Crosby v. Watkins
| Decision Date | 28 January 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 04-cv-01171-ZLW-MJW. |
| Parties | David CROSBY, Petitioner, v. Gary WATKINS, Warden, and The Attorney General of the State of Colorado, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
David Crosby, Canon City, CO, pro se.
John Jacob Fuerst, III, Colorado Attorney General's Office-Appellate Section, Denver, CO, Respondents.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
The matter before the Court is Petitioner David Crosby's Application For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Application). Petitioner is serving a 30-year sentence after conviction in state court on charges of first degree sexual assault, false imprisonment, and prohibited use of a weapon. On June 9, 2004, Petitioner filed the present Application, setting forth three claims. Claim one states that "[t]he trial court erred in refusing to grant motion to suppress Petitioner's statements to police." Claim two states that "[t]he trial court erred in failing to grant motion to dismiss or alternatively for mistrial because of the destruction by police taped statements of the Petitioner and the victim." Claim three states that "[t]he appellate court erred in ruling that Petitioner had failed to properly raise the issue of deficient counsel for failing to obtain expert medical testimony." Petitioner filed his Application pro se.1
Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.1, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe, who on June 4, 2007, issued a Recommendation On Application For a Writ Of Habeas Corpus Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 2254 By A Person In State Custody (Recommendation) in which he recommended that the Application be denied and that this action be dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner thereafter filed Petitioner's Objection To Magistrate's Recommendation. The Court reviews de novo those portions of the Recommendation to which Petitioner has specifically objected.2 Under the de novo standard, this Court makes "an independent determination of the issues" and does not "give any special weight to the [prior] determination."3
The factual background of this case and the proceedings in the state courts were recited in detail in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation and will not be repeated herein.
Where a constitutional claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody properly is granted only where the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law," or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."4 The state court's factual determinations must be presumed to be correct.5
Petitioner alleges in his first claim that the state trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police. In his Application and supporting Memorandum In Support Of Petition For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Memorandum), Petitioner argued that the statements that he made to police before he was given a Miranda warning should have been suppressed because they were made while he was in custody, and that the statements that he made to police after he was given the Miranda warning and waived his Miranda rights were inadmissible because his Miranda waiver was involuntary as a result of his alcohol intoxication. In his objection to the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation, Petitioner asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred by failing to consider the following with respect to Petitioner's motion to suppress: (1) Petitioner's intoxication level at the time that he was given the Miranda warning, specifically, evidence that Petitioner was singing, speaking slowly, was unbalanced, and had bloodshot eyes, and the determination by Lt. John Dodson of the Avon, Colorado Police Department that Petitioner needed to be placed into protective custody due to his level of intoxication, and (2) the destruction by the Avon Police of audio tapes containing Petitioner's statements to the police, which he asserts "would have helped determine the truthfulness of the polices' version of events."6
A waiver of Miranda rights is valid only if it was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made; it "must have been made with a full awareness, both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it."7 The Magistrate Judge determined that "[w]hile there was evidence that petitioner was intoxicated, the officers testified that petitioner was responsive, seemed to understand questions and responded to them intelligently (State Court Record Vol. 3 at 36 lines 1-5, 38 at lines 4-5), his speech was slow but clear, and he was `quite coherent' (State Court Record Vol. 3 at 52, lines 9-10, 21)." Petitioner contends that other evidence of his intoxication, specifically, that he was singing,8 was unbalanced, and had bloodshot eyes, and the fact that Officer Dodson felt the need to place him in protective custody due to his intoxication, indicates that he was so intoxicated that his Miranda waiver was involuntary. The Court disagrees. "The test of whether a person is too affected by alcohol or other drugs voluntarily and intelligently to waive his rights is one of coherence, of an understanding of what is happening."9 The fact that Petitioner was singing, was unsteady on his feet, and had bloodshot eyes does not, alone, establish that he could not understand the nature of the rights that he was waiving and the consequences of that waiver, in the face of uncontradicted evidence that Petitioner was coherent, spoke clearly, understood questions, and responded intelligently. Specifically, Officer Dodson testified that Petitioner's speech was "slow but clear," that he was "quite coherent" and "was talking like a normal conversation," and indicated that Petitioner did not have slurred speech and did not have to have things repeated to him.10 Officer Dodson testified that at no point did he feel that Petitioner did not understand the questions being asked of him,11 and that he placed him in protective custody simply because he smelled of alcohol and Dodson believed that he was intoxicated.12 There is no evidence in the record before the Court that Petitioner was intoxicated to such a degree that he could not comprehend what was being said to him, including the Miranda warning or the consequences of its waiver.13 To the contrary, again, Officer Dodson testified that Petitioner was coherent and understood the questions he was asked.14
Petitioner argued in his Memorandum that the tape recording of his interview by Officer Dodson would have reflected his intoxication level.15 This may or may not be true. However, there was alternate evidence submitted concerning Petitioner's intoxication level, namely, Officer Dodson's testimony indicating that although Petitioner had bloodshot eyes, was unsteady, sang, and smelled of alcohol, he was coherent, spoke clearly and without slurring, understood questions, and responded intelligently. The state court's factual determination as to Petitioner's alcohol level is presumed correct.16 Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the state courts' determination that Petitioner's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.17
In his second claim, as further described in his Memorandum, Petitioner alleges that the destruction by the police of his taped statements and those of the victim to police violated his constitutional right to due process. Under Arizona v. Youngblood,18 the failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence does not constitute a denial of due process unless the criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police.19 Petitioner has made no showing of bad faith on the part of the police in this case.20 Thus, the failure to preserve the tapes does not constitute a due process violation.21
In his objection, Petitioner asserts that the Colorado Court of Appeals incorrectly characterized his due process claim stemming from the destruction of the tapes as a "general claim of potential exculpatory value,"22 which the court found be constitutionally insufficient under Banks v. People23 and State v. Morales.24 Petitioner argues that he is contending, more specifically, that the taped statements were not only exculpatory, but also impeached the victim, and that it was unreasonable for the state appellate court to "rule on the destruction of petitioner's statements but fail to rule on the destruction of the victim's statements."25 However, the state Court of Appeals expressly noted Petitioner's argument that "the destroyed tape recordings had exculpatory value because the impeachment of a victim's account of a sexual assault and corroboration of a defendant's denial are always relevant in a sexual assault proceeding."26 Ultimately, Petitioner's argument is the same with respect to both his own statements and the victim's statements: that they both had the potential to exculpate him (whether directly or by revealing untruthfulness on the part of the victim), and thus their destruction constitutes a due process violation. The Court concurs with the Colorado Court of Appeals that such a claim does not rise to the level of a due process violation.
Petitioner further objects to the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation on the ground that the Magistrate Judge "fail[ed] to acknowledge that police LIED to the court about the existence of the tapes."27 However, Petitioner has cited to no portion of the record indicating that any police officer lied about the existence of the tapes, and the Court has found none. Rather,...
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Shea v. Raemicsh
...followed and applied evenhandedly by Colorado courts and, therefore, it constitutes an adequate state ground. Crosby v. Watkins, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1267-68 (D. Colo. 2009). Additionally, the Colorado Court of Appeals relied solely on the state procedural bar and, therefore, it is an inde......