Crowley v. Crowley

• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: DALY
• Citation: Crowley v. Crowley, 699 A.2d 1029, 46 Conn.App. 87 (Conn. App. 1997)
• Decision Date: 05 August 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15975,15975
• Parties: Patricia D. CROWLEY v. Patrick J. CROWLEY.

Page 1029

699 A.2d 1029

46 Conn.App. 87

Patricia D. CROWLEY v. Patrick J. CROWLEY.

No. 15975.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 19, 1997.

Decided Aug. 5, 1997.

Joseph A. O'Brien, West Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Sheila S. Horvitz, Norwich, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before FOTI, LAVERY and DALY, JJ.

DALY, Judge.

This is an appeal from the modification of a dissolution judgment. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) found a substantial change in circumstances and applied an incorrect legal standard in reaching that conclusion, (2) concluded that the plaintiff would remain in continuing need of support, (3) assessed interest on a modified retroactive alimony award, (4) extended the duration of the life insurance coverage required by the original dissolution judgment, and (5) awarded counsel fees. We reverse the judgment in part and affirm it in part.

The parties' marriage of twenty-one years was dissolved by a November 21, 1989 judgment, which provided that the defendant was to pay unallocated alimony for a total of ten years in the amount of $50,000 per year for the first four years, $40,000 for each of the subsequent two years, and $20,000 for each of the final four years. All alimony payments would terminate in ten years and the term would be nonmodifiable. The defendant was to maintain a $100,000 life insurance policy, with the plaintiff as a beneficiary, for a period of eight years or until the plaintiff's earlier demise, remarriage or cohabitation. The judgment provided that the plaintiff would receive full interest in the parties' jointly owned real property and 50 percent of the value of the defendant's pension. ¹ The judgment also provided that the plaintiff would have custody of the parties' two minor children. ²

On October 13, 1993, the parties filed a stipulation that modified the alimony award. The stipulation provided that the defendant would pay alimony starting in January, 1994, at the rate of $34,000 per year, instead of $40,000, and $17,000 per year, instead of $20,000, from November 21, 1995, to November 24, 1999.

On November 6, 1995, the plaintiff filed a motion to modify requesting an increase in alimony. A hearing on that motion was held on April 10, 1996. ³ The plaintiff testified that she worked part-time at the Saybrook Veterinary Hospital in Old Saybrook and that her income has remained about the same since 1989. She testified that she did not have many workplace skills at the time of the parties' divorce, but that she believed she could make a decent living if she could work full-time showing dogs. She testified that, because of the 1993 modification, she decided to keep her part-time job at the veterinary hospital and, thus, was unable to work full-time at showing dogs and develop the reputation necessary to earn a decent income from that work. The defendant testified that his base pay was $106,000 and that additional income from his employment came from bonus payments based on his performance and his company's performance. He testified that he was residing with a woman ⁴ and that, in January, 1995, they had purchased a home in Old Saybrook for $256,000. The defendant testified that he took out a mortgage of $204,000 to finance the purchase and that the home required repairs, which resulted in his incurring an additional $69,900 in debt.

The trial court on April 30, 1996, found that there had been a substantial change in circumstances and granted the plaintiff's motion for modification. The court's ruling modified the alimony by ordering the defendant to pay $40,000 per year, retroactive to November 28, 1995, the date of service of the motion on the defendant, with the monthly payments to commence May 1, 1996. The court ordered the defendant to pay interest, at the rate of 10 percent, on the unpaid balance of the arrearage with payments to commence on December 1, 1999. The court ordered the defendant to maintain the $100,000 life insurance policy until the alimony and arrearage were fully paid. Furthermore, the defendant was to pay counsel fees in the amount of $2761.70. This appeal ensued.

I

The defendant first claims that there is insufficient evidence of a substantial change in circumstances, and, therefore, the case should be remanded with direction to deny the plaintiff's motion to modify alimony or, alternatively, for further proceedings to determine whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances. Additionally, the defendant claims that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in concluding that there had been a substantial change in circumstances. These claims are interrelated, and we address them together.

A trial court is in an advantageous position to assess the personal factors so significant in domestic relations cases, and its orders in such cases will not be reversed unless its findings have no reasonable basis in fact or it has abused its discretion, or unless, in the exercise of such discretion, it applies the wrong standard of law. See Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 739-40, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994); see also Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 517, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993); McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 13, 440 A.2d 804 (1981). "[W]e do not review the evidence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Meehan v. Meehan, 40 Conn.App. 107, 110, 669 A.2d 616, cert. denied, 236 Conn. 915, 673 A.2d 1142 (1996).

Trial courts have "broad discretion in deciding motions for modification." Noce v. Noce, 181 Conn. 145, 149, 434 A.2d 345 (1980). Modification of alimony, after the date of a dissolution judgment, is governed by General Statutes § 46b-86. ⁵ Borkowski v. Borkowski, supra, 228 Conn. at 734, 638 A.2d 1060; Denley v. Denley, 38 Conn.App. 349, 350-51, 661 A.2d 628 (1995). "When ... the disputed issue is alimony, the applicable provision of the statute is § 46b-86 (a), which provides that a final order for alimony may be modified by the trial court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Borkowski v. Borkowski, supra, at 734, 638 A.2d 1060. The party seeking modification bears the burden of showing the existence of a substantial change in the circumstances. Jaser v. Jaser, 37 Conn.App. 194, 204, 655 A.2d 790 (1995). The change may be in the circumstances "of either party." (Emphasis in original.) McCann v. McCann, 191 Conn. 447, 450, 464 A.2d 825 (1983); see General Statutes § 46b-86. The date of the most recent prior proceeding in which an alimony order was entered is the appropriate date to use in determining whether a significant change in circumstances warrants a modification of an alimony award. See Avella v. Avella, 39 Conn.App. 669, 672, 666 A.2d 822 (1995); see also Borkowski v. Borkowski, supra, at 737-38, 638 A.2d 1060.

"In general the same sorts of [criteria] are relevant in deciding whether the decree may be modified as are relevant in making the initial award of alimony.... More specifically, these criteria, outlined in General Statutes § 46b-82, ⁶ require the court to consider the needs and financial resources of each of the parties ... as well as such factors as the causes for the dissolution of the marriage and the age, health, station, occupation, employability and amount and sources of income of the parties." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 736, 638 A.2d 1060.

When presented with a motion for modification, a court must first determine whether there has been a substantial change in the financial circumstances of one or both of the parties. Id., at 737, 638 A.2d 1060. Second, if the court finds a substantial change in circumstances, it may properly consider the motion and, on the basis of the § 46b-82 criteria, make an order for modification. Id. The court has the authority to issue a modification only if it conforms the order to the distinct and definite changes in the circumstances of the parties. Id., at 738, 638 A.2d 1060. The inquiry, then, is limited "to a comparison between the current conditions and the last court order." Id.

Here, the trial court, pursuant to its statutory powers and responsibilities, made findings of fact that formed the basis for its orders. The court found that the defendant's weekly income had increased from $1193 to $1836 in a period of less than three years. ⁷ The court concluded that this increase constituted a substantial change in circumstances.

That finding alone is sufficient to justify reconsideration of a prior alimony order. ⁸ See McCann v. McCann, supra, 191 Conn. 447, 451, 464 A.2d 825 (1983); cf. Hardisty v. Hardisty, 183 Conn. 253, 258, 439 A.2d 307 (1981). "[A] dramatic increase in the income of one of the parties may constitute a substantial change in circumstances...." Simms v. Simms, 25 Conn.App 231, 234, 593 A.2d 161, cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911, 597 A.2d 332 (1991). ⁹

Although that finding alone is a sufficient basis for a finding of a substantial change in circumstances, the court made additional findings. The court found that the continuation of the prior alimony award would be unjust and inequitable under all of the circumstances. Although a "trial court need not make a special individual finding as to each of the criteria which it could have considered"; Howat v. Howat, 1 Conn.App. 400, 407, 472 A.2d 799 (1984); here the court made additional findings concerning the criteria relevant to the question of modification. Among the court's findings were the following: the defendant's financial condition had substantially improved since the date of the prior modification, while the plaintiff's had worsened; the plaintiff's financial decline was due in part to her "improvident financial transactions and expenditures"; even without such unwise expenditures, the plaintiff, considering her age, vocational...