Crowder v. Va.N Bank Of Commerce Inc

• Decision Date: 10 June 1920
• Citation: 103 S.E. 578
• Parties: CROWDER. v. VIRGINIAN BANK OF COMMERCE, Inc.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

103 S.E. 578

CROWDER.

v.VIRGINIAN BANK OF COMMERCE, Inc.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

June 10, 1920.

Error to Circuit Court, Lunenburg County.

Motion in the nature of an action in assumpsit by J. N. Crowder against the Virginian Bank of Commerce, Incorporated, to recover an amount alleged to be due for rent. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and rendered.

S. S. P. Patteson, of Richmond, and Charles T. Reekes, of Boydton, for plaintiff in error.

George E. Allen, of Victoria, for defendant in error.

PRENTIS, J. [1] This controversy arises out of these facts: J. N. Crowder is the owner of property in Victoria of which the Virginian Bank of Commerce was the tenant under a lease containing this language:

"The said property is leased for a period of two years from the date hereof, yielding therefor during the said term the rent of $25 per month, payable at the expiration of each month. It is further agreed and understood that the said party of the second part shall have the privilege of renting the said property for two additional years, with the privilege of the said party of the first part advancing the rent $5 per month."

The tenancy commenced under the lease on the 1st day of July, 1914. On the 1st day of July, 1916, at the end of the two-year period first provided for, nothing was said by the parties, hut the bank continued to occupy the premises, paying therefor the advance of $5 additional rent per month for the succeeding nine months, and then gave notice of its intention to surrender the property on the 1st day of July, 1917. The landlord pro tested, declined to accept such surrender, and insisted that under the contract the bank had already exercised its privilege of renting the property for two additional years, which did not expire until July 1, 1918.

The issues of law and fact were submitted to the trial judge, who decided the case in favor of the bank.

The giving of three months' notice and the claim of right to abandon the property on the 1st day of July, 1917, indicates that at that time the bank assumed that it held as a tenant from year to year, because such a notice is required by statute to terminate such a tenancy. If so, this was an erroneous assumption. While it is true that a tenancy from year to year arises by implication when a tenant for a fixed term continues to hold over without any new agreement or understanding with his landlord except the payment and acceptance of the rent, it is also true that, if he continues to hold under any agreement, that agreement determines the relation of the parties. In this case the issue must be determined by the proper construction of the clause of the contract which gives to the tenant the privilege of renting the property for two additional years, with a corresponding privilege of the landlord to advance the rent $5 a month. In this case there was no mere holding over without more. It is claimed for the bank that the language "two additional years, " in the contract, in the absence of the words "period" or "term, " should be construed to give it the option of renting the property either for one or for two additional years, and that the facts of this case should be construed to indicate that it exercised its option to rent it for one additional year.

We cannot agree, however, that it had such an option. The only right it had under that clause was the privilege of renting the property for an extended term or period of two additional years, and, if the bank had desired to rent it for one additional year instead of two, a new agreement would have been necessary. As indicated, we are of opinion that it only had the option of taking the property for two additional years, the precise time specified, while the landlord had the right to increase the rent exactly $5 per month, in case the tenant exercised such option. The irresistible conclusion from the action of the parties is that each exercised the precise privilege accorded by the contract. This, we think, is sufficient to dispose of the case, but there is abundant authority to sustain this conclusion, if it needs any support. Peirce v. Grice, 92 Va. 763, 24...