Crosby v. County of Spokane

• Decision Date: 04 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 65924-9,65924-9
• Citation: 971 P.2d 32,137 Wn.2d 296
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Wes CROSBY and C.H.D., Inc., a Washington corporation, Petitioner, v. COUNTY OF SPOKANE, a Washington corporation; Spokane County Board of Commissioners; Allen R. Osborne; Robert Loweree and Patricia Loweree, husband and wife; and James Pollard and Mary Pollard, husband and wife, Respondents.

Page 296

137 Wn.2d 296

971 P.2d 32

Wes CROSBY and C.H.D., Inc., a Washington corporation, Petitioner, v. COUNTY OF SPOKANE, a Washington corporation; Spokane County

Board of Commissioners; Allen R. Osborne; Robert Loweree

and Patricia Loweree, husband and wife; and James Pollard

and Mary Pollard, husband and wife, Respondents.

No. 65924-9.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Argued June 23, 1998.

Decided Feb. 4, 1999.

Witherspoon & Kelley, Frederick J. Dullanty, Kelly Nolen, Spokane, for Petitioners Wes Crosby and C.H.D., Inc.

Steven Tucker, Spokane County Prosecutor, Robert Binger, Deputy Prosecutor, Spokane, for Respondents County of Spokane & Spokane County Board of Commissioner.

Eugster, Haskell, Stephen Eugster, Spokane, for Respondents Allen Osborne, Et Al.

MADSEN, J.

The superior court dismissed this case involving review of a denial of a plat application on the basis the court lacked appellate jurisdiction because petitioners failed to submit an affidavit or verification in support of an application for a writ of certiorari as required by RCW 7.16.050. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse.

Facts

On June 24, 1993, petitioners Wes Crosby and C.H.D., Inc. (hereafter petitioners) submitted an application for a preliminary plat of a 31-lot residential development on 9.3 acres in the Spokane Valley. After a public hearing, the Spokane County Hearing Examiner Committee approved the application. Neighboring landowners, respondents Allen Osborne, Robert and Patricia Loweree, and James and Mary Pollard, appealed the Committee's decision to the Spokane County Board of Commissioners. In November 1993, following a public hearing, the Board reversed in a 2-1 decision. The Board's denial was without prejudice until a public sewer was extended to the property (the proposed plat involves land overlying the Spokane aquifer).

On December 2, 1993, petitioners applied to Spokane County Superior Court for issuance of a writ of certiorari, naming the County and the Board as defendants. On January 6, 1994, petitioners obtained an order to show cause why a writ should not issue. ¹ On January 7, 1994, the County stipulated to issuance of the writ and the court signed an agreed order issuing a writ of certiorari directing the County to produce a copy of the agency record.

In December 1994, the superior court held a hearing on the writ, and in February 1995, issued a letter decision concluding that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on need for a sewer line when, at the time, applicable law allowed for subdivision development in the area without sewer. The court concluded that because petitioners had complied with the requirements existing at the time of the application, they had acquired vested rights. Before an order on the decision was entered, however, respondent Osborne moved to intervene for the purpose of a motion to dismiss the case because petitioners had failed to submit an affidavit or verification in support of the application for the writ, as required by RCW 7.16.050. Osborne later amended his pleadings to seek a declaration that the Board's decision was res judicata as to him. The superior court issued a letter decision granting the motion to intervene, following which petitioners moved to join respondents Loweree and Pollard as intervenors (as they had also appealed to the Board). The Lowerees and the Pollards did not object to being joined solely for purposes of moving to dismiss the case or for a declaration that the Board's decision was res judicata as to them.

On November 14, 1995, the superior court issued orders granting Osborne's motion to intervene, granting petitioners' motion to join the Lowerees and the Pollards, and granting the respondents-neighboring landowners' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to petitioners' failure to submit an affidavit or verification. The court also held that dismissal was required because petitioners failed to join indispensable parties, Osborne, the Lowerees, and the Pollards, within the statute of limitations period (within 30 days of filing their application for a writ), and held that the Board's denial of the plat application was res judicata as to respondents Osborne, Loweree, and Pollard.

Petitioners appealed to this court, which transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals. Division Three affirmed the superior court. Crosby v. County of Spokane, 87 Wash.App. 247, 941 P.2d 687 (1997), review granted, 134 Wash.2d 1019, 958 P.2d 318 (1998). The Court of Appeals held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction due to petitioners' failure to file an affidavit or verification within 90 days after filing the application for a writ of certiorari, and, in light of that conclusion, declined to reach other issues raised by the parties.

Petitioners then sought discretionary review by this court, which was granted.

Jurisdiction

A superior court is a court of general jurisdiction. However, when it acts in an appellate capacity in a statutory writ proceeding it has only such jurisdiction as is conferred by law. Deschenes v. King County, 83 Wash.2d 714, 716, 521 P.2d 1181 (1974); KSLW v. City of Renton, 47 Wash.App. 587, 595, 736 P.2d 664 (1986). Thus, statutory procedural requirements must be satisfied before a superior court's appellate jurisdiction is invoked. City of Seattle v. Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 116 Wash.2d 923, 926, 809 P.2d 1377 (1991). If a court lacks jurisdiction over a writ proceeding, it "may do nothing other than enter an order of dismissal." Deschenes, 83 Wash.2d at 716, 521 P.2d 1181. The issue whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. See State v. Squally, 132 Wash.2d 333, 937 P.2d 1069 (1997).

RCW 7.16.050 provides that an application for a writ of certiorari, a "writ of review," "must be made on affidavit by the party beneficially interested...." A verification may be substituted for an affidavit. RCW 9A.72.085; Gordon v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 49 Wash.2d 728, 731, 306 P.2d 739 (1957). The purpose of the requirement is to "assure the truthfulness of the pleadings and to discourage claims without merit...." Griffith v. City of Bellevue, 130 Wash.2d 189, 194, 922 P.2d 83 (1996). Both the superior court and the Court of Appeals reasoned that submission of an affidavit or verification is a jurisdictional requirement which was not satisfied in this case.

We agree that the statutory affidavit/verification requirement is jurisdictional. However, we have recognized that in some circumstances jurisdictional requirements may be satisfied by substantial compliance. " ' "Substantial compliance has been defined as actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of [a] statute." ' " (Alteration in original.) Continental Sports Corp. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 128 Wash.2d 594, 602, 910 P.2d 1284 (1996) (quoting City of Seattle v. Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 116 Wash.2d 923, 928, 809 P.2d 1377 (1991) (quoting In re Writ of Habeas Corpus of Santore, 28 Wash.App. 319, 327, 623 P.2d 702 1981))). The doctrine of substantial compliance has been utilized where invocation of a superior court's appellate jurisdiction is concerned. For example, the doctrine has been applied when determining compliance with notice of appeal requirements under the industrial insurance act, RCW 51.52.110. In re Disciplinary Proceeding against Saltis, 94 Wash.2d 889, 621 P.2d 716 (1980).

Moreover, we have specifically applied substantial compliance principles when deciding cases involving defective affidavits or verifications in support of applications for statutory writs of certiorari. In a case where an affidavit in support of an application for a writ of certiorari was signed by the applicant's attorney rather than by the applicant, the court held that the defect did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. In re Welfare of Messmer, 52 Wash.2d 510, 326 P.2d 1004 (1958). More recently, we held that the failure to sign a verification in support of an application for a writ of certiorari was not a defect which deprived the superior court of jurisdiction. Griffith v. City of Bellevue, 130 Wash.2d 189, 922 P.2d 83. In In re Messmer and in Griffith, substantial compliance with the jurisdictional requirement, not strict compliance, was held sufficient.

The Court of Appeals, however, found Griffith distinguishable from the present case because there a verification had been timely filed, while in this case no affidavit or verification was submitted at all. We agree that generally noncompliance with a statutory mandate is not substantial compliance. See San Juan Fidalgo Holding Co. v. Skagit County, 87 Wash.App. 703, 709, 943 P.2d 341 (1997). However, as noted, the key to substantial compliance is the satisfaction of the substance essential to the purpose of the statute. Continental Sports Corp., 128 Wash.2d at 602, 910 P.2d 1284. The writ statute authorizes a court to issue a writ without notice to the governmental body to which the writ is directed, RCW 7.16.050, and in such cases an affidavit or verification is especially needed to assure the truthfulness of the pleadings and discourage meritless claims. However, where the governmental body to which the writ is directed has notice and stipulates to issuance of the writ, generally the purpose of the requirement will be satisfied. Absent some clear indication in the record to the contrary, a court can assume that a governmental body would not agree to issuance of a writ based upon falsehoods or where a claim is frivolous. ² Here, a show cause hearing was scheduled at which the County could have argued against issuance of the writ, but instead the County stipulated to its issuance. Following the stipulation, there was little point in submission of an affidavit or verification. We conclude that the stipulation by the County served as an adequate substitute for the...