Crosky v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr.

Decision Date08 March 2012
Docket NumberCase No. 2:09-cv-400
PartiesJohn R. Crosky, Plaintiff, v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY

Magistrate Judge Kemp

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court to consider the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants. Also pending are several unopposed motions filed by the plaintiff including a motion for leave to file instanter a response to the motion for summary judgment, a motion for leave to file a supplemental response to the motion for summary judgment and a motion to amend the response. All of these unopposed motions are granted. In light of this, the motion for summary judgment has been fully briefed. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff John Crosky filed his complaint against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and several employees of the Chillicothe Correctional Institution including Warden Timothy P. Brunsman, Arville Duty, Gary Clever, Heather Howard, Charlie F. McKee, Kelly M. Thomas, Melissa Bartlett, Tammy Smith, D. Coffey, Lita Pritchard, Michael A. Eiring, Larry Grant, Glen Bryan, Sgt. DiSantis, Josh Thoroman, Katrina L. Ragland, Amanda J.Ragland, Mal Payne, Teddi Engle, and Brian Wittrup. Mr. Crosky also named John and Jane Doe defendants. All individual defendants were named in both their individual and official capacities.

According to the complaint, Mr. Crosky was accused falsely by defendant Howard of molesting two children during a visit with his mother and a family friend on May 21, 2007. Mr. Crosky was immediately placed into disciplinary control where he eventually spent 87 days. Defendants Duty and Clever undertook an investigation on May 22, 2007, during which Mr. Crosky was threatened with transfer and physical harm and threats of criminal prosecution were made against his visitors. While in disciplinary control, Mr. Crosky was denied access to exercise and showers and confined in his room for up to 48 hours at a time. His mother was denied visitation with Mr. Crosky temporarily and his family friend was permanently barred from visiting him.

Mr. Crosky contends that several defendants altered official documents and forged his signature on hearing documents in an effort to legitimize Ms. Howard's accusations. He asserts that he "was subjected to numerous RIB hearing and re-hearings and went through a lengthy appeals process" which also resulted in a "cover-up" of the falsity of Ms. Howard's allegations. All of these actions, according to the complaint, resulted in Mr. Crosky's suffering "extreme mental cruelty." Following his release from disciplinary control, and he contends, "in retaliation to his various attempts to refute the groundless accusations of May 21, 2007," Mr. Crosky was transferred to the Lebanon Correctional Institution on August 17, 2007.

According to Mr. Crosky's affidavit attached to his complaint, he was subjected to unlawful RIB or local control hearings on June 1, 13, 19, 27, and 29, 2007. He contends that, atall of these hearings, forged or falsified documents were used to find him guilty and subject him to unlawful treatment. Mr. Crosky contends that the CCI administration had targeted him as a result of his very public defense in the newspaper of a woman falsely accused by the Grove City Police Department.

Based on all of the above, Mr. Crosky asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of his First, Fifth, Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights. He also asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1985 as well as civil RICO claims. Mr. Crosky seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Although Mr. Crosky filed his complaint pro se on April 21, 2009, he has been represented by counsel in this case since October 21, 2010,

All of the defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Mr. Crosky's claims. Their first ground for summary judgment is that Mr. Crosky failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §1997e. They also contend that they are entitled to summary judgment for various reasons with respect to the merits of Mr. Crosky's claims. First, they contend that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction is entitled to sovereign immunity. Further, they assert that Mr. Crosky's constitutional rights were not violated by his placement in segregation, placement in local control, or transfer to another institution and that he received the due process to which he was entitled during his Rules Infraction Board hearings. They assert also that Mr. Crosky has no constitutional claim arising from threats allegedly made to him following the incident in the visiting room. With respect to Mr. Crosky's civil conspiracy and RICO claims, they maintain that Mr. Crosky has failed to set forth facts sufficient to state such claims. Finally, they contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

In response, Mr. Crosky addresses only the issues of exhaustion, due process, and qualified immunity. Mr. Crosky also appears to raise, for the first time, a claim for denial of access to the courts. In reply, defendants contend that Mr. Crosky has failed to assert an access to the courts claim. In his supplemental response, Mr. Crosky addresses the conspiracy issues through a declaration of plaintiff, a third annotated declaration of plaintiff, and a fifth annotated declaration of plaintiff attached to the supplemental response .

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact [such that] the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). But "summary judgment will not lie if the ... evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The movant therefore has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1388-89 (6th Cir.1993). The central inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. But the non-moving party "may not rest merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir.1994). The non-moving party must present"significant probative evidence" to show that there is more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Moore v. Philip Morris Co., 8 F.3d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir.1993). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district court is not required to sift through the entire record to drum up facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim. InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989). Instead, the Court may rely on the evidence called to its attention by the parties. Id.

III. Factual Background

The record in this case is not insubstantial. According to the Court's docket, seven depositions have been filed. In addition to the affidavit attached to his complaint, and various other exhibits attached to his filings including declarations from his mother and family friend Carolyn Dickson, Mr. Crosky has submitted an eleven-page "Declaration" as well as five "Annotated Declarations," all sworn to by him and totaling well over 100 pages in length. Defendants also have filed numerous exhibits including at least nine declarations and the documents relating to Mr. Crosky's RIB hearing. In fact, the briefs and exhibits relating to the motion for summary judgment alone comprise over 300 pages. Accordingly, at first glance, it would appear that this is a highly fact-intensive case warranting a lengthy and detailed recitation.

The Court's review of this information, however, reveals that the overwhelming majority of it is focused on two primary issues. The first issue is whether Mr. Crosky properly exhausted his administrative remedies before filing this action. The second issue is Mr. Crosky's version of the events of May 21, 2007, and his attempts to demonstrate both the falsity of defendants' accusations and what, in his view, were unlawful actions taken to ensure that he was punished based on such accusations.

As will be discussed in detail below, the Court finds it appropriate under the circumstances of this case to proceed to a review of the merits of Mr. Crosky's claims consistent with 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c)(2). Consequently, the Court will not address the factual scenario underlying the exhaustion issue despite the parties', and particularly Mr. Crosky's, painstaking detailing of it. Further, as also will be discussed in depth below, because a detailed version of the underlying events of May 21, 2007, is not necessary to the Court's consideration of Mr. Crosky's claims, the Court will not devote a significant discussion to them, again despite Mr. Crosky's voluminous reiterations. Rather, it is sufficient for purposes of summary judgment on the claims presented by Mr. Crosky's complaint for the Court to note that he vehemently challenges the defendants' view of his actions that day which resulted in defendant Heather Howard removing him from the visiting room.

That being said, there is a largely undisputed chronology of events that is clear from the various evidentiary materials in the record noted above. On ...

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