Crouse v. McVickar

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CULLEN
• Citation: Crouse v. McVickar, 207 N.Y. 213 (N.Y. 1912)
• Decision Date: 31 December 1912
• Parties: CHARLES E. CROUSE, Appellant, v. DOROTHEA E. MCVICKAR et al., Respondents.

207 N.Y. 213

100 N.E. 697

CROUSE

v.McVICKAR et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 31, 1912.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Action by Charles E. Crouse against Dorothea Edgarita McVickar and others. Judgment for defendant was modified and affirmed by the Appellate Division (143 App. Div. 956,128 N. Y. Supp. 1119), and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

D. Raymond Cobb, of Syracuse, for appellant.

Charles O. Mass, and Morgan M. Mann. both of New York City, and William Rubin, of Syracuse, for respondents.

CULLEN, C. J.

One Crouse died on the 21st day of November, 1892, leaving a last will and testament whereby, after many legacies, he bequeathed a large residuary estate of personalty to the persons who would be entitled to take the same, under the law, if he had died intestate. To plaintiff and certain others, first cousins of the testator, were his next of kin, unless the defendant Dorothea Edgarita Crouse, who was then an infant aged six years, was his legitimate child. The claim was made on behalf of said infant that she was such child, and by the defendant Eula H. Potulicka that she was the widow of said testator. In this state of conflicting claims the executors of the will of the deceased brought an action in the Supreme Court against all the various persons claiming any portion of the estate under the will, asking that it be determined who were entitled to the estate. The complaint in this action does not set forth in full the judgment roll in the executors' action, but it does state the object of the action, and that the issue in it was as to the status of the defendant Dorothea. It alleges that the action was brought on for trial, when the parties entered into stipulation, by which it was agreed that the conflicting claimants, the first cousins on one side and Dorothea on the other, should share the residuary estate equally, and that judgment to that effect should be had. In accordance with the stipulation, which the guardian was authorized by the court to make on behalf of the infant, judgment was entered on the 19th day of February, 1895, which decreed that the residuary estate be divided as stipulated; certain deductions being made from the infant's share in favor of third parties, details of which are immaterial in this controversy. A copy of that judgment is annexed to the complaint, and forms part thereof. The complaint then charges that the claim on behalf of Dorothea was not only false, but fraudulent and made in bad faith, and that it was intended to support it by the perjury of certain witnesses, who had been suborned for the purposes; that plaintiff did not know at the time, and had no means of knowing that the claim was fraudulent, but supposed it was made in good faith; and that, relying on the false statements made in various stages of the suit, he made the compromise and entered into the stipulation above recited. He asks as relief that the judgment be set aside, and that the defendant Dorothea restore to him the moneys awarded to her out of his share.

[1] I think the courts below were right in holding the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The complaint was evidently framed, and the appeal has been argued, as if the action were to set aside for fraud merely an agreement to compromise, and to recover money paid thereunder. But this is a mistaken view. There is a solemn judgment rendered in one action which it is sought to attack by another. The court whose decree is assailed had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, of the parties thereto, and jurisdiction to render a judgment distributing the estate of the decedent. It matters not whether that judgment was right or wrong. Until reversed on appeal or set aside, it was conclusive . Nor does it matter that when the cause was brought on for trial, instead of hearing testimony the court made its decree on the stipulation of the parties. A judgment by default is as conclusive as any other judgment, and a judgment rendered on the express stipulation of the parties can hardly be of less effect than one rendered on the failure of a party to appear. Parties may, by their stipulation, make the law of the case, which the courts may, and at times are bound, to enforce. Matter of N. Y., Lackawanna & W. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 447.

The judgment sought to be set aside was therefore subject to the same, and only to the same, attack that could be made on any other judgment. It is doubtless true that a judgment can be set aside for fraud by an action brought for that purpose; but it is the settled law, save possibly in one or twojurisdictions,that the fraud for which a judgment can be impeached must be in some matter other than the issue...