Cross, In re
| Decision Date | 21 April 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 48707-3,48707-3 |
| Citation | 99 Wn.2d 373,662 P.2d 828 |
| Parties | In re the Detention of Eloise CROSS: Leon S. DIAMOND, M.D., and Ruth Kane, M.S.W., Respondents, v. Eloise CROSS, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Law Offices of Public Defender, Peter Offenbecher, Seattle, for appellant.
Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Byron Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tacoma, for respondents.
Appellant, Eloise Cross, was a gravely disabled person involuntarily committed for less restrictive outpatient treatment pursuant to RCW 71.05.320. 1 Respondents sought revocation of Ms. Cross' less restrictive treatment, on the ground that she had failed to comply with its conditions. Court Commissioner Krilich found that Ms. Cross had complied with the conditions but nonetheless ordered her returned to inpatient status because it would be dangerous to allow her to remain free. We reverse on two alternative grounds: (1) The Court Commissioner had no authority, absent a finding of noncompliance, to issue the order; and (2) Ms. Cross was given inadequate notice of the grounds on which respondents sought her return to inpatient status.
Ms. Cross was originally detained on January 2, 1981. Statutory civil commitment procedures were then followed which resulted in a court order for 90 days of involuntary treatment on a less restrictive basis. The order also required Ms. Cross to comply with several conditions; namely, that she return to her own home, that she take all prescribed medications, and that she attend regularly scheduled therapy sessions.
On February 10, respondents once again detained Ms. Cross and on February 13 filed a "Petition for Revocation of Less Restrictive Placement" with the court. The petition appeared to state only one ground for detention, that Ms. Cross had failed to comply with the condition that she take her prescribed medication. At the hearing pursuant to respondents' petition, the Court Commissioner found that respondents had not shown that Ms. Cross had failed to comply with the condition that she take her medication. Despite this finding, the Court Commissioner still chose to revoke Ms. Cross' less restrictive treatment, citing the intervening deterioration in her condition and the danger of permitting her to continue treatment on an outpatient basis. 2
Following the Court Commissioner's decision, Ms. Cross moved the Superior Court for an order of revision pursuant to RCW 2.24.050. The court denied the motion, ruling that, while the statute governing civil commitment proceedings authorizes "revocation" of less restrictive treatment solely for failure to comply with the conditions attached to such treatment, the Court Commissioner had inherent power to "modify" his order. The Superior Court construed the Court Commissioner's decision as such a modification. The court also concluded that respondents' failure to give Ms. Cross notice that modification on the ground of general deterioration would be an issue did not violate her procedural rights because the issue could not have been anticipated.
Initially, respondents argue that this case is moot. The detention which is the subject of this appeal has long since ended. Indeed, since her release, Ms. Cross has been detained under three successive 180-day commitment orders. The first, issued soon after the expiration of the 90-day order involved herein, permitted treatment on a less restrictive basis, but that less restrictive placement was revoked within a month. The second and third orders required inpatient treatment. Between February 10, 1981, when Ms. Cross was first detained for the revocation at issue here, and July 2, 1982, the most recent date for which we are aware of her status, Ms. Cross appears to have been almost continually detained at Western State Hospital. There she may well remain even today.
We agree that this case is moot. A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief. State v. Turner, 98 Wash.2d 731, 733, 658 P.2d 658 (1983). Since the detention which is the subject of this appeal has already ended, we cannot provide the most basic relief which Ms. Cross originally sought. Moreover, while most civil commitment appeals will be saved from mootness by the significant and adverse collateral consequences to which commitment gives rise ( see, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 651-53 (D.C.Cir.1973); cf. State v. Turner, supra, 98 Wash.2d at 733, 658 P.2d 658 ()), such consequences do not exist here. The invalidation of less than 60 days out of the minimum year and a half during which Ms. Cross has been detained seems to us of minimal significance.
Even where a case is moot, however, we may nonetheless decide it if it involves "matters of continuing and substantial public interest". Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wash.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972). The criteria to be considered in determining whether a sufficient public interest is involved are: (1) the public or private nature of the question presented; (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination which will provide future guidance to public officers; and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur. Sorenson, at 558, 496 P.2d 512.
We believe these criteria militate in favor of review in the present case. The central issues are whether the Commissioner had authority to act in the manner he did and whether the notice given Ms. Cross was sufficient. The question of a judicial officer's authority is certainly public in nature. An awareness on the part of such officers of the scope of their authority is crucial and consideration of the arguments made before us and the statutory scheme governing civil commitment convinces us that clarification is necessary. Similarly, it is important that mental health professionals such as respondents understand the nature and purpose of the notice which they must provide to committed persons whose less restrictive treatment they seek to revoke. Finally, the likelihood of recurrence is high. The approach taken here by respondents and the lower court is procedurally more convenient, though such convenience is gained at the expense of the rights of committed persons such as Ms. Cross. Absent some direction to the contrary, we think the temptation of this convenience is likely to encourage similar action in the future.
There exist two provisions which arguably grant a court the authority to revoke or modify a prior order for involuntary psychiatric treatment on a less restrictive basis. The first such provision is RCW 71.05.340(3), which specifically provides for revocation of less restrictive treatment if the patient violates the conditions of his or her release. The second arguably applicable provision is RCW 2.28.150, which generally allows the courts to adopt suitable procedures to effect their jurisdiction when no procedures are specifically provided. 3
RCW 71.05.320(1) provides that if a person on less restrictive treatment fails to adhere to the conditions of such treatment, the designated county mental health professional may detain the person and petition the court for return to inpatient status. The detainee is then entitled to a hearing. RCW 71.05.320(1); RCW 71.05.340(3). The issues to be considered at the hearing are expressly delineated by the statute.
The issues to be determined shall be whether the conditionally released person did or did not adhere to the terms and conditions of his release; and, if he failed to adhere to such terms and conditions, whether the conditions of release should be modified or the person should be returned to the facility.
(Italics ours.) RCW 71.05.340(3). RCW 71.05.340(3) permits return to inpatient status only if the court finds a violation of the conditions of release. Indeed, by failing to argue this point, respondents appear to concede it.
Instead, respondents argue that the courts have inherent power under RCW 2.28.150 to "modify" less restrictive treatment orders. That statute provides:
When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution of this state, or by statute, conferred on a court or judicial officer all the means to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of the jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding is not specifically pointed out by statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of the laws.
Respondents contend that no statute specifically directs a court how to proceed when faced with a situation such as that which arose in the present case. Further, they argue, the Court Commissioner's action, when faced with a patient whose condition had severely deteriorated despite adherence to her release conditions, was highly consistent with the legislative goal of "restor[ing] [such persons] to normal mental condition as rapidly as possible ... with as little formality as possible". RCW 71.02.900.
We must reject respondents' argument. RCW 2.28.150 is to be construed strictly here because a deprivation of liberty is involved. See In re Carson, 84 Wash.2d 969, 973, 530 P.2d 331 (1975). The statute is applicable only if (1) jurisdiction is otherwise conferred on the court, and (2) no course of proceeding is specifically pointed out. Neither of these conditions is satisfied here. Moreover, even if these conditions were satisfied, the mode of proceeding adopted by the Court Commissioner was not that "most conformable to the spirit of the laws". RCW 2.28.150.
Jurisdiction has two elements--jurisdiction over the person and jurisdiction over the subject matter. State v. Swanson, 16 Wash.App. 179, 189, 554 P.2d 364 (1976). The latter aspect of jurisdiction has two subelements--jurisdiction over the class of actions in question and jurisdiction to determine the particular issues presented. State ex rel. New York Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Wash.2d 834, 840, 199 P.2d 581 (1948). The instant proceeding arose...
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