Crosier v. Kopp
| Decision Date | 29 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: SAG-19-3536 |
| Parties | JACK CROSIER, Plaintiff, v. NANCY KOPP, Treasurer, DETECTIVE JOSEPH BROWN, JR., and DETECTIVE RICHARD FLEURIMOND, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
In this civil rights action, Plaintiff Jack Crosier alleges that Defendants Brown and Fleurimond improperly seized his vehicles without probable cause. Defendants have moved to dismiss the action or, alternatively, for summary judgment to be granted in their favor. ECF No. 14. Crosier opposes the motion. ECF Nos. 16, 17, 23.1 The issues are fully briefed, and a hearing is not needed. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the following reasons, Defendants' motion, construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment, is granted.
On November 22, 2014, Detectives Joseph Brown, Jr. and Richard Fleurimond took over the investigation of a shooting that occurred on Fairlawn Avenue in Baltimore City. ECF No. 4-1, p. 1. As a result of the investigation, Crosier's 2000 Jaguar and 2004 Lincoln LS were towed from Fairlawn Avenue to the Northwest District Police Station. Id. Crosier contends that there was no probable cause to seize the vehicles, which were never found to be connected to a criminal violation. Id.
On December 4, 2014, in conjunction with the ongoing shooting investigation, a warrant was executed at 322 North Hilton Street, Apartment 2. ECF No. 4-1, p. 2. Crosier contends that this warrant was also without probable cause. Id. On the same date, his 2001 Mercedes Benz SUV was seized as part of the investigation into the shooting. The vehicle was not located at 322 North Hilton Street, and Crosier states that there has been no finding that the Mercedes was used in the commission of a crime. Id.
Crosier claims that the seizure and forfeiture of each of the three vehicles was improper. ECF No. 4-1, p. 2. Crosier alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and that, as a result, he has suffered mental and emotional distress causing him to experience seizures. Id. He also claims he suffers from anxiety and insomnia. Id. He seeks compensatory damages.
A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom. McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint" and must "draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff." E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citationsomitted); see Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Ltd. P'ship, 903 F.3d 415, 423 (2018); Semenova v. Md. Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015); Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 522 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 943 (2011).
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with "fair notice" of the claims and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (). But, the Supreme Court has explained that a "plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ().
Moreover, to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Fund Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2019); Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "But where the well-pleaded factsdo not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not 'show[n]' -- 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Mere "'naked assertions' of wrongdoing" are generally insufficient to state a claim for relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). Put another way, "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation" does not state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" a cognizable cause of action, "even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). "A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer" that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Soc'y Without a Name v. Comm'w of Va., 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).
Nonetheless, the complaint does not need "detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Instead, "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 563. Moreover, federal pleading rules "do not countenance dismissal of acomplaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014) (per curiam).
Courts generally do not "resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses" through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Edwards, 178 F.3d at 243 (quotation marks and citation omitted). But, "in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6)." Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc); accord Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 533 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2009); see also U.S. ex rel. Oberg v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 148 (4th Cir. 2014). However, because Rule 12(b)(6) "is intended [only] to test the legal adequacy of the complaint," Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993), "[t]his principle only applies . . . if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense 'clearly appear [ ] on the face of the complaint.'" Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (quoting Forst, 4 F.3d at 250) (emphasis in Goodman); see Dean v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 395 F.3d 471, 474 (4th Cir. 2005).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court ordinarily "may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein . . .." Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013); see Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). "Generally, when a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), courts are limited to considering the sufficiency of allegations set forth in the complaint and the 'documents attached or incorporated into the complaint.'" Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int'l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606(4th Cir. 2015) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 448). Under limited circumstances, however, when resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider documents beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. Goldfarb v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015).
A court may consider documents that are "explicitly incorporated into the complaint by reference and those attached to the complaint as exhibits." Goines, 822 F.3d at 166; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Paradise Wire & Cable, 918 F.3d at 318. Notably, "[w]hen the plaintiff attaches or incorporates a document upon which his claim is based, or when the complaint otherwise shows that the plaintiff has adopted the contents of the document, crediting the document over conflicting allegations in the complaint is proper." Goines, 822 F.3d at 167. Conversely, "where the plaintiff attaches or incorporates a document for purposes other...
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