Crooks for Williams v. Greene

• Decision Date: 29 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. 59054,59054
• Citation: 12 Kan.App.2d 62,736 P.2d 78
• Parties: Julie C. CROOKS, Conservator for David A. WILLIAMS, and David A. Williams, individually, Appellants, v. Horace T. GREENE, M.D., and Jane C. Stormont Hospital and Training School for Nurses, a Kansas non-profit corporation, Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

Page 78

736 P.2d 78

12 Kan.App.2d 62

Julie C. CROOKS, Conservator for David A. WILLIAMS, and David A. Williams, individually, Appellants, v. Horace T. GREENE, M.D., and Jane C. Stormont Hospital and Training School for Nurses, a Kansas non-profit corporation, Appellees.

No. 59054.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Jan. 29, 1987.

Publication Granted April 2, 1987.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists when the record is viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

2. The plain language of K.S.A. 60-256(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof.

3. Although the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists when the record is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, this does not mean that a moving party who is a defendant in a negligence action must prove that defendant is not negligent. The moving party is not required by K.S.A. 60-256 to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim.

4. A party cannot avoid summary judgment on the mere hope that something may develop later during discovery or at trial.

Kevin Diehl and Eugene B. Ralston, of Eugene B. Ralston and Associates, of Topeka, for appellants.

Jeffrey W. Jones and Thomas L. Theis, of Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan and Glassman, of Topeka, for appellee Horace T. Greene, M.D.

Wayne T. Stratton and Les E. Diehl, of Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & Palmer, of Topeka, for appellee Jane C. Stormont Hosp. and Training School for Nurses.

Before BRISCOE, P.J., and REES and BRAZIL, JJ.

BRISCOE, Presiding Judge:

This is a medical malpractice case brought by plaintiff David A. Williams, through his conservator, against Dr. Horace Greene and Stormont-Vail Hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment in defendants' favor and plaintiffs appeal.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants based on plaintiffs' failure to obtain expert testimony to establish proximate cause.

Plaintiffs alleged the defendants were negligent in prescribing and dispensing Valium to plaintiff Williams and that this negligence was the proximate cause of Williams' cerebral damage. According to plaintiffs, Dr. Greene knew Williams was an alcoholic and therefore should not have prescribed Valium. Plaintiffs also alleged Stormont-Vail Hospital pharmacy was negligent in monitoring his Valium prescription.

In response to written interrogatories, plaintiffs stated they did not intend to present any expert testimony. After the close of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment and emphasized in their motions plaintiffs' failure to identify any expert who would testify regarding defendants' standard of care or causation. Defendants argued that plaintiffs were unable as a matter of law to establish either the governing standard of care or proximate cause without the aid of expert testimony. Plaintiffs countered that these issues were not technical or complex and were therefore within the common knowledge and experience of a jury. The trial court agreed with plaintiffs that the applicable standard of care could be established without expert testimony, but disagreed on the issue of proximate cause. With the following language, the trial court concluded that proximate cause could not be resolved by a jury without the benefit of expert testimony, and granted summary judgment:

"4. Under the facts of plaintiff's case, it would also appear that the PDR [Physician's Desk Reference] and manufacturer's warning label are insufficient to establish causation. Neither the warning label or the PDR gave specific warnings of the resulting hazards in the event the instructions and warnings were not followed. Additionally, this clearly is not a case where the causation factor can be determined through the common experience of mankind. Williams had a pre-existing condition of phlebitis which could have also contributed to his development of cerebral damage. The trier of fact cannot, without the aid of expert testimony, draw accurate conclusions on causation from the PDR or warning label. The effects of drugs on an individual's body are too complex and not within the common knowledge and experience of mankind to permit the jury to determine without the aid of an expert.

"By reason of the foregoing, we conclude that defendants' motions should be sustained and this case is hereby dismissed."

The rules which govern the granting of a motion for summary judgment are well settled. A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." K.S.A. 60-256(c). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists when the record is viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Farmers State Bank & Trust Co. of Hays v. City of Yates Center, 229 Kan. 330, 341-42, 624 P.2d 971 (1981). Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, this does not mean the defendants, the moving parties here, had to prove in their summary judgment motions that they were not negligent. Defendants were entitled to prevail if they could establish that there was an absence of evidence to support plaintiffs' case. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, ----, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 273-74 (1986), when analyzing the import of Rule 56(a), (b), and (c), Fed.R.Civ.Proc., which mirror the language of K.S.A. 60-256(a), (b), and (c):

"In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is 'entitled to judgment as a matter of law' because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof....

"... [W]e find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to 'the affidavits, if any' (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement. And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56(c) in this regard, such doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide that claimants and defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment 'with or without supporting affidavits' (emphasis added). The import of these subsections is that, regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be...