Crosby v. United States
Decision Date | 15 February 1957 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 718. |
Citation | 148 F. Supp. 810 |
Parties | Frank A. CROSBY and P. E. Berry, individually and as Administrators of the Estate of Lewis G. Crosby, also known as L. G. Crosby, Deceased, Plaintiffs, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Watson & Brown, Pensacola, Fla., for plaintiffs.
C. W. Eggart, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Pensacola, Fla., for defendant.
DE VANE, Chief Judge.
Lewis G. Crosby, a resident of Pensacola, Florida, died intestate on February 27, 1950, leaving surviving him his wife and three children. On May 24, 1951, a Federal Estate Tax Return was filed showing his gross estate to be $2,145,299.81 and, claiming deductions in the sum of $729,177.58, a total net estate tax of $408,739.32. In order to secure release of Federal liens on some of the realty, the administrators paid to the Collector of Internal Revenue at Jacksonville, Florida, $464,855.35 on March 13, 1951. This was in excess of the tax shown on the return by $56,115.83. Subsequently, an audit and review of the return was made by the Internal Revenue Agent in Charge, who, after allowing the full 80% credit for state inheritance taxes, assessed a deficiency of $149,669.57. Subtracting from this deficiency the $56,115.83 previously paid in excess of the tax shown on the return, left a balance of $93,553.74 to be paid. This amount was paid on October 28, 1953.
On March 29, 1954, plaintiffs filed a claim for refund of $117,938.05. This claim was based on the contention that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue improperly disallowed a portion of the marital deduction. The claim was rejected and this suit followed. The facts are not in dispute and the case is before the Court on a motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant.
The marital deduction around which this suit revolves involves the construction and application of certain Alabama statutes providing for dower. Title 34, Sections 40 and 41, of the Alabama Code provide in part as follows:
It is clear that under the above provisions of the Alabama Code the widow's dower interest in her husband's real property is a life estate or a right to a life estate. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Section 812(e) (1) (B), 26 U.S.C.A. § 812(e) (1) (B) provides that a life estate will not qualify as a marital deduction. The parties in this case are not in dispute with reference to the effect of this section of the Revenue Code upon the right to treat a dower interest as a deduction in determining the estate tax. It cannot be deducted.
The controversy in the case arises by virtue of other Alabama statutes. Title 61, Sections 244, 271 and 272 have relevance here. They are as follows:
The administrators of the Crosby estate found it necessary to sell some of the real estate owned by Crosby in order to pay debts, estate ond other taxes. Crosby died seized and possessed of a large tract of land in Baldwin County, Alabama, and the administrators petitioned the Circuit Court of Baldwin County for authority to sell the estate's interest in this land to raise money to pay debts, taxes, etc. Mrs. Crosby had not elected to have her dower interest in any of her deceased husband's property set apart for her and under authority of Section 271 she joined with the administrators and filed in the suit in Baldwin County her consent to the sale of her dower interest in this property and petitioned the court to set apart out of the proceeds the share of her dower interest therein. The property with a clear title was sold in this proceeding for $1,640,689. The court placed the value of the dower interest of Mrs. Crosby at $546,896.66, which amount was paid to her out of the proceeds of the sale and the remainder passed to the estate.
Plaintiffs here contend that this sum paid to the widow for her dower interest in this property should be allowed as a gross deduction from the gross estate under Section 812(e) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C.A. § 812(e) (1) (A), and that Section 812(e) (1) (B) is not applicable here. The two subsections of 812 (e) (1) are as follows:
The crucial question in this case is whether upon decedent's death his widow took only a terminable dower interest in the realty as provided in Title 34, Sections 40 and 41, or whether Title 61, Sections 271 and 272, gave to her a different and superior interest in realty sold to pay debts. While counsel for the respective parties cite numerous cases in support of the position taken by them on the law controlling here, the difficulty the Court finds itself in is that neither of them cite any case in point on the precise question before the Court and all this Court is able to do is make the best guess it can in deciding the case.
Without doubt the legal property rights of the parties are governed by the laws of Alabama. And in this connection it should be noted here that while Section 244 quoted above...
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...66 So.2d 176; Tipton et al. v. Tipton et al., 268 Ala. 497, 108 So.2d 348. 3 United States v. Crosby, 5 Cir., 257 F.2d 515, affirming D.C., 148 F.Supp. 810 and D.C., 151 F.Supp. 497; Wootten et al. v. Vaughn, 202 Ala. 684, 81 So. 660; Thomas v. Blair et al., 208 Ala. 48, 93 So. 704; Hamm v.......
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United States v. Crosby
...court for the amount in dispute. In the district court a memorandum opinion and a supplemental opinion were filed. Crosby v. United States, D.C., 148 F.Supp. 810, 812. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were thereafter filed. Crosby v. United States, D.C., 151 F.Supp. 497. In its memor......