Crowder v. Bayless
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:23-CV-130 (GROH) |
| Decision Date | 07 September 2023 |
| Parties | DANNY B. CROWDER, JR., Petitioner, v. M. J. BAYLESS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY AS MOOT PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF
On May 18, 2023, the pro se Petitioner, a federal inmate who was formerly incarcerated[1] at Morgantown FCI, in Morgantown West Virginia, filed the above-styled habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1.[2] Petitioner seeks an order which submits him to a Residential Reentry Center (RRC) or Home Confinement (HC), and which directs the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to recalculate his sentence to reflect 1024 FSA credit days, and to issue a Projected Release Date (PRD) of October 19, 2021. ECF No. 1 at 8.
The matter is now before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation to the District Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and LR PL P 2. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the District Court deny as moot and dismiss the petition for habeas corpus with prejudice.
On October 22, 2013, a superseding indictment was returned in the Eastern District of Tennessee, case number 3:13-CR-137, which charged Petitioner and several codefendants in Count One of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of a controlled substance. ECF Nos. 27, 31. Petitioner was also charged with one count of being a prohibited person in possession of ammunition in Count Nine. Id. On April 17, 2014,[4]Petitioner entered a guilty plea pursuant to a written agreement to both Counts One and Nine of the superseding indictment. ECF Nos 141, 168. Petitioner waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. ECF No. 141 at 6. On January 16, 2015, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of 168 months of incarceration, comprised of 168 months as to Count One, and 120 months as to Count Nine, with those sentences served concurrently with one another. ECF No. 339, 342.
Consistent with his plea agreement, the Petitioner did not file an appeal in the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Consistent with his plea agreement, the Petitioner did not file a collateral attack of his conviction or sentence.
On May 18, 2023, Petitioner filed a petition and exhibit for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF Nos. 1, 1-1. The petition alleges that Petitioner's sentence was improperly calculated by the BOP which failed to accurately state the Home Confinement eligibility date, and which failed to calculate a Projected Release Date (PRD) in contravention of BOP Policy Statement 5400.01. ECF No. 1 at 5 - 6. Petitioner contends that he exhausted his administrative remedies, but that no response was received from General Counsel to his BP-11. Id. at 7 - 8. As relief, Petitioner requests that the Court order the BOP: (1) “to submit Petitioner for RRC/HC forthwith”; (2) to issue a Projected Release Date of October 19, 2021; and (3) to recalculate Petitioner's sentence to reflect 1024 First Step Act (FSA) credit days. Id. at 8.
On August 3, 2023, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment and a memorandum and exhibits in support thereof. ECF Nos. 10, 10-1 through 10-8. Respondent contends that the BOP correctly calculated the Petitioner's sentence including the application of Federal Time Credits pursuant to the First Step Act, having accrued 1660 program days with 430 days of Time Credits toward prerelease custody (halfway house or home confinement) and 365 days towards early transfer to supervised release [ECF No. 10-1 at 5 - 7]. Respondent also argues that the Court cannot require the BOP to review and place an inmate in prerelease custody on any earlier date than that calculated by the BOP [Id. at 7 - 10]. Further, Respondent contends that a BOP halfway house, “indicated it could accommodate [Petitioner], starting on August 30, 2023”, and that Petitioner's halfway house placement date was August 30, 2023. ECF Nos. 10-1 at 10; 10-2 at 3; 10-3 at 2; 10-8.
Petitioner filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss on August 30, 2023.[5] ECF No. 16. Therein, the Petitioner argues that Respondent concedes the Petitioner has enough time credits to be eligible for RRC placement. Id. Further, Petitioner requests that the Court apply an additional 659 days “as a credit towards the term of supervised release, either by shortening the term of probation or by shortening the term of RRC placement.” Id. at 2.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and the Court's Local Rules of Prisoner Litigation Procedure, this Court is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. This Court is charged with screening Petitioner's case to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts; see also Rule 1(b) Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (a district court may apply these rules to a habeas corpus petition not filed pursuant to § 2254).
Courts must read pro se allegations in a liberal fashion and hold those pro se pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court is required to perform a judicial review of certain suits brought by prisoners and must dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. A complaint is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (superseded by statute). The Supreme Court in Neitzke recognized that:
Section 1915(d)[6] is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. To this end, the statute accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.
Prisoners seeking to challenge the validity of their convictions or their sentences are required to proceed under § 2255 in the district court of conviction. By contrast, a petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to § 2241, is intended to address the execution of a sentence, rather than its validity, and is to be filed in the district where the prisoner is incarcerated. “As we noted in O'Brien [v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 505 (4th Cir. 2005)], the ‘essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody' and ‘the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.'” Obando-Segura v. Garland, 999 F.3d 190, 194 (4th Cir. 2021), quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). Accordingly, a petition filed pursuant to § 2241 is the appropriate method for a prisoner to challenge the fact and length of his confinement, but generally not the conditions of that confinement. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498 - 499. “[I]mmediate release or speedier release from [ ] confinement [is] the heart of habeas corpus.” Id. at 498.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a case when a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only, “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Courts long have cited, “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and therefore the Court must liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 - 1 (1972) (per curiam); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007).
Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation in pleading “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do....” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Accordingly, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” to one that is “plausible on its face.” Id. at 555,...
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