach and that of Justices Fitzgerald, Kavanagh and Levin is that he believes some operational activities of government and some activities which have common analogies in the private sector may be deemed essential to governing. Parker v. City of Highland Park, 404 Mich. 183, 200, 273 N.W.2d 413. The latter three justices apparently would hold that all such activity is nongovernmental. See Thomas v. Department of State Highways, supra, 398 Mich. pp. 21-25, 247 N.W.2d 530.

In determining that the operation of a general hospital is nongovernmental, Justice Moody found five factors to be relevant. First, the number of private general hospitals is far greater than the number of governmental hospitals in this state. Second, the fiscal involvement of the state in the operation of such hospitals is significantly displaced by private payment. Third, government has little direct responsibility for placing patients in public general hospitals. Fourth, the day-to-day care afforded to the substantial majority of patients in general hospitals is not of a uniquely governmental character or precipitated by governmental mandate. Fifth, holding cities liable for negligent...