Crowell v. State Pub. Defender, 12–2226.

• Decision Date: 12 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–2226.,12–2226.
• Citation: 845 N.W.2d 676
• Parties: Edward CROWELL, Appellee, v. STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, Appellant. Iowa Department of Management, Plaintiff, v. Iowa District Court for Linn County, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

845 N.W.2d 676

Edward CROWELL, Appellee,

v.STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, Appellant.

Iowa Department of Management, Plaintiff,

v.Iowa District Court for Linn County, Defendant.

No. 12–2226.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 12, 2014.

Samuel P. Langholz, State Public Defender, Julie A. Miller, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, and Meghan L. Gavin, Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Edward F. Crowell, Cedar Rapids, pro se.

APPEL, Justice.

A juvenile court ordered the State Public Defender to pay for court-appointed counsel for an indigent parent in a contested termination-of-parental-rights proceeding brought pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 600A (2013). The juvenile court concluded that although the indigent parent was not statutorily entitled to counsel at public expense, payment of the attorney's fees at public expense was constitutionally required. The district court reasoned that principles of equal protection prohibited treating an indigent parent in an involuntary termination proceeding filed under Iowa Code chapter 600A differently than an indigent parent in a termination proceeding filed under Iowa Code chapter 232. The State Public Defender denied payment on the ground the appointed attorney's fees did not qualify for payment from the indigent defense fund. After the appointed attorney sought judicial review of the State Public Defender's denial, the juvenile court ordered the Iowa Department of Management (Department) to pay the fees.

The State Public Defender and the Department filed an appeal challenging the juvenile court's appointment of counsel at public expense. We conclude the State Public Defender's appeal is moot and the Department's appeal should be treated as a petition for an original writ of certiorari, which we grant. On the merits, we conclude the juvenile court correctly determined the indigent parent was entitled to counsel at public expense. As a result, we annul the writ.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

A child's father and stepmother filed a termination action pursuant to Iowa Code section 600A.5, seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child's mother. The grounds urged for the termination were abandonment and nonpayment of child support. The mother requested the juvenilecourt to appoint counsel at public expense to provide her representation in the proceeding.

In considering the application, the juvenile court first considered whether the mother had a statutory right to counsel under Iowa Code section 600A.6A(2). This provision provides that “the parent against whom the petition is filed” is entitled to counsel at public expense if (1) the parent requests appointment; (2) the parent is indigent; (3) the juvenile court determines that “because of lack of skill or education,” the parent “would have difficulty in presenting [his or her] version of the facts in dispute, particularly where the presentation of the facts requires the examination or cross-examination of witnesses or the presentation of complex documentary evidence”; and (4) the juvenile court determines the parent “has a colorable defense to the termination of parental rights, or there are substantial reasons that make termination of parental rights inappropriate.” Iowa Code § 600A.6A(2).

The juvenile court found the first two elements satisfied, but concluded the third was not met. The juvenile court declined to determine whether the parent had a colorable defense, believing such a finding by the trial court could have a chilling effect on the parent's perception of fairness and interfere with the parent's presentation of relevant evidence during trial. The juvenile court noted, however, the grounds urged for termination, abandonment and nonpayment of support, are factual issues and do not involve complex legal theories. The juvenile court further noted the mother had attended school through eleventh grade, was working on obtaining a GED degree, and was not at any time a special education student or the subject of an individualized education plan. The juvenile court observed the mother was aware of the nature of the proceedings, appeared to understand her obligations with regard to the presentation of evidence at trial, and had made arrangements for witnesses to appear on her behalf. Finally, the juvenile court stated none of the witnesses appeared hostile to the mother's interests such as to render the presentation of their testimony challenging for the mother. As a result, the juvenile court concluded the mother was not entitled to appointment of counsel under Iowa Code section 600A.6A(2).

The juvenile court next considered whether the mother was entitled to appointed counsel as a matter of constitutional law. The juvenile court noted that in In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 650–51 (Iowa 2004), we held the general assembly could not constitutionally distinguish between the right to counsel at public expense in privately prosecuted termination proceedings under Iowa Code chapter 600A and state-prosecuted termination proceedings under Iowa Code chapter 232.¹ The juvenile court concluded that under In re S.A.J.B. the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution guarantees an indigent parent the right to counsel at public expense in an involuntary chapter 600A terminationproceeding because the right is coextensive with an indigent parent's right to counsel in a chapter 232 termination proceeding. In particular, the juvenile court noted the involuntary nature of both proceedings. As a result, the juvenile court held that while the mother did not qualify for appointed counsel under section 600A.6A, she was nonetheless entitled to counsel under In re S.A.J.B. Accordingly, the juvenile court appointed attorney Edward Crowell to represent the mother in the proceeding. Ultimately, the juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights based upon the grounds urged in the petition.

The original juvenile court order appointing Crowell directed the petitioners—the father and stepmother—to pay the cost of the mother's legal defense. The juvenile court subsequently amended its order to require payment by the State Public Defender after determining the petitioners were indigent. The juvenile court further approved fee expenses in excess of the State Public Defender's fee guidelines, noting that while the legal issues in the case were not complex, the factual context in which those theories arose was “unusual so as to render a greater amount of time than contemplated by fee guidelines reasonably necessary for location and presentation of relevant evidence and legal theory.”

Crowell submitted a claim of $2040 to the State Public Defender for his legal services in representing the mother. Pursuant to Iowa Code section 13B.4(4)( c )(2)(b), the State Public Defender denied payment on the ground the fees did not qualify for payment from the indigent defense fund. The notice to Crowell stated:

The court's May 4, 2012, appointment order specifically found that [S.H.] was not entitled to counsel under Iowa Code section 600A.6A, rather that she was entitled to court appointed counsel under In re S.A.J.B.Iowa Code section 815.11 authorizes payment for court appointed attorney fees under 600A.6B, but no other costs under 600A are payable from the indigent defense fund. Section 600A.6B only applies to counsel appointed under 600A.6A. Section 815.11 does not authorize payment for counsel appointed under In re S.A.J.B.

Crowell filed a timely motion for judicial review of the State Public Defender's action.² He requested a new appointment order satisfying the requirements of section 600A.6A or review of the fee claim denial. The juvenile court noted that though it had previously appointed counsel based solely upon a finding of indigency, with the benefit of the evidence received at trial, it would likely find the mother met the requirements for appointment of counsel under section 600A.6A(2). The juvenile court noted that while the grounds urged for her termination of parental rights were factual, the mother

likely would have been prejudiced in her ability to obtain and adequately present evidence relevant to her defense as well as arguing its significance. Her ability to effectively examine and cross-examine witnesses would have also likely been adversely impacted by the hostility between the parties and extended family.

Nonetheless, the juvenile court declined to amend its prior order to resolve the issue. The juvenile court then reconfirmed its conclusion that the mother was entitled to counsel at public expense under In re S.A.J.B.

The juvenile court next considered which state entity would be liable for payment of the fees. The juvenile court noted Iowa Code section 815.10(1)( a ) authorizes the appointment of counsel to represent an indigent person in chapter 600A termination cases “in which the indigent person is entitled to legal assistance at public expense.” The juvenile court reasoned that although the State Public Defender was responsible for providing counsel under chapter 600A, the use of the phrase “public expense” in section 815.10(1)( a ) limited the obligation to an appointment made pursuant to the restrictive provisions of section 600A.6A(2) and did not extend to a constitutionally required appointment under In re S.A.J.B.

Having concluded attorney's fees generated by constitutionally mandated counsel could not be paid under section 815.11, the juvenile court looked for an alternative method of payment.³ The juvenile court concluded the attorney's fees should be paid by the Department pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 25. The juvenile court noted that in determining the amount of fee award, the fee guidelines of the State Public Defender would be probative but not determinative as to reasonableness. Accordingly, the juvenile court ordered that the reasonable costs of the defense of the mother be submitted to the...