Crow v. Monsell, 10802

• Decision Date: 29 May 1967
• Docket Number: No. 10802,10802
• Citation: 200 So.2d 700
• Parties: O. P. CROW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Annie Lee MONSELL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 700

200 So.2d 700

O. P. CROW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Annie Lee MONSELL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10802.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

May 29, 1967.

Rehearing Denied July 27, 1967.

Ford E. Stinson, Benton, for appellant.

J. L. Thomas, Jr., Bossier City, Henri Loridans, New Orleans, for appellee.

Before HARDY, AYRES, and BOLIN, JJ.

AYRES, Judge.

This is an action for specific performance of a contract of February 23, 1965, to sell a tract of land for a price of $10,000.00 . Plaintiff paid $500.00 at the time of execution of the contract, which was to be applied on the purchase price of the property, and, through a letter from his attorney to defendant, tendered the balance of the agreed consideration. The defendant having refused to comply with the agreement, this action followed.

Defendant interposed an exception of no cause or right of action on the ground that the contract should be interpreted in such a manner as to relieve either party of liability in the event defendant failed to tender a valid title. On the merits, defendant urged the special defense of lesion beyond moiety, claiming the value of the land to have been more than $20,000.00 at the time of execution of the contract of sale. Defendant's exception was overruled and, after trial on the merits of the case, there was judgment ordering defendant to execute a conveyance of the property in accordance with the terms of the contract. From the judgment, defendant appealed.

The provision of the contract upon which defendant's exception is based provides:

'The obligation of Vendee to purchase, as hereinabove recited, is, however, contingent upon vendor. * * *

'a. Tendering a legal, valid and merchantable title to the hereinabove described property, in default of which this contract shall terminate and both parties shall be relieved of all obligations hereunder without liability or responsibility of any kind or character, * * *.'

The conclusion is inescapable, when this provision is read in connection with a provision subsequently appearing in the contract to the effect that either party thereto shall have the right to specific performance in the event of failure by the other to perform, that the intent of the parties was to relieve either party from liability only in the event the vendor's title should prove to be defective.

A cardinal rule for the interpretation of contracts is that courts must seek for and ascertain, if possible, the mutual intention of the parties. LSA-C.C. Art. 1945; Cooley v. Meridian Lumber Co., 195 La. 631, 197 So. 255 (1940); Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Lewis (La.App.) 68 So.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1953--cert. denied). Although language employed in contracts is usually interpreted according to the ordinary and customary meaning of the words used, clauses couched in general terms, which if taken literally, would lead to unreasonable consequences must be construed according to what, under all circumstances, was probably the intention of the parties. Losecco v. Gregory, 108 La. 648, 32 So. 985 (1901); Molero v. California Company (La.App.) 145 So.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1962--cert. denied). Where the words of a contract are susceptible of more than one meaning, courts must give them the interpretation that carries out the object and purpose of the contract. Robbert v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 217 La. 325, 46 So .2d 286 (1950). Even where the words used in a contract are fairly explicit, it is the duty of the courts to refrain from construing them in such a manner as to lead to absurd consequences. LSA-C.C. Art. 1945; Texaco, Inc. v. Vermilion Parish School Board, 244 La. 408, 152 So.2d 541 (1963); Bondio v. Joseph Binder, Inc. (La.App.) 24 So.2d 398 (Orl. 1946).

To sustain defendant's contention would lead to an unreasonable, inequitable, and absurd result. Plaintiff and defendant entered into a serious contract whereby defendant agreed to sell and plaintiff agreed to buy the tract of land described in their contract, in connection with the execution of which plaintiff made a deposit to be applied upon the purchase price of the property. The agreement further provides that either party shall have the right to specific performance.

Should defendant's position be upheld, his agreement to sell would be dependent upon his will to tender, if he so desired, a title to the property. His obligation would thus be dependent upon a potestative condition. A reasonable interpretation of the agreement as a whole does not lead to such an inequitable or absurd result.

Nor do we find any basis for the release of defendant from her obligation to sell because of lesion beyond moiety. 'Lesion' is defined as the injury suffered by one who does not receive a full equivalent for what he gives in a commutative contract. LSA-C.C. Art. 1860. In matters of sales of immovable property, the vendor may be relieved if the price given is less than one-half of the value of the property sold. LSA-C.C. Art. 1861.

The application of these principles is dependent upon a determination of the value of the property at the time the contract was entered into. Such determination is a factual matter to be resolved from the record as made up on the trial of the case.

The property involved comprises 13.01 acres of land located at the northeast corner of the intersection of U.S. Highway 80 and the Bellevue Road, upon which is located and old frame store building formerly used as a grocery store. Across the highway and in the vicinity of the subject property is a dilapidated filling station, an old abandoned tourist court, a fairly modern store, and a junk yard. A portion of the property, from its use as a dump, had the appearance of an unsightly wrecking yard. The property was located three-and-one-half miles east of the municipal limits of Bossier City.

Four expert witnesses testified as to the value of the property. Mrs. Bertha Maude Sweeney placed a value of $32,000.00 on the property. This appraisal was based on a...