Crossett v. Campbell

Decision Date14 December 1908
Docket Number17,144
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court
PartiesCROSSETT v. CAMPBELL et al

Rehearing Denied January 18, 1909.

Appeal from Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Winn; George Wear, Judge.

Action by Fenner B. Crossett against J. W. Campbell and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

John Henry Mathews, for appellant.

Casimir Moss, for appellees.

OPINION

MONROE J.

Statement of the Case.

This is an action for damages in which plaintiff appears before this court as appellant from a judgment rejecting his demands.

He states his supposed cause of action by alleging that:

"Petitioner was in company with his wife and friends on an open lot, in the village of Dodson, * * * behaving himself, in every respect, as a good citizen should do; * * * that, while so situated, J. W. Campbell, the marshal of the town, * * * and W. C. Johnson, acting in conjunction with and aiding and assisting each other, did, with force and arms, unlawfully arrest, detain, and imprison your petitioner, by seizing hold of your petitioner's body and drawing a deadly weapon on your petitioner, and, in this manner, dragged your petitioner through a large assembly of people congregated there, and did in this manner forcibly detain petitioner, against his will for some considerable time; * * * that there never did exist any warrant or legal process whatever authorizing either the said J. W. Campbell or the said W. C. Johnson to take petitioner in their custody or to detain or imprison him; * * * that said acts furnish an instance of false imprisonment for which they should be held liable in solido; * * * that, on account of said false imprisonment, he has suffered damages * * * in the sum of $ 3,000; and he prays judgment against the defendants in solido."

An exception of no cause of action was filed and overruled, and, defendant having answered, the case was tried on its merits, developing the following facts: The boys of the Dodson High School, having decided to celebrate their commencement by giving a public picnic, to be followed in the afternoon by a game of baseball, secured from the Tremont Lumber Company the use of certain ground, owned by the latter, from which they removed the stumps and other obstructions, and which they inclosed by encircling it with a rope and a wire. No charge was made for participation in the picnic, but, in order to provide balls and bats, and to aid in paying the expenses of the visiting, Winnfield, High School team, the Dodson boys found it necessary to charge a fee of 25 cents to those who chose to remain, or to come, after dinner, within the inclosure and witness the baseball game, and notice of their intention in that respect was published in the Dodson paper, and was also served on many of the citizens by means of postal cards, plaintiff being one of those to whom such a card was mailed. He, however, seems to have conceived the idea that the charge was an imposition, and, before going to the grounds, announced his determination not to pay it. He says in his testimony:

"About 2 o'clock the professor got up on a stump and announced for everybody to go down to the gate so that they could collect their 25 cents. Most of the ladies went, and a good lot of men. Some of them stood around and did not go."

Plaintiff's wife was one of the ladies who "went." She gave the gate keeper 10 cents, and told him she would give him the remaining 15 cents (to make up the 25 cents for her admission) before she left the grounds, and her assurance was accepted, without discussion, as satisfactory. Plaintiff though he had in his pocket more than enough money to pay the charge, was one of those "who stood around and did not go." In that situation, appeals were made by the boys to plaintiff, and to those who assumed a like position, either to pay or to go out, and most of them did one thing or the other. Plaintiff did neither. One of the boys, being asked, "What did you propose to do if a person came on the ground that day and did not want to pay a fee," replied, "We did not think that any one would want to run over us in that way. * * * Didn't think very much about that." Campbell, the marshal, had had a talk with the mayor, in which the latter had expressed the opinion that no one could be arrested or otherwise dealt with under the town ordinances for refusing to pay the admission fee, and the marshal, acting on that opinion, contented himself with merely appealing to the recalcitrants either to pay or go out. He says he explained to plaintiff and others why the charge was made, and told them, "I believe I would pay or just go out, and not create any contrariness." He did nothing more. Johnson, a citizen of the town and a friend of the boys, seems rather to have urged the matter upon the few who persisted in holding out, and, it being said by some of them, "Everybody has gone out except that Dodson fellow [referring to plaintiff], and if he will go out we will go out too," he approached plaintiff, who had already been appealed to several times, and, at this point, there is some variance in the testimony. One or two witnesses say that Johnson asked plaintiff whether he had paid; that plaintiff replied that he had not; that Johnson then requested him to go to the gate, and took him by the arm; that plaintiff resisted, slightly, at first, and then walked in the direction of the gate, all the witnesses agreeing that he settled the matter by paying before reaching the gate. Plaintiff says that Johnson asked if he had been to the gate; that he replied, "No, my wife has made arrangement"; that Johnson then said, "Consider yourself under arrest for resisting an officer," and grabbed him by the arm; that he "finally got loose, * * * was not trying very hard, and, when he did, Johnson grabbed him again," and "threw his hand back like he was going to pull a gun"; that he (plaintiff) said, "You can't arrest me, for I am not bothering you"; that Johnson said, "Pay up, then, pay up," and that he went with Johnson for a distance of some 75 yards, when he paid up and was released. Johnson says: "I said, 'Mr. Crossett, everybody has gone out but you, and it don't look nice for you to stay;'" and I said, "If I was you, I would go out, and act nice about it," and he said, "My wife paid," and I said, "Did she pay for you?" and I asked Mrs. Crossett did she pay for him, and she said, "No;" and I...

To continue reading

Request your trial
25 cases
  • Nguyen v. La. State Bd. of Cosmetology
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana
    • February 20, 2017
    ...of the liberty of the person.’ " Rice v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. , 770 F.3d 1122, 1136 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Crossett v. Campbell , 122 La. 659, 48 So. 141, 143 (1908) ). To establish a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she was detained and (2) her deten......
  • Kelly v. West Cash & Carry Bldg. Materials
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • October 20, 1999
    ...or threatened physical restraint. False imprisonment is the unlawful and total restraint of the liberty of the person. Crossett v. Campbell, 122 La. 659, 48 So. 141 (1908).4 Submission to the mere verbal direction of an employer, unaccompanied by force or by threats, does not constitute fal......
  • Heaney v. Roberts
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • January 23, 2017
    ...of the liberty of the person." Rice v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. , 770 F.3d 1122, 1136 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Crossett v. Campbell , 122 La. 659, 48 So. 141, 143 (1908) ). The district court found that probable cause was not required because "Heaney was not formally arrested and the only de......
  • Rice v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • October 27, 2014
    ...False Imprisonment False imprisonment is the “unlawful and total restraint of the liberty of the person.” Crossett v. Campbell, 122 La. 659, 664, 48 So. 141, 143 (La.1908). To prove their claim for false imprisonment, the Rice Plaintiffs must prove that (1) Rice was detained and (2) his det......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT