Crouse v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 02 March 1891
• Docket Number: 42
• Citation: 140 Pa. 335,21 A. 358
• Parties: JOHN CROUSE ET AL. v. DANIEL MURPHY ET AL
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

21 A. 358

140 Pa. 335

JOHN CROUSE ET AL. v. DANIEL MURPHY ET AL

No. 42

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

March 2, 1891

Argued January 19, 1891

APPEAL BY CHARLES ROGGENMOSER FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NO. 2 OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY.

No. 42 July Term 1890, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 527 March Term 1888, C.P. No. 2.

On February 1, 1889, a scire facias was issued at the suit of John Crouse and Elizabeth Schwartz, trading as Crouse &amp Schwartz, to revive against Daniel Murphy, defendant, and Charles Roggenmoser, terre-tenant, a judgment for $1,000 entered on April 27, 1888, in favor of the plaintiff and against said Daniel Murphy.

The terre-tenant, Roggenmoser, having appeared and made defence a case stated was agreed upon showing the following facts:

"Judgment was entered in this case on April 27, 1888, upon a judgment note dated April 26, 1888, for $1,000, payable in one day after date, etc., as appears of record. This note was signed by the defendant by the name, 'Daniel Murphy.' At the request of the prothonotary, a memorandum in pencil was made, at the time of entering judgment, below the defendant's signature to the note, in these words: 'Drover, 4120 Parrish St.,' thereby indicating, according to the usage of the prothonotary's office, the occupation and residence of the defendant. The place so indicated was then the defendant's residence. The said memorandum still appears upon said note. The judgment was duly entered on the judgment index of the court as against 'Daniel Murphy' and has remained as such unsatisfied, and no part of the same has been paid.

"The defendant had been a drover or dealer in live stock, in the stock yards in the city of Philadelphia, from about 1872 until 1888, and was known among his friends and transacted his business as simply 'Daniel Murphy' or 'Dan Murphy.' The plaintiffs knew him only by these names; they are dealers in live stock at said stock yards. He had for many years as his only business sign, a tin sign with the name 'D. Murphy,' which sign was displayed in a conspicuous place in said stock yards. He transacted his business through the stock yards, in giving and receiving orders of various kinds, in the name 'Dan'l Murphy' or 'Daniel Murphy;' and his accounts were kept in such names with his knowledge, by the book-keepers of the stock yard association through which he did business. He kept his bank account during the whole period from 1872 to 1888, and signed his checks in the name of 'Daniel Murphy.' The defendant's full name is Daniel Joseph Murphy, and he has been doing business in the city of Chicago in the name of Daniel J. Murphy since June, 1888.

"At the time of the entering of judgment, as above stated, the defendant owned certain real estate in the city of Philadelphia, situate at the southeast corner of Myrtle and Holly streets, which he had acquired by deed dated June 27, 1883, and recorded July 11, 1883, in . . . in which deed he was described as 'Daniel J. Murphy.' He gave a purchase money mortgage of the same date by the name 'Daniel J. Murphy,' and April 23, 1888, gave a second mortgage by the same name.

"By deed dated August 23, 1888, and recorded August 27, 1888 in . . . the defendant by the name 'Daniel J. Murphy' conveyed the above mentioned property to Charles Roggenmoser, the terre-tenant above named, for the consideration of $1,200, subject to the payment of the said purchase money mortgage of $3,500. The defendant, from the time of purchasing the said property until shortly before conveying the same as aforesaid, had occupied the same as his residence.

"At the time of his purchase, Charles Roggenmoser, the terre-tenant above named, caused searches to be taken against 'Daniel J. Murphy,' but the plaintiffs' judgment was not shown upon his search; he then made settlement, paid said purchase money to said Murphy, or on his account, the said deed was delivered, and he is in possession of the said premises. He had no actual knowledge of the entering of the plaintiffs' judgment, or that Murphy was known by any other name than that by which he held the title and executed the deed. The name of the defendant, during the time in question and for a long time previous, appeared in the city directories of Philadelphia as 'Daniel J. Murphy,' but was not so inserted by his authority. There were a number of other persons of the name 'Daniel Murphy' residing in the city of Philadelphia at the time of this transaction.

"The plaintiffs had no knowledge of the defendant using the name 'Daniel J. Murphy' or taking title to property in that name.

"If the court be of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover as against the terre-tenant, judgment to be entered for plaintiffs for one thousand dollars, with interest from April 26, 1888; but if the court be of opinion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover as against the terre-tenant, judgment to be entered for Charles Roggenmoser, terre-tenant."

After argument, the court, on April 12, 1890, without opinion filed, entered judgment for the plaintiffs, liquidated at $1,124.33; whereupon the terre-tenant took this appeal specifying that the court erred:

1. In entering judgment for the plaintiffs on the case stated.

The judgment is reversed, and judgment is now entered in favor of the defendant upon the case stated.

Mr. J. B. Colahan, Jr., (with him Mr. John G. Johnson), for the appellant:

1. The facts do not establish anything more than that Daniel J. Murphy traded at the time in question as Daniel Murphy, and this amounts to nothing more than if he had done business under the name of Daniel Murphy & Co. Whatever name he did business under, or whatever abbreviated name he may have been known by among his intimate acquaintances, his true name remained the same. The facts show that he had not abandoned the J as a part of his name, and, as there were other Daniel Murphys in the city, it was an important mark by which to distinguish him. The terre-tenant has been guilty of no laches, but has done all that he was bound to do in the way of examining for liens.

2. The terre-tenant was entitled to record notice of the judgment, and no part of it could rest in parol: Zimmerman v. Briggans, 5 W. 186. And it was the plaintiffs' duty to see that their judgment was rightly entered, so as to give notice to purchasers; and the middle initial of the defendant's name is essential, when its omission may deceive a purchaser: Wood v. Reynolds, 7 W. & S. 406; Heil's App., 40 Pa. 453; Hutchinson's App., 92 Pa. 186. Any other rule would bring conveyancing to a standstill in a city like Philadelphia. The only safeguard of purchasers will lie in a decision that a man can have but one name at a time, and that the occasional or even frequent use of an additional name does not amount to an abandonment or change of the real one. Jenny v. Zehnder, 101 Pa. 296, was not intended to overrule Wood v. Reynolds, supra, and is distinguishable from the case at bar.

Mr. Henry T. Dechert (with him Mr. Henry M. Dechert), for the appellees:

1. The appellant's argument ignores the facts that the defendant signed the judgment note by his usual name, "Daniel Murphy;" that his identity was fixed by the record, through the prothonotary's practice of requiring his occupation and residence to be given on the judgment note; and that he was known to the plaintiffs as Daniel Murphy only, and was so known generally. His business was so carried on for sixteen years. The argument, however, that Daniel Murphy was a trading name or a nickname for Daniel J. Murphy, cannot be urged seriously in view of the facts. On the contrary, the case stated finds that the defendant was known generally as Daniel Murphy. The only instances of his use of the initial J are in acquiring and conveying a single piece of real estate.

2. The form in which the defendant's name appeared in the city directory is irrelevant, as it was admittedly not authorized by him. Nor can the name by which he has done business in another city, since the plaintiffs' rights became vested, in any manner affect the case. And it was no part of the plaintiffs' duty to examine the title to the defendant's real estate to see by what name he may have chosen to take that title. Their judgment was properly entered, if the defendant was commonly and generally known by the name given on the record. The case is ruled by Jenny v. Zehnder, 101 Pa. 296. None of the cases cited by appellant affect its authority or are in conflict with it. The inconvenience of searching is an incident which cannot affect the rights of lien holders.

Before PAXSON, C.J., STERRETT, GREEN, CLARK, WILLIAMS, McCOLLUM and MITCHELL, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE WILLIAMS:

The intention to protect an innocent purchaser against secret liens and conveyances manifested itself very early in this state. An act of the colonial legislature passed in 1772 ^[*] made it the duty of "any judge or other officer of a court of record within this province that shall sign any judgments," to enter the date of signing on the margin of the record, and declared that the lien of the judgment thereafter should begin at that date, instead of extending, by relation, to the first day of the term or the return of the original writ. Three years later ^[+] it was made the duty of purchasers to record their deeds within six months, and if they failed to do so, their unrecorded deeds were to be held fraudulent and void against subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees. Prior to 1775 there was no duty to record resting on purchasers, and one buying land was bound to investigate the title at his peril: Maclay v. Work, 5 Binn. 154. In 1798 the duration of the lien of a judgment upon the defendant's land was limited to five years, unless duly revived. ^[++] ...