Crossville Med. Oncology v. Glenwood Sys. LLC

• Decision Date: 11 January 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:10-00061,Case No. 2:04-00091
• Parties: CROSSVILLE MEDICAL ONCOLOGY, P.C., Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. GLENWOOD SYSTEMS, LLC, d/b/a GLENWOOD SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff. GLENWOOD SYSTEMS, LLC, d/b/a GLENWOOD SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiffs, v. DAVID C. TABOR, M.D., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

CROSSVILLE MEDICAL ONCOLOGY, P.C.,

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

v.GLENWOOD SYSTEMS, LLC, d/b/a

GLENWOOD SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.

GLENWOOD SYSTEMS, LLC, d/b/a

GLENWOOD SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiffs,

v.DAVID C. TABOR, M.D., Defendant.

Case No. 2:04-00091

Case No. 2:10-00061

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

Dated: January 11, 2011

Consolidated with:

JUDGE HAYNES

ORDER

Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 provides the following standards for consolidation of separate actions:

(a) Consolidation. If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may:

(1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions;

(2) consolidate the actions; or

(3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.

(b) Separate Trials. For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims. When ordering a separate trial, the court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.

Courts that have applied Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 to explain that the primary purpose of joining actions is to "promote convenience and judicial economy." Johnson v, Manhattan Railway Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97, 53 S.Ct. 721, 77 L.Ed. 1331 (1973); Katz v. Realty Equities of New York, 521 F.2d 1354, 1358 (2d Cir. 1975); May v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 600, 603 (S.D. Ohio 1981). Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 is also "designed to encourage consolidation where common questions of law or fact are present." 9 Wright & Miller's Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2383 at 26061 (1971); United States v. Knauer, 149 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1945), affd, 328 U.S. 654, 66 S.Ct. 1304, 90 L.Ed. 1500 (1946). See also 5 Moore's Federal Practice § 42.02.

To be sure, "[consolidation does not merge the two suits into a single cause or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another." Midwest Community Council v. Chicago Park Dist, 98 F.R.D. 491, 499 (N.D. 111. 1983) citing McKenzie v. United States, 678 F.2d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1982); cf. Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 657 F.2d 124 (7^th Cir. 1981). "[Hence] [i]f two cases appear to this Court to be of like nature and relative to the same question, if a joint trial of them would avoid unnecessary costs and delay, and it is reasonable to try them together, it is within this Court's discretionary power to order consolidation." Midwest Community Council, 98 F.R.D. at 499, citing Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 292, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706 (1982).

Thus, the District Court possesses discretion to determine when actions involving common questions of law or fact are before the Court and whether such cases are proper for consolidation. Even where cases involve common questions of law or fact, consolidation may be rejected if upon consolidation, confusion and prejudice are likely to occur. "Where prejudice to the rights of the parties obviously results from the order of consolidation, the action of the trialjudge has been held reversible error." Dupont v. Souther Pacific Co., 366 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1966), cert denied, 396 U.S. 958, 87 S.Ct. 1027, 18 L.Ed.2d 106 (1967). Critical to the resolution of such consolidation motion is whether confusion will occur or the rights of any party will be prejudiced by the consolidation. Wright...