Crowe v. Wayne County

Decision Date16 March 1962
Docket NumberNo. 97,97
Citation365 Mich. 656,114 N.W.2d 240
PartiesAnna S. CROWE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF WAYNE, a Body Politic, Board of Wayne County Auditors, Jacob P. Sumeracki, Arthur A. Sumeracki and Charies Edgecomb, Defendants and Appellees.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Harry Kobel, Harold Norris, Detroit, for plaintiff and appellant.

Samuel H. Olsen, Pros. Atty., Aloysius J. Suchy, F. Clifton Lind, Asst. Pros. Attys., Detroit, for defendants and appellees.

Before the Entire Bench except ADAMS, J.

CARR, Justice.

By resolution adopted April 11, 1950, the Board of Supervisors of Wayne County prescribed the form of an oath of allegiance to be taken by county employees, in terms requiring each taker thereof to swear or affirm that he would support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Michigan, and that he would faithfully perform the duties of his position as an employee of Wayne County to the best of his ability. Said resolution was amended on July 30, 1953, by adding thereto a sentence reading as follows:

'I FURTHER DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I AM NOT A COMMUNIST.'

The amended resolution further requested the Civil Service Commission of the county to adopt the form of oath therein set forth in place of the previously used form. The commission complied with the request.

Under the rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commission previously adopted in May, 1950, failure to subscribe to the oath of allegiance required of all employees was listed as a ground for suspension, demotion or removal. Prior to August 19, 1953, Mrs. Anna S. Crowe, plaintiff in this action, had been for several years an employee in the office of the Wayne County Treasurer. When requested to take the oath as prescribed by the amended resolution of the Board of Supervisors she refused to do so. In consequence she was discharged, whereupon she left the office and proceeded immediately to take an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In accordance with her request a hearing was had before the commission on September 2, 1953, at which Mrs. Crowe testified at some length in her own behalf and stated reasons for her refusal to take the oath as prescribed. Following the hearing, under date of September 3, 1953, the commission entered an order sustaining the action of the County Treasurer in dismissing Mrs. Crowe as an employee in his office.

It does not appear that there were any further proceedings instituted by Mrs. Crowe until January 3, 1957, when she filed a petition with the Board of Auditors of Wayne County reciting her employment in the office of the Treasurer, her refusal to take the oath prescribed for county employees, her discharge, and the subsequent affirmance of such action by the Civil Service Commission. Asserting that her discharge was wrongful, she asked by way of relief that she be granted salary from August 19, 1953, at the rate of $3,924 per annum, together with interest, and such additional sums as might be due to her for vacation pay, longevity pay increases, sick leave pay, and holiday pay. The Board of Auditors rejected the claim on March 28, 1957, and thereupon Mrs. Crowe appealed to the circuit court of Wayne County.

Defendants filed answer to the claim of appeal, denying plaintiff's claim that the requirement with reference to the taking of the oath violated her constitutional rights or was for any other reason invalid. It was also pleaded by way of affirmative defense that plaintiff was guilty of laches because of her delay in filing the petition with the Board of Auditors, that she had failed to seek review of the order of the Civil Service Commission by writ of certiorari, and that the appeal to the circuit court constituted a collateral attack on the order of the commission.

The trial of the case in circuit court began on October 24, 1958. Mrs. Crowe was a witness in her own behalf, testifying at some length as to her employment in the county service and her refusal to take the oath as prescribed by the resolution of the Board of Supervisors. In substance she indicated that her refusal to take the oath was based on the inclusion of the statement that she was not a Communist. Following the conclusion of the hearing the trial judge filed a written opinion, rejecting the claim made by plaintiff that the oath was vague and indefinite, and that it violated the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. The court further concluded that the Board of Supervisors had acted within the limits of its authority in prescribing the oath, and that plaintiff's delay, following the affirmance of her discharge by the Civil Service Commission, for the period indicated constituted an acquiescence in the discharge and abandonment of any rights that she may have had. An order was accordingly entered affirming the action of the Board of Auditors of the county. From such order plaintiff has appealed to this Court.

On behalf of appellant it is contended that the form of oath submitted to her contravened the due process clause of the Federal Constitution because of failure to specifically refer therein to the elements of knowledge and intent, that it was indefinite failed to provide proper standards, and abridged freedom of speech. The claim made involves a consideration of the exact form of the oath as prescribed, which read as follows:

'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this State, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of my position as an employee with the government of Wayne County, according to the best of my ability.

'I FURTHER DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I AM NOT A COMMUNIST.'

It will be noted that the language of the required oath is not involved, or in any respect equivocal. The argument made is directed against the statement that the employee is not a Communist. The term in question is one of common use and we think it may be assumed that citizens of this country understand its significance, and that the ordinary individual, possessing the degree of intelligence evidenced by Mrs. Crowe as a witness in her own behalf on the trial of the case and in the prior hearing before the Civil Service Commission, is fully aware whether he is a Communist or belongs to the Communist party. Certainly if one is a member of such party he is aware of that fact. It will be noted that the oath does not contain any references to 'subversive organizations', or language of like nature. Based on the record before us we do not think that it may be claimed that Mrs. Crowe refused to sign the oath because she did not understand it.

On the hearing before the commission plaintiff was questioned by an Assistant Prosecuting Attorney of the county, as well as by members of the commission. The following excerpts from her testimony are suggestive of her reasons for refusing to take the oath, and also of her understanding thereof:

'Mr. Taylor: I said, do you understand that the oath is not aimed at your personal intellectual beliefs as such, but rather at connections with, and membership in organizations which are so connected with the Russian Communist party as to be subversive in nature?

'Mrs. Crowe: Well, the reason that I didn't sign the oath is because I believe it is interference in personal, political, and religious beliefs.

'Mr. Taylor: I am not speaking of your individual beliefs as such, I am speaking of your connections. I mean, the oath is directed at organizational activities, do you understand that?

'Mrs. Crowe: Yes, I do, though I do not agree with the purpose and intent of the oath.

'Mr. Taylor: Do you understand that the oath is directed at knowing membership in groups which are subversive in nature?

'Mrs. Crowe: Yes, I do understand that, and flowing from that I believe the requirement of that kind of oath is not constitutional.

* * *

* * *

'Mr. Taylor: Well, I mean, is it your position that we may not legally require of you or ask you to take an oath certifying to the fact that you do not knowingly belong to an organization which may have as some of its purposes, subversive activity or the overthrow of this Government by force and violence?

'Mrs. Crowe: Yes, that is my position.

* * *

* * *

'Mr. Taylor: May I ask this question? You understand the form of Government we are living in?

'Mrs. Crowe: Yes, sir.

'Vice Chairman Martin: And that is by the people and for the people, do you understand that?

'Mrs. Crowe: Yes.

'Vice Chairman Martin: And elected or appointed, the people in any form of government or any branch of government have the right to make rules and regulations.

'Mrs. Crowe: Yes, I do understand that.

'Vice Chairman Martin: All right.

'Mrs. Crowe: But my question is what kind of regulations and what do they entail? Will the Commission admit that there is a period of hysteria in our society?

'Vice Chairman Martin: I don't get you.

'mrs. Crowe: I say, will the Commission admit that there is a period of hysteria in our society?

'Commissioner Burns: That has nothing to do with this at all. We are not going to get into serious debates. The question before us is did you refuse to sign that oath?

'Mrs. Crowe: May I go on to the next point on why I refused to sign the oath?

'Commissioner Burns: Surely.

'Mrs. Crowe: As I stated in my letter to the Commission, I refused to sign the oath because this would be the end of Civil Service protection. I put in my letter something to the effect that, in view of the braodness of this oath, in view of the fact that the full force of the oath has not been felt yet, who are we to assume that the period--I grant that there is a period of hysteria. I saw it in action in the County Treasurer's office when I refused to sign the oath. I metioned in the letter the '54 senatorial and the '56 presidential campaigns. To me, this is the foot in the door for the destruction of Civil Service. Whatever reasons, or...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Bass v. Spitz
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • March 23, 1981
    ...(Mich.Stat.Ann. § 5.1191(12) (Callaghan 1973)). The doctrine should be applied here. See generally Crowe v. County of Wayne, 365 Mich. 656, 114 N.W.2d 240 (1961) (Black, J., concurring); Doyle v. Kammeraad, 310 Mich. 233, 17 N.W.2d 165 1 The suspension notice stated that it was an "indefini......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT