Cross v. Burke, 1,105
Decision Date | 14 November 1892 |
Docket Number | No. 1,105,1,105 |
Parties | CROSS v. BURKE, Jail Warden |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Statement by Mr. Chief Justice FULLER:
William D. Cross was found guilty for the second time upon an indictment for murder in the supreme court of the District of Columbia holding a criminal term, and sentenced to death, the time of his execution being fixed for January 22, 1892. He prosecuted an appeal to the court in general term, which, on January 12, 1892, finding no error in the record, affirmed the judgment rendered at the criminal term, (20 Wash. Law Rep. 98,) and on January 21, 1892, a writ of error from this court was allowed by the chief justice of the supreme court of the district, citation was signed and served, and the time for filing the record enlarged. On the same day the execution of the sentence of death was postponed until the 10th of June, 1892, by order entered by the court in general term.
That writ of error was dismissed May 16, 1892. Cross v. U. S., 145 U. S. 571, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 842. May 28, 1892, Cross filed his petition in the supreme court of the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus, which petition was heard in the first instance by that court in general term. The application was denied June 4, 1892, and the petition dismissed. 20 Wash. Law Rep. 389. On June 8, 1892, the court in general term allowed an appeal to this court.
C. Maurice Smith and Joseph Shellington, for appellant.
Sol. Gen. Aldrich, for appellee.
Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
It was not denied in the supreme court of the district that the time and place of execution are not parts of a sentence of death unless made so by statute. Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U. S. 483, 495, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 143; Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442, 451, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525. But it was insisted that in the District of Columbia the time has been made a part of the sentence by section 845 of the Revised Statutes of the District, which is in these words: 'To enable any person convicted by the judgment of the court to apply for a writ of error, in all cases when the judgment shall be death, or confinement in the penitentiary, the court shall, upon application of the party accused, postpone the final execution thereof to a reasonable time beyond the next term of the court, not exceeding in any case thirty days after the end of such term.' And it was contended that the time fixed by such a postponement is to be regarded as a time fixed by statute, and that the power of the court to set a day for execution is thereby exhausted.
The supreme court of the District of Columbia, speaking by James, J., held that that the power of the court to set a day for execution was not exhausted by its first exertion; and that, if the time for execution had passed for any cause, the court could make a new order.
We have held that this court has no jurisdiction to grant a writ of error to review the judgments of the supreme court of the District in criminal cases, either under the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, (26 St. p. 826, c. 517,) or under the act of congress of February 6, 1889, (25 St. p. 655, c. 113,) or any other. In re Heath, 144 U. S. 92, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 615; Cross v. U. S., 145 U. S. 571, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 842. Have we jurisdiction over the judgments of that court on habeas corpus?
Under the fourteenth section of the judiciary act of 1789, (1 St. p. 73,) the courts of the United States, and either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as the judges of the district courts, had power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment; but this extended in no case to prisoners in jail, unless in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or committed for trial before some court of the United States, or necessary to be brought into court to testify.
By the seventh section of the act of March 2, 1833, (4 St. p. 634,) the power was extended to all cases of prisoners in jail or confinement, when committed or confined on or by any authority or law for any act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree of any judge or court thereof.
By the act of August 29, 1842, (5 St. p. 539,) the power was further extended to issue the writ when the prisoner, being a subject or citizen of a foreign state, and domiciled therein, 'shall be committed or confined or in custody under or by any authority or law, or process founded thereon, of the United States, or of any one of them, for or on account of any act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption set up or claimed under the commission or order or sanction of any foreign state or severeignty, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations, or under color thereof.'
By the first section of the act of February 5, 1867, (14 St. p. 385,) it was declared that the courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges thereof, should have power 'to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States;' and it was provided that 'from the final decision of any judge, justice, or court inferior to the circuit court an appeal may be taken to the circuit court of the United States for the district in which said cause is heard, and from the judgment of said circuit court to the supreme court of the United States.'
March 27, 1868, an act was passed (15 St. p. 44) to the effect that 'so much of the act approved February five eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, entitled 'An act to amend 'An act to establish the judicial courts of the United States,' approved September twenty-fourth, seventeen hundred and eighty-nine' as authorizes an appeal from the judgment of the circuit court to the supreme court of the United States, or the exercise of any such jurisdiction by said supreme court on appeals which have been or may hereafter be taken, be, and the same is, hereby repealed.' Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wall. 318; Id., 7 Wall. 506; Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85.
These various provisions were carried forward into sections 751-766 of the Revised Statutes.
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