Crowl v. Berryhill, No. 17A03-9603-CV-81
| Docket Nº | No. 17A03-9603-CV-81 |
| Citation | 678 N.E.2d 828 |
| Case Date | April 10, 1997 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Page 828
v.
Raymond and Kay BERRYHILL, Appellees-Intervenors.
Page 829
Claramary Winebrenner, VanHorne, Turner & Stuckey, Auburn, for Appellant-Respondent.
Bruce M. Frey, Marion, for Appellees-Intervenors.
Pamela Carter, Attorney General, Jon Laramore, Chief Counsel, Appeals Division, Indianapolis, for Amicus Curiae.
GARRARD, Judge.
Kimberly Crowl, now Bowen, ("Kimberly"), appeals from the trial court's order holding her in contempt of court for failing to comply with a provisional visitation order which provided her parents, Raymond and Kay Berryhill (the "Grandparents"), visitation with Kimberly's two minor daughters. In addition to its finding of contempt, the trial court ordered Kimberly to pay $5,000.00 for the Grandparents' attorney's fees. In her appeal, Kimberly attempts to bring a constitutional challenge to Indiana's Grandparent Visitation Statute ("GVS"), Indiana Code § 31-1-11.7-1 et seq., as amended July 1, 1993. Because of the procedural posture of this case, we need not reach the merits of Kimberly's constitutional claim.
We affirm.
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it held Kimberly in contempt of court for violating the court's provisional visitation order.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it ordered Kimberly to pay $5,000.00 for the Grandparents' attorney's fees.
Kimberly and Michael Crowl were divorced and Kimberly was granted custody of the couple's two minor daughters, Kecia and Megan. On August 12, 1993, Kimberly's parents, the Grandparents, filed their amended petition to establish visitation with Kecia and Megan. Pending the court's final decision regarding the Grandparents' petition, on August
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8, 1994, the parties filed a stipulation with the court providing for temporary visitation. The court approved the parties' stipulation and ordered that the Grandparents were to have visitation with Kecia and Megan on the first and third Saturdays of each month from 10:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. When Kimberly repeatedly failed to comply with the provisional visitation order, the Grandparents filed several petitions for rule to show cause against Kimberly. After hearing evidence on the Grandparents' third and fourth petitions for rule to show cause, the court took the matter of Kimberly's alleged contempt under advisement. Meanwhile, Kimberly moved for summary judgment arguing that the GVS is unconstitutional. On February 1, 1996, following a hearing, the trial court denied Kimberly's motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, on February 5, 1996, the court ruled on the contempt matter and found Kimberly in contempt of court. The court entered a money judgment against Kimberly for the Grandparents' attorney's fees. It is the order holding Kimberly in contempt from which Kimberly brings her appeal.Issue One: Contempt Order
Kimberly contends that the court's visitation order is unconstitutional and, thus, her repeated violations of that order could not support a finding of contempt. We disagree.
Whether a party is in contempt of court is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. State ex rel. Prosser v. Ind. Waste Sys., 603 N.E.2d 181, 185 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). We reverse a trial court's finding of contempt only if it is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court and any reasonable inferences arising therefrom. Id.
Uncontradicted evidence that a party is aware of a court order and willfully disobeys it is sufficient to support a finding of contempt. Jackson v. Farmers State Bank, 481 N.E.2d 395, 402 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), trans. denied. Even if that order is erroneous, it must still be obeyed until reversed on appeal. Id. A party's remedy for an erroneous order is appeal and disobedience of the order is contempt. Id.
Kimberly concedes that she willfully disobeyed the trial court's visitation order yet asserts that the order is based upon an unconstitutional statute and, therefore, cannot support a finding of contempt. In raising the constitutionality of the GVS in this appeal, Kimberly seeks to collaterally attack the trial court's underlying visitation order. Although a collateral attack is permitted if the trial court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction to enter an order, Clark v. Atkins, 489 N.E.2d 90, 96 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), trans. denied, the trial court here...
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Noble County v. Rogers, 57S03-0003-CV-218.
...as a court's power to enforce compliance with its orders and decrees duly entered is inherent."), transfer denied; Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) ("Time and time 745 N.E.2d 199 again, Indiana appellate courts have recognized the inherent judicial power to deal wit......
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Beeching v. Levee, 71A03-0103-CV-66.
...Tr. pp. 188, 194, 196-98. A party cannot invite error and then request relief on appeal based upon that ground. See Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). An error invited by the complaining party is not subject to review by this court. Id.; see also, City of Lake Statio......
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Cowart v. White, 29S02-9906-CV-355
...party).3 Whether a party is in contempt is a matter left to the discretion of 711 N.E.2d 531 the trial court. Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind.Ct.App.1997); State ex rel. Prosser v. Indiana Waste Sys. Inc., 603 N.E.2d 181, 185 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). We reverse a trial court's findin......
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Indiana Glass Co. v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., 27A02-9707-CV-479
...is responsible for his or her own attorney's fees absent statutory authority, agreement, or rule to the contrary. Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). The contract between I & M and Indiana Glass makes no provision for the recovery of attorney's fees in the event of br......
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Noble County v. Rogers, No. 57S03-0003-CV-218.
...as a court's power to enforce compliance with its orders and decrees duly entered is inherent."), transfer denied; Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) ("Time and time 745 N.E.2d 199 again, Indiana appellate courts have recognized the inherent judicial power to deal wit......
-
Beeching v. Levee, No. 71A03-0103-CV-66.
...Tr. pp. 188, 194, 196-98. A party cannot invite error and then request relief on appeal based upon that ground. See Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). An error invited by the complaining party is not subject to review by this court. Id.; see also, City of Lake Statio......
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City of Gary v. Major, No. 45S04-0401-CV-10.
...is contempt." Carson v. Ross, 509 N.E.2d 239, 243 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (citations omitted), trans. denied; accord Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) ("A party's remedy for an erroneous order is appeal and disobedience of the order is Jurisdiction is comprised of three el......
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Cowart v. White, No. 29S02-9906-CV-355
...party).3 Whether a party is in contempt is a matter left to the discretion of 711 N.E.2d 531 the trial court. Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind.Ct.App.1997); State ex rel. Prosser v. Indiana Waste Sys. Inc., 603 N.E.2d 181, 185 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). We reverse a trial court's findin......