Appeal
from Circuit Court, Carroll County; Wm. Henry Forsythe, Jr.
Judge.
"To
be officially reported."
Benjamin
F. Crouse was convicted of violating the anti-saloon law, and
appeals. Affirmed.
Argued
before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, PATTISON, URNER
STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ.
BURKE
J.
The
appellant in this case was indicted, tried, and found guilty
in the circuit court for Carroll county for the violation of
the anti-saloon law of that county, being Acts 1914, chapter
492, as amended by Acts 1916, chapter 340, and was adjudged
to pay a fine of $20 and costs, and stand committed to the
custody of the sheriff of Carroll county until the fine and
costs are paid or be discharged in due course of law. The
appeal before us was taken from that judgment.
The
appellant filed a demurrer to the indictment, and to each
count thereof, which was overruled. The indictment contained
three counts, but the state abandoned the second count. The
appellant reserved an exception to the action of the court in
permitting the state to prove the sale of intoxicating
liquor, as charged in the indictment. The demurrer was
interposed, and the exception reserved, for the purpose of
raising the single question presented by this record, viz.
the constitutionality of the law. It was contended with great
earnestness by counsel for the appellant that the law is
invalid, because it contravenes that provision of section 29,
article 3, of the Constitution, which declares that:
"Every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace
but one subject, and that shall be described in its
title."
In the
presentation of their objections to the act, counsel indulged
in a wide range of discussion, but the legal question
presented is a narrow and familiar one, and, we think, is not
difficult of solution. The court must approach the
consideration of the questions here presented in the light of
well-established principles. The section of the Constitution
quoted deals with two things: First, the subject of the
enactment; and, secondly, its title. The first must be
single, and the second must describe the subject. It was said
in Fout v. Frederick County, 105 Md. 545, 66 A. 487,
that:
"The general disposition of the courts has been to give
a liberal construction to this provision of the Constitution,
rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose
strictness is unnecessary to render effective the purposes
for which it was adopted. It is stated by Judge Cooley that
the general purpose of this provision of the Constitution is
accomplished
when the law has but one general object, which is fairly
indicated in its title, and that to require every end and
means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of
this general object to be provided for, by a separate act
relating to that alone, would be not only unreasonable, but
would render legislation impossible. This court has had
occasion to pass so frequently upon this provision of the
Constitution that its purpose and meaning may be assumed to
be well understood and thoroughly well settled. The
difficulty in this, as in other cases, is found to exist in
the application of the settled rule to the particular case.
There must be unity in the subject-matter of the act, but
'if the several sections of the law refer to and are
germane to the same subject-matter, which is described in
its title, it is considered as embracing but a single
subject, and as satisfying the requirements of the
Constitution in this respect.' Mayor, etc., v.
Reitz, 50 Md. 579. The title is sufficient if it
fairly indicates the subject-matter of the
enactment. These rules of construction have been stated and
applied by this court in every case in which it has been
called upon to consider this section of the Constitution,
from the case of Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 decided in 1854, in which the question was
before the court for the first time, to the case of
Mayor, etc., v. Flack et al., 104 Md. 107 , decided October 4, 1906, and in all of the cases it
is held that the title need not contain an abstract of the
act; nor mention the means or methods by which it is to be
carried into effect; nor will an act of a general nature be
declared obnoxious to this clause of the Constitution,
unless there be ingrafted upon it some subject of a private
or a local character, or unless two or more dissimilar and
discordant subjects be legislated upon in the same law. If
foreign, irrelevant, or discordant subjects are introduced,
they will be rejected, if other sections of the law can
stand without them."
In
State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91, 16 A. 445, Judge Alvey,
speaking of the title of an act, said:
"The objects designed to be attained by the
constitutional provision are twofold: The first is to prevent
the combination in one act of several distinct and
incongruous subjects; and the second is that the Legislature
and the people of the state may be fairly advised of the real
nature of pending legislation. All titles of acts, therefore,
should be so framed as to accomplish these objects. But we
regret to say that, in practice, a strict observance of the
terms of the Constitution has not always marked our
legislation in this respect. Many acts are passed, and often
of great importance, the titles of which are exceedingly
deficient in definite and clear description of the
subject-matter of the act. But this court has ever been
reluctant to defeat the will of the Legislature by declaring
such legislation void, if by any construction it could
possibly be maintained."
We said
in Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 87 A. 413:
"Every presumption favors the validity of the statute;
it cannot be stricken down as void unless it plainly
contravenes some provision of the Constitution; a reasonable
doubt as to its constitutionality is sufficient to sustain
it, and the party assailing the Act must point out the
special provision of the Constitution to which it is
obnoxious. * * * 'A statute may be good in part, while
other parts are invalid. If a portion be unconstitutional,
the Court is not authorized, for that reason, to declare the
whole void.' Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 . In Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray
[Mass.] 482, where the same rule of construction was
adopted, the court said: "The constitutional and
unconstitutional provisions may even be contained in the same
sections, and yet be perfectly distinct and separable, so
that the first may stand, though the last fall. The point is,
not whether they are contained in the same section, for the
distribution into sections is purely artificial; but
whether they are essentially and inseparably connected in
substance."'
In
People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N.E. 865, 123
Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994, in which the
constitutionality of the local option act of 1907 was
sustained, the court said:
"The rule of law is that an investigation like this,
concerning the constitutionality of an act of the
Legislature, begins with the presumption that the act is
valid. All doubts or uncertainties, arising either from the
language of the Constitution or the act, must be resolved in
favor of the validity of the act, and the court will only
assume to declare it void in case of a clear conflict with
the Constitution. The duty of the court is to so construe
acts of the Legislature as to uphold their constitutionality
and validity, if it can reasonably be done, and if their
construction is doubtful, the doubt will be resolved in favor
of the law. * * * If the subject is not expressed in the
title or if the act embraces more than one subject the act
will be void, and in this act the creation and abolition of
anti-saloon territory is expressed in the title and covered
by the body. In deciding the question whether the act
embraces more than one subject we are to be governed by
certain well-established rules. The only purpose of the
provision of the Constitution is to prevent the joining in
one act of incongruous and unrelated matters, and the word
'subject' is not synonymous with 'provision.'
Any number of provisions may be contained in an act, however
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general
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