Crook v. Baker
| Decision Date | 06 May 1987 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 84-1372,85-1118,s. 84-1372 |
| Citation | 813 F.2d 88 |
| Parties | 38 Ed. Law Rep. 81 Wilson W. CROOK, III, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Deane BAKER, Paul W. Brown, Gerald R. Dunn, David Laro, Robert E. Nederlander, Sarah Goddard Power, Thomas A. Roach, James J. Waters and Harold T. Shapiro, President of the University of Michigan, as the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Peter A. Davis, Davis and Fajen, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for defendants-appellants.
Eugene D. Gulland (argued), Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Counsel.
John Parker, Bushnell, Gage, Doctoroff, Reizen and Byington, Southfield, Mich., George E. Bushnell, Jr. (argued,) for plaintiff-appellee.
Before KENNEDY and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge.
This appeal raises the question whether a Master of Science degree that has been granted by the Regents of the University of Michigan may later be revoked by the Regents on the ground that the holder of the degree was guilty of fraud in procuring the degree and, if so, whether the University Appellee Wilson W. Crook, III (Crook) was awarded such a degree. Thereafter, information came to the attention of the University that Crook may have fabricated data in his master's thesis, and Crook was advised that a hearing would be held to determine whether such was true, and if so, that his degree might be revoked. An Ad Hoc Disciplinary Committee (Committee) of University professors was designated to hear the charges. Crook was furnished with documents allegedly supporting the charges, to which Crook replied. A hearing was held at which Crook was accompanied by his attorney, following which the Committee filed a report finding that Crook had indeed been guilty of fraud but made no recommendation as to revocation of the degree. This finding was approved and revocation was recommended by intermediate authorities in the University hierarchy. However, before the Board of Regents of the University acted, Crook filed this action in the district court against the Regents to enjoin the rescission of the degree. When the district court denied a preliminary injunction, the Regents, having approved the finding of fraud and having accepted the recommendation, rescinded the degree.
afforded due process of law in revoking the degree in this case. The district court assumed, arguendo, that the Regents could revoke the degree but concluded that due process of law was not afforded in revoking the degree and granted relief. We determine that the Regents had the authority to revoke the degree and that the procedure followed in doing so comported with due process requirements. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for dismissal.
In his complaint in district court, 1 Crook contended that the Regents could not, under Michigan law, revoke his degree once granted or could accomplish this only by a court proceeding; alternatively, Crook, relying on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, contended that, even if the Regents had the power and authority to revoke his degree, they could accomplish this only by meeting the requirements of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, which, he contended, they did not do in this case.
The district judge expressly assumed, without deciding, that the Regents could revoke the degree, provided due process was afforded to Crook; she then held a nine-day trial to determine what process Crook had received. Following this trial, the district judge filed a lengthy opinion in which she determined that Crook had not been afforded due process, declared the revocation of his degree to be a nullity, and ordered the Regents to restore the degree. 584 F.Supp. 1531 (E.D.Mich.1984). The district court also awarded substantial attorney fees and costs to Crook.
On appeal, the Regents contend that they did have the power and authority to revoke Crook's degree and that they afforded Crook due process of law in doing so. The Regents further rely on the eleventh amendment of the Constitution in contesting this judgment and contend that, in any event, the amount of the fee awarded to Crook's counsel is not supported by the record.
We conclude, as heretofore stated, that the Regents did have the power and authority to revoke Crook's degree and that the University afforded to him due process of law. We therefore vacate the district judge's judgment declaring the Regents' rescission of the degree to be a nullity and mandating that the degree be restored to Crook and awarding attorney fees and costs. This being our decision, we need not decide whether the entry of the judgment violated the eleventh amendment or whether the attorney fee awarded is supported by the record.
As we have stated, Crook's basic position has been that, under the law of Michigan, the Regents had not the power to withdraw or rescind his degree upon proof of fraud in the inducement no matter what process was afforded to him by the University. Crook's alternative position has been that, even if the Regents had such power, they must comply with the due process clause of It is obvious that if it were determined that the Regents had not the power, under Michigan law, to revoke the degree, that would have ended the matter, and it would have not been necessary, indeed would not have been proper, to have decided the federal constitutional question. That being so, the district court should have first resolved Crook's state law contention. "[P]rior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional ground for decision." Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 2199, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981), quoted in Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664, 671 (1985).
the fourteenth amendment and that they failed to do so in this case.
Although we could remand this cause to the district court for a determination of the state law question, we have decided not to do so. The parties have filed supplemental briefs, requested by this court at oral argument, directed to the state law question, and the question does not to any extent turn on a fact that is not in the record or is in dispute. This is already an old matter, the dispute having begun in 1978. We therefore believe it to be sound judicial administration for this court now to dispose of the state law issue.
As heretofore indicated, this court at argument asked for supplemental briefs on the question whether, to rescind Crook's degree, Michigan law required a court proceeding. In this brief, Crook seems to argue that, by posing the question in this way, the court is improperly assuming that the degree could be rescinded even as a result of a full-blown proceeding in state court. Supp. brief at 2. We take this contention to be that the Regents could not, by charging Crook with fraud in the inducement and proving such fraud in a state court proceeding, under Michigan law, obtain a rescission or revocation of the degree. Therefore, Crook seems to argue that, under Michigan substantive law, fraud in the inducement is not a ground for rescission of the award of the degree. Crook cites no authority for this bald proposition, and we know of none. We reject the contention as unsupported in the law.
Crook's more plausible contention is that, under Michigan law, a full-blown court proceeding, such as would be necessary to rescind an executed sale of land or to rescind an executed gift of personalty, is required to rescind a grant of a degree. The argument is that the grant of a degree vests in the grantee a valuable property right, and the grantor, here the Regents, can no more rescind the grant than one can, without court action, rescind the sale of land or gift of personalty.
At the outset, we may say that we are surprised at the dearth of case law dealing with the requirements for the rescission of the grant of a degree and, more particularly, dealing with the question whether court action is necessary. 2 After reviewing the legal position of the University of Michigan under the state constitution and statutes and under case law, we conclude that the Regents had the authority, under Michigan law, to revoke this degree and that a court proceeding was not necessary to do so.
As recognized in Regents of the University of Michigan v. State, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d 1 (1975), under article VIII, Section 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and prior constitutions, the University is a separate constitutional "body corporate known as the Regents of the University of Michigan," which Regents have "general supervision" of the University. The court further stated: "Michigan is one of the few states to give independent constitutional status to its universities." 395 Mich. at 74, 235 N.W.2d at 11.
In Regents of the University of Michigan v. Michigan Employment Relations Commission, 389 Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973), the interns and residents at the University Because of the unique nature of the University of Michigan, above referred to, the scope of bargaining by the Association may be limited if the subject matter falls clearly within the educational sphere. Some conditions of employment may not be subject to collective bargaining because those particular facets of employment would interfere with the autonomy of the Regents. For example, the Association clearly can bargain with the Regents on the salary that their [sic] members receive since it is not within the educational sphere. While normally employees can bargain to discontinue a certain aspect of a particular job, the Association does not have the same latitude as other public employees. For example, interns could not negotiate working in the pathology department because they found such work distasteful. If the administrators of...
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