Crouch v. W. Express, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 March 2014
• Docket Number: NO. 3:11-0903,3:11-0903
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
• Parties: HERNDON CROUCH and DAN KLABANOFF v. WESTERN EXPRESS, INC.

HERNDON CROUCH and DAN KLABANOFF v. WESTERN EXPRESS, INC.

NO. 3:11-0903

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

Dated: March 19, 2014

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court is Defendant Western Express, Inc.'s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, motion for a new trial (Docket Entry No. 86), to which the Plaintiffs have responded in opposition (Docket No. 88). Also before the Court is the Defendant's reply (Docket Entry No. 89). For the reasons discussed herein, this motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Herndon Crouch ("Crouch"), Dan Klabanoff ("Klabanoff"), and William Allen, Jr. ("Allen") brought this action against Western Express, Inc. ("Western Express") alleging claims of age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. ( "ADEA") and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-101, et seq. ("THRA"). Western Express is a trucking company headquartered in Nashville, Tennessee, and the former employer of the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs alleged that they were wrongfully terminated fromemployment because of their ages¹ despite performing their assigned duties in an acceptable and satisfactory manner. See Joint Pretrial Order (Docket Entry No. 49), at 2. The Defendant denied that it terminated the Plaintiffs from their employment because of their ages and contended that each Plaintiff had performance issues at his job and that the decisions to terminate the Plaintiffs' employment were made because of legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons. Id.

The case was tried to a jury on April 16-18, 2013. Upon the conclusion of the Plaintiffs' proof, the Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion was granted as to Allen and his claims were dismissed. See Order Entered May 14, 2013 (Docket Entry No. 70). The motion was denied as to Crouch and Klabanoff and their claims were submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the two Plaintiffs awarding Crouch back pay in the amount of $50,000.00 and compensatory damages in the amount of $10,000.00 and awarding Klabanoff back pay in the amount of $15,000.00 and compensatory damages in the amount of $10,000.00. The jury also found that the Plaintiffs had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant's conduct was a willful or reckless violation of the ADEA.

II. THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION

Following the jury verdict, the Defendant timely filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or, alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In support of its renewed request for judgment as a matter of law, the Defendant contends that:

(1) statements allegedly made by the Defendant's employees do not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination because the statements are too isolated, ambiguous, and unrelated to the decision-making process to equal direct evidence of age discrimination;

(2) even if the alleged statements do constitute direct evidence of discrimination, the Defendant would have made the same employment decisions concerning Plaintiffs Crouch and Klabanoff regardless, negating liability;

(3) the Plaintiffs lack sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of fact concerning whether the Defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its adverse employment actions were a pretext for age discrimination;

(4) the Plaintiffs lack evidence that the Defendant committed willful violations of the

ADEA; and

(5) in the event that the Defendant's motion is denied as to Crouch, the award of back pay to Crouch should be reduced to six (6) months of back pay based on the undisputed evidence that he would have been laid off in July 2011.

See Docket Entry No. 86.

In support of its alternative request for a new trial, the Defendant contends that:

(1) the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence;

(2) the Court's admission of the testimony of Shawn Fancher concerning comments allegedly made by Clarence Easterday was erroneous because the comments were irrelevant or, even if relevant, were unfairly prejudicial and confusing and amounted to more than merely harmless error; and

(3) the Court's jury instructions and verdict forms regarding willfulness under the ADEA were erroneous, confusing, misleading, and prejudicial because they did not properly inform the jury that upon a finding of willfulness, the Court was required to award the Plaintiffs liquidated damages in an amount equal to the award of back pay.

Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Renewed Motion for Judgment as Matter of Law under Rule 50(b)

A motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) may only be granted when, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issue of material fact remains for the jury, and all reasonable minds would necessarily find in favor of the moving party. Gray v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 263 F.3d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 2001); Patton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 234 F.3d 1269, 1269 (6th Cir. 2000). A party seeking a judgment as a matter of law must "overcome the substantial deference owed a jury verdict." Radvansky v. City of Olmstead Falls, 496 F.3d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court must affirm the jury verdict unless the Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake resulting in plain injustice has been committed or if the verdict is contrary to all reason. Schoonover v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 147 F.3d 492, 494 (6th Cir. 1998). The Defendant must show the evidence was so overwhelming that no jury could reasonably find in favor of the Plaintiffs. Id. In undertaking its analysis, the Court may not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2010); Radvansky, 496 F.3d at 614.

The ADEA prohibits an employer from failing or refusing to hire, discharging, or discriminating "'against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.'" Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).² A plaintiff may obtain relief under the ADEA if the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the "but-for"cause of the challenged employment action. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009). A violation of the ADEA can be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Provenzano, supra; Martin v. Toledo Cardiology Consultants, Inc., 548 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2008). Direct evidence of discrimination is that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions. Provenzano, supra; Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Direct evidence does not require the fact finder to draw any inferences to reach that conclusion. See Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 440 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2006). Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is proof that does not on its face establish discriminatory animus, but does allow a fact finder to draw a reasonable inference that discrimination occurred. Id.

The Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to show that the Plaintiffs' age was the "but-for" cause of their terminations. The Defendant first contends that evidence of statements made by Ron Rich, the Defendant's Breakdown Department Manager, to Klabanoff and Crouch cannot be viewed as direct evidence of discrimination because Mr. Rich was not the ultimate decision maker with respect to the employment decisions regarding Crouch and Klabanoff and, further, because the comments made by Mr. Rich were too isolated, ambiguous, and unrelated to the decision-making process to constitute direct evidence of age discrimination.³

The Court does not agree. There was evidence before the jury in the testimony of Mr. Rich, Mr. Morrison, and Mr. Easterday that Mr. Rich was one of the Defendant's management employees who was involved in the decision making regarding the terminations of Crouch and Klabanoff.⁴Accordingly, the comments at issue were not remarks made by a random management employee in the Defendant's workplace. Further, these comments were all made within 45 days of the termination decisions regarding Crouch and Klabanoff. The comments were not made so far removed from the date of the terminations that the comments could not be reasonably viewed as having a proximate link to the termination decisions. Additionally, each of the comments related specifically to a negative link between older age and job performance or a positive link between younger age and job performance, each of the comments was specifically made in the context of the jobs of Klabanoff and Crouch, and two of the comments were direct comments on the age of Crouch and Klabanoff, respectively, made in a negative manner as it related to their jobs with the Defendant. The Court does not view the comments as vague, ambiguous, or isolated. See Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc., 726 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2013). The comments were direct evidence that could reasonably be viewed as supporting the Plaintiffs' claims, and the comments were properly presented to the jury for review. Whether the comments were innocuous, were significant evidence of discriminatory ageist animus, or fell somewhere in between was a determination to be made by the jury.

The Defendant next contends that it produced evidence at trial showing that reasons other than the Plaintiffs' ages motivated the termination decisions. As to Plaintiff Crouch, the Defendantasserts that its evidence showed that Crouch was...