Cronin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 57991,57991
• Citation: 313 N.E.2d 245,19 Ill.App.3d 1073
• Parties: James J. CRONIN, an Administrator of the Estate of Clara Schmidt, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC., a corporation, Defendant-Appellee, Otis Elevator Company, a corporation, Defendant, City of Chicago, a municipal corporation, Defendant (Dismissed).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 245

313 N.E.2d 245

19 Ill.App.3d 1073

James J. CRONIN, an Administrator of the Estate of Clara

Schmidt, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC., a corporation, Defendant-Appellee, Otis Elevator Company, a corporation, Defendant,

City of Chicago, a municipal corporation, Defendant (Dismissed).

No. 57991.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

May 17, 1974.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing June 18, 1974.

John C. Ambrose and Philip J. Schmidt, Chicago, for appellant

Peterson, Ross, Rall, Barber & Seidel, Chicago, for appellee; Irving G. Swenson and Arthur C. Perivolidis, Chicago, of counsel.

SULLIVAN, Presiding Justice:

This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Delta Airlines (Delta). Clara Schmidt (plaintiff) filed a complaint seeking damages from Delta, the City of Chicago (City) and Otis Elevator Company (Otis) for injuries sustained in a fall on an escalator in the O'Hare International Airport terminal building. After the filing of her complaint, plaintiff died and an administrator was substituted.

Motions for summary judgment by Delta and the City were followed by a second amended complaint, which alleged that plaintiff deboarded a Delta plane and was using an escalator in the terminal area as the means provided for her to reach the baggage area, where Delta was to bring her luggage. It was further alleged that her fall resulted from the condition of the escalator, the negligence in its maintenance and because of a failure to act by the defendants with reasonable care in other respects. Delta, in its answer, generally denied the allegations of the complaint and contemporaneously reasserted a previously filed motion for summary judgment. In the motion for summary judgment, Delta asserted that it was not liable to plaintiff as a matter of law because: (1) the accident occurred on an escalator between the main and lower levels of the terminal; (2) the escalator was at least three-quarters of a block to a block from the deboarding gate of plaintiff's plane; and (3) the escalator was not installed, operated or maintained by Delta. This motion was supported by short excerpts from the depositions of plaintiff and her son, confirming the facts alleged by Delta. In effect, Delta asserted that it had no duty to provide for the plaintiff's safety at the place where the injury occurred.

Plaintiff, in her answer to Delta's motion, alleged that defendant was liable 'in accordance with the law of Illinois on liability of a common carrier for injuries which occur on the premises of a terminal which is rented by an airline from a municipality.' In a reply of plaintiff's answer, Delta further argued that there was no dispute that it 'did not design, manufacture, install, operate, maintain, supervise or control the escalator in question' and, therefore, no triable issue of fact existed against Delta. Delta did, however, admit to the lease arrangement it had with the City, wherein Delta was and is granted the right to use the public facilities of the airport, including the escalators.

The trial court granted Delta's motion for summary judgment, finding: 'that there are no material issues of fact As to the matters raised in the motion for summary judgment of defendant Delta Airlines, Inc., and as a matter of law said defendant cannot be held liable to plaintiff herein.' (Emphasis added.)

OPINION

The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to render expeditious judgment on a question of law, but only after first deciding that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists between the parties. (Applicolor, Inc. v. Surface Combustion Corp., 77 Ill.App.2d 260, 222 N.E.2d 168.) The court must construe the pleadings, depositions and affidavits most strictly against the moving party and most liberally in favor of the opponent. (Giova v. Carrol, 109 Ill.App.2d 259, 248 N.E.2d 836.) In its motion for summary judgment, Delta contended that it owed no duty to the plaintiff at the place where the injury was sustained, since the injury occurred some distance from the point where plaintiff deboarded the Delta plane. On the basis of this contention, as noted in the judgment order, the trial court, as a matter of law, determined there was no duty owing and Delta could not, therefore, be liable to the plaintiff. On appeal, Delta argues that it was not negligent and therefore not liable to plaintiff. It is interesting to note that Delta now disavows the express ruling rendered by the trial court by stating: '(T)he Trial Court did not rule that Delta had no duty to Clara Schmidt or that under no circumstances could Delta be held liable.' It is, according to the record and Delta's motion, on this exact point which the trial court made its finding. It appears to us that the question of its negligence was not raised by Delta in the trial court. The judgment order was specifically limited to 'matters raised in the motion for summary judgment of defendant Delta'; which 'matters' deal exclusively with the question of whether a duty was owed to plaintiff. In addition, Delta's memorandum of law and its affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment contain no reference or assertion with respect to the question of Delta's negligence.

We are apprised of the fact that the preclusion of raising matters for the first time on appeal is limited to appellants and,...