Crooks v. Lynch, No. 08-2618.
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | Bye |
| Citation | 557 F.3d 846 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-2618. |
| Decision Date | 02 March 2009 |
| Parties | Darin CROOKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rick LYNCH, individually and in his official capacity as the Floyd County Sheriff; Jessie Marzen, individually and in his official capacity as Floyd County Attorney; Floyd County, Iowa, Defendants-Appellees. |
v.
Rick LYNCH, individually and in his official capacity as the Floyd County Sheriff; Jessie Marzen, individually and in his official capacity as Floyd County Attorney; Floyd County, Iowa, Defendants-Appellees.
[557 F.3d 847]
Thomas P. Frerichs, on the brief, Waterloo, IA, for appellant.
Beth E. Hansen, on the brief, Waterloo, IA, for appellee.
Before BYE, JOHN R. GIBSON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
BYE, Circuit Judge.
Darin Crooks appeals the district court's1 dismissal of his case. We affirm.
Crooks was a Deputy Sheriff for Floyd County, Iowa. On April 12, 2007, Crooks was charged with two criminal complaints alleging he supplied alcohol to an underage person in violation of Iowa Code § 123.47. That same day, Floyd County Sheriff Rick Lynch terminated Crooks's employment.
By letter dated April 29, 2007, Crooks gave notice to the Floyd County Civil Service Commission ("Commission") he was appealing his dismissal. Because the terms of all the commissioners had expired at the time of this letter, new commissioners were appointed. By letter dated May 3, 2007, Crooks informed the new commissioners of his pending appeal, asked them to order Lynch not to permanently remove or suspend him, and requested a hearing.
By letter dated May 15, 2007, the Commission ordered Crooks not to be permanently removed or suspended until resolution of his appeal. The Commission held a
hearing on May 21, 2007, but did not issue a ruling at that time.
On June 6, 2007, a jury found Crooks not guilty of the criminal charges. Later that day, a news story was published at globegazette.com reporting Crooks's acquittal, which included the following quotes from Floyd County Attorney Jesse Marzen: "This man violated the law and a jury has now found him not guilty, which I accept;" and "He admitted several times that he served this gal, who is 20 years old. I don't know what to say about that."
Crooks subsequently filed suit against Floyd County, Lynch, and Marzen, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of his property interest in his position as deputy sheriff without procedural due process ("property interest claim"), deprivation of his liberty interest in his reputation without procedural due process ("liberty interest claim"), and conspiracy to violate his procedural due process rights, as well as a state law unlawful termination claim. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion as to Crooks's federal claims and dismissed his state claim without prejudice. This appeal followed.
We review "de novo the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true and granting all reasonable inferences in favor of [the plaintiff], the nonmoving party." Stufflebeam v. Harris, 521 F.3d 884, 886 (8th Cir.2008).
We first address Crooks's property interest claim. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether subject matter jurisdiction over this claim exists. See...
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Magee v. Trs. of the Hamline Univ., Civil No. 11–949 (JRT/AJB).
...Defendants cannot have been acting under color of state law when they allegedly violated Magee's constitutional rights. See Gibson, 557 F.3d at 846 (“A private party may be held liable under § 1983 only if it is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” (interna......
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Meyer v. Herndon, Case No. 4:19-cv-00109-SMR-HCA
...Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor, Crooks v. Lynch , 557 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir. 2009), but "[t]he facts alleged in the complaint ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,’ " Clemo......
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C. Line, Inc. v. City of Mali, 3:11–cv–92.
...before such an allegation states a claim under § 1983.” 213 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir.2000) (emphasis added); see also Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir.2009) (finding the Wax 'n Works requirement “is necessary for a procedural due process claim to be ripe for adjudication,” relyin......
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John Doe v. Univ. of Neb., 4:18CV3142
...procedural due process because the plaintiff failed to pursue available post-termination administrative remedies); Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[T]his requirement is distinct from exhaustion requirements in other contexts. Rather, this requirement is necessary for a ......
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Magee v. Trs. of the Hamline Univ., Civil No. 11–949 (JRT/AJB).
...Defendants cannot have been acting under color of state law when they allegedly violated Magee's constitutional rights. See Gibson, 557 F.3d at 846 (“A private party may be held liable under § 1983 only if it is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” (interna......
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Meyer v. Herndon, Case No. 4:19-cv-00109-SMR-HCA
...Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor, Crooks v. Lynch , 557 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir. 2009), but "[t]he facts alleged in the complaint ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,’ " Clemo......
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C. Line, Inc. v. City of Mali, 3:11–cv–92.
...before such an allegation states a claim under § 1983.” 213 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir.2000) (emphasis added); see also Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir.2009) (finding the Wax 'n Works requirement “is necessary for a procedural due process claim to be ripe for adjudication,” relyin......
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John Doe v. Univ. of Neb., 4:18CV3142
...procedural due process because the plaintiff failed to pursue available post-termination administrative remedies); Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[T]his requirement is distinct from exhaustion requirements in other contexts. Rather, this requirement is necessary for a ......