Cronin v. Police Dept. of City of New York

• Citation: 675 F. Supp. 847
• Decision Date: 21 December 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86 Civ. 7010 (JMC).,86 Civ. 7010 (JMC).
• Parties: Cornelius A. CRONIN, Plaintiff, v. The POLICE DEPARTMENT OF the CITY OF NEW YORK, and the City of New York, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

675 F. Supp. 847

Cornelius A. CRONIN, Plaintiff, v. The POLICE DEPARTMENT OF the CITY OF NEW YORK, and the City of New York, Defendants.

No. 86 Civ. 7010 (JMC).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

December 21, 1987.

William Berger, Dept. of Labor, Atlanta, Ga., Susan Johnston, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, for plaintiff.

Thomas C. Mansfield, Beth G. Schwartz, Asst. Corp. Counsel, New York City, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CANNELLA, District Judge.

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment is denied. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Cornelius A. Cronin is a police officer employed by defendants The Police Department of the City of New York "Police Department" and The City of New York the "City". Cronin was first employed by the Police Department on October 25, 1968. At the time of his initial appointment, Cronin was a member of the United States Marine Corps Reserves, having previously served on active duty.

On May 12, 1976, Cronin requested and received permission from the Police Department to transfer from the Marine Corps Reserves to the Air Force Reserves. The transfer was necessary in order for Cronin to receive training as a combat ready flight engineer on the C-141, a United States military cargo aircraft. Such training takes approximately 12 to 18 months. On May 30, Cronin requested and received an indefinite military leave of absence, to commence June 19.

Cronin served on active duty training with the Air Force Reserves from June 19, 1976 to August 8, 1977, at which time he was released from service. Between June 14 and August 5, 1976, Cronin was on paid military leave and paid vacation, and pension contributions were deducted from his salary. His unpaid military leave commenced on August 6, 1976. In 1977, Cronin received an additional 30 days of paid military leave. Following his release from duty, Cronin applied to be and was reinstated as a police officer with the Police Department. He worked in that capacity from August 8, 1977 to March 5, 1985.

On February 20, 1985, Cronin requested and received a second indefinite military leave of absence, to commence on March 3, 1985. The purpose of the military leave was to receive training as a flight engineer on the C-5, another United States military cargo aircraft. As with the C-141, flight engineer training for the C-5 requires approximately 12 to 18 months. Cronin served on active duty training in the Air Force Reserves from March 3, 1985 to April 5, 1986, at which time he was released from service. Between March 3 and April 26, 1985, Cronin was on paid military leave and paid vacation and pension contributions were deducted from his salary. His unpaid military leave commenced April 27, 1985. Upon his release, Cronin applied to be and was reinstated as a police officer with the Police Department.

Relying on section 242 of the New York Military Law, which allows government employees to take up to six months of military leave "NYML § 242", the City has granted Cronin pension credit for only the first six months of his 1976-1977 and 1985-1986 unpaid military leaves. In addition, the City has revised Cronin's initial appointment date from October 25, 1968 to July 3, 1970 to reflect that portion of his unpaid military leave for which the City is unwilling to grant pension credit.¹

DISCUSSION

In this action, brought pursuant to the Veteran's Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 "VRRA", Cronin seeks (1) pension credit for the entire time he was on military leave in 1976-1977 and 1985-1986; and (2) restoration of his initial appointment date to October 25, 1968 so as to make him eligible for vested interest separation and retirement with full benefits on October 25, 1988. Cronin argues that NYML § 242, the statute relied upon by the City in limiting Cronin's pension credit to six months for each military leave, is preempted by § 2024(d) of VRRA.

A. The Statutory Framework

Section 2024(d) of VRRA provides in pertinent part:

Any employee who is a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces shall upon request be granted a leave of absence by such person's employer for the period required to perform active duty for training or inactive duty training in the Armed Forces of the United States. Upon such employee's release from a period of such active duty for training or inactive duty training, or upon such employee's discharge from hospitalization incident to that training, such employee shall be permitted to return to such employee's position with such seniority, status, pay, and vacation as such employee would have had if such employee had not been absent for such purposes.

38 U.S.C. § 2024(d).

NYML § 242(3) allows a government employee who is a reservist to obtain a military leave for up to six months in any four-year period. The City relies on NYML § 242(3) to support its argument that Cronin is entitled only to twelve months of pension credit for his two unpaid leave periods.

Cronin's first argument is that NYML § 242(3) is preempted by § 2024(d) of VRRA because it places a six-month limitation on the duration of military leave when § 2024(d) carries no such limitation. The City concedes, as it must, that Cronin's pension benefits fall within the scope of § 2024(d) insofar as they relate to his military service, but is "troubled" by the fact that § 2024(d) contains no express limitation on the duration of military leave for which pension credit must be given. The City contends that NYML § 242(3) does not conflict with § 2024(d), but, rather, merely places a reasonable limitation on the duration of a reservist's term of military leave. Accordingly, the City argues, NYML § 242(3) is not preempted by § 2024(d) of VRRA.

B. The Doctrine of Preemption

The City correctly points out that federal law may preempt state or local laws in either of two ways. First, federal regulation in a given area may be so pervasive that Congress explicitly declares that States are prohibited from regulating in that area. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157, 98 S.Ct. 988, 994, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978). Second, "even if Congress has not completely foreclosed state legislation in a particular area, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute." Id. at 158, 98 S.Ct. at 994. A conflict will be found "where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941); see Ray, 435 U.S. at 158, 98 S.Ct. at 994; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540-41, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1317, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977).

With these principles in mind, the Court examines the language of § 2024(d). It is by now axiomatic that "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980).

It is clear, and the City concedes, that § 2024(d) contains no express limitation with respect to the duration of protected military leave for training. In fact, the statute requires an employer to grant leave "for the period required to perform active duty for training ... in the Armed Forces of the United States." 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d). Despite this broad language, the City argues that Congress intended § 2024(d) only to cover military leaves of up to 90 days. To support its view, the City relies, first, on a 1960 Senate Report accompanying passage of 50 U.S.C.App. § 459, the predecessor of § 2024(d).² The City argues that the Senate Report indicates that § 2024(d) was intended to cover training periods lasting "only a short period of time" such as "30, 60, or 90 days." Defendants' Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, 86 Civ. 7010 (JMC) (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1987) (citing and quoting S.Rep. No. 1672, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1960 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3077, 3078).³

The City goes on to argue that, in the case of Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 101 S.Ct. 2510, 69 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981), the Supreme Court "held" that § 2024(d) was designed "to deal with problems faced by employees who had military training obligations lasting less than three months." Id. at 555, 101 S.Ct. at 2514; see also United States v. New England Teamsters And Trucking Industry Pension Fund, 737 F.2d 1274, 1278 (2d Cir.1984) (observing that § 2024(d) applies to "reservists with military training obligations lasting less than three months....").

There are several reasons why the City's arguments do not persuade the Court. First, with respect to Monroe, the passage quoted above was clearly dicta. Monroe involved an employee-reservist who worked at a plant that operated 7 days a week, 24 hours a day. Like other employees, the reservist was often scheduled to work weekends as part of a regular 40-hour workweek. Because he was required to perform his reserve duty on weekends, a conflict often arose between this duty and the reservist's regular work schedule. Although the employer granted the reservist leave for such weekends, in compliance with § 2024(d), the reservist claimed that he had been treated differently from other employees who were not reservists, in violation of § 2021(b)(3) of VRRA.⁴ Thus, the Court had before it the specific issue of whether "an employer has a statutory duty under § 2021(b)(3) to make work-scheduling accommodations for reservist-employees not made for other employees, whenever such accommodations reasonably...