Crowley v. Engelke

Decision Date12 September 1946
Docket NumberNo. 29327.,29327.
Citation394 Ill. 264,68 N.E.2d 241
PartiesCROWLEY et al. v. ENGELKE et al. STOLTZNER et al. v. CROWDER et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Ulysses S. Schwartz, judge.

Suit in equity by Jerome J. Crowley and others, trustees, against Mildred S. Engelke and others to determine true parties in interest entitled to distribution of the funds in the hands of trustees under the will of Henrietta Snell. Mildred S. Engelke and Helen Stroh filed counterclaims that assignment to Frode Stoltzner of counterclaimants' interest in estate as heirs were fraudulent and void. From judgment holding assignment of Mildred S. Engelke and Helen Stroh to Frode Stoltzner void, and holding assignments of other interests by Mildred S. Engelke, O. G. Hoegstedt, and Helen M. Lauer valid, Frode Stoltzner, Mildred S. Engelke, O. G. Hoegstedt and Helen M. Lauer appeal.

Decree reversed and cause remanded in part, and affirmed in part.

Farthing, Farthing & Feickert, of Belleville, and James D. Peterson, of Chicago, for appellants Frode Stoltzner et al.

Walter F. Boye, of Chicago, for appellants Mildred S. Engelke et al.

John B. King, Roy Malcolm McKerchar, David J. A. Hayes, and Gotthard A. Dahlberg, all of Chicago, for appellees.

GUNN, Justice.

This appeal has a double aspect, and for conciseness the different issues should be pointed out preliminary to a discussion of the case. A suit in equity was filed in the superior court of Cook county by the trustees under the will of Henrietta Snell, deceased, to determine the true parties in interest who were entitled to a distribution of the funds in the hands of the trustees under such will. The only property in controversy in this suit was that claimed to have vested in Chester Snell Coffin, deceased, a grandson of Henrietta Snell and who died after her, before the termination of the trust. It is agreed that if Chester Snell Coffin had a vested interest in the corpus of the estate as a remainderman, he being a child of Grace Henrietta Love, a child of Henrietta Snell, a one-half interest in his share upon his death passed to Helen M. Coffin Lauer, his survivingwidow; and a one-eighth interest each to his father, Franc Nixon Coffin; his mother, Grace Henrietta Love; his sister, Mildred S. Engelke; and his half sister, Helen Stroh.

Grace Henrietta Love and Franc N. Coffin assigned a part of their interest, as heirs of Chester Snell Coffin, to Henry Arthur Ingalls, which by mesne assignment finally vested in Helen E. Crowder and Ernest E. Danke. Mildred S. Engelke assigned to Frode Stoltzner what purported to be all of her interest as heir-at-law of Chester Snell Coffin, deceased, and Helen Stroh likewise assigned what purported to be all of her interest as heir-at-law of Chester Snell Coffin, deceased, to Frode Stoltzner, all of which said assignments were executed before the termination of the trust.

The court held all of these assignments to be valid with the exception of that of Mildred S. Engelke and Helen Stroh, both made to Frode Stoltzner, and both of which the court held to be void. Stoltzner appealed these rulings against him, as also did Mildred S. Engelke, O. G. Hoegstedt and Helen M. Lauer, against whom decrees were rendered holding their respective assignments of other interests valid. A freehold is involved because at the time the assignments were made unsold real estate remained in the trust.

The ground of Stoltzner's appeal is that the finding of the master in chancery, approved by the court, holding his assignments void because of fraud, was contrary to the evidence. Mildred S. Engelke, O. G. Hoegstedt and Helen M. Lauer appeal upon the ground the interest of Chester Snell Coffin in the corpus of the estate was a contingent interest and not subject to assignment, and therefore, even though the assignments were made in good faith, they transferred something that was not subject to being assigned. Thus it appears the facts surrounding the transaction of the assignments to Frode Stoltzner and the facts surrounding the assignments made of the other interests, would be wholly immaterial if the interest of Chester Snell Coffin in the estate of Henrietta Snell, deceased, were contingent and unassignable. It, therefore, becomes necessary in the first instance to ascertain whether the interest of Chester Snell Coffin was a vested interest subject to assignment; and, if it is a vested interest, the fairness and legality of each of the assignments is open for consideration. On the other hand, if it should be determined that the interest of Chester Snell Coffin is a contingent interest, all of the assignments should be held invalid, regardless of any other question in the case.

We might say parenthetically that while Helen M. Lauer appears as an appellant we have found nothing in the briefs concerning her interests, but do find a statement in the brief of Mildred S. Engelke and O. G. Hoegstedt to the effect that the controversy between Helen M. Lauer and her assignees has been settled. No stipulation or other statement appears regarding the disposal of the Helen M. Lauer issue. Attorneys owe a duty to the court to indicate the settlement of a case which has been transferred to this court by notice of appeal.

In order to determine whether Chester Snell Coffin had a vested interest in the estate left by Henrietta Snell which would be subject to assignment, or whether he had only a contingent remainder which would not be subject to assignment, requires an examination of the will. The will is long, and only the material parts necessary for the decision of this point will be set out. However, in general, the will provided that all of her estate be devised to three trustees, who were to hold the property during the lives of Albert Jerome Snell and Grace Henrietta Coffin, testatrix's children, and Willey McCrea, her son-in-law, who was the father of two grandchildren of testatrix by the name of Willey Solon McCrea and Henrietta Alice McCrea. These two grandchildren were to receive the income from the share of their mother, and, upon the death of the two children of testatrix and the son-in-law, distribution was to be made.

The will was executed February 2, 1899; Henrietta Snell died February 3, 1900; the will was admitted to probate April 7, 1900. At the time of testatrix's death Grace Henrietta Coffin Love, a surviving daughter, had two children, viz., Mildred S. Coffin, now appearing as appellant Mildred S. Engelke, and Chester Snell Coffin, a son; and also another son, Jerome S. Coffin, who died prior to the death of his grandmother, leaving no descendants and no interest in the estate. Chester Snell Coffin died October 24, 1912, leaving as his heirs his widow, Helen M. Lauer, Franc Nixon Coffin, Grace Henrietta Love, Mildred S. Engelke and Helen Stroh, whose interests as heirs are pointed out above.

The material parts of the will are the fourth, seventh and ninth clauses, the material parts of which are as follows:

‘Fourth. I give, devise and bequeath unto A. W. Adcock, Homer M. Thomas and Frank L. Salisbury, my trustees herein appointed, all the real estate of which I may die possessed, to be held, managed and controlled by them during the lives of Albert Jerome Snell, Grace Henrietta Coffin and Willey McCrea. The two first mentioned are my children; the other, Willey McCrea, married my daughter Alice, and is the father of Henrietta Alice McCrea, above mentioned. My said trustees shall hold said real estate in trust and shall have sole and exclusive charge, management and control of it until the death of the said Albert Jerome Snell, Grace Henrietta Coffin and Willey McCrea and not until the death of all of them shall the trusts, herein created, end. * * * And my trustees shall, each and every year pay one- third of the net income from said real estate unto my daughter, Grace Henrietta Coffin during the term of her natural life, provided, however, that my trustees, whenever they may deem fit and proper, may use all or any portion of the said Grace Henrietta Coffin's shares of said income for the education, support and maintenance of her children, Mildred A. Coffin and Chester Snell Coffin, (or either of them) during the lifetime of the said Grace Henrietta Coffin. * * *

‘Seventh. Upon the termination of the trusts herein created, that is, upon the death of Albert Jerome Snell, Grace Henrietta Coffin and Willy McCrea, I devise and bequeath all the remainder of the real estate then being in the possession and control of my trustees, or their successors in trusts, as follows: * * * One-third thereof, in fee, to the lawful children of the said Grace Henrietta Coffin, their heirs and assigns forever. * * *

‘Ninth. I hereby authorize and direct my trustees, in their judgment and discretion to sell and convey any or all of my vacant real estate. * * * If in the judgment of my trustees it is fit and proper, my trustees may use all of or any part of the proceeds of sales for the proper support and maintenance of the families of Albert Jerome Snell and Grace Henrietta Coffin; or the proceeds may be invested, changed or reinvested, and the income therefrom distributed, as hereinbefore provided for the distribution of said net income, until the termination of the trust herein created, and then upon the death of Grace Henrietta Coffin, Albert Jerome Snell and Willey McCrea, the principal, if any, in the hands of my trustees from the sales of real estate shall be distributed as follows: One-third (1/3) thereof to the legal children of Albert Jerome Snell; one-third (1/3) thereof to the legal children of Grace Henrietta Coffin, and the remaining one-third (1/3) thereof to Henrietta Alice McCrea and Snell McCrea, provided, * * *.’

The question raised by Mildred S. Engelke and O. G. Hoegstedt is that the interest of Chester Snell Coffin, who died in 1912, was not vested, but was wholly contingent, therefore rendering...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • De Korwin v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, General No. 43 C 1043.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • May 19, 1949
    ...that the Bates case, overruled in Dustin v. Brown, 297 Ill. 499, 130 N.E. 859, can no longer be deemed applicable. See Crowley v. Engelke, 394 Ill. 264, 272, 68 N.E.2d 241. This court is of the opinion that at all relevant times the authorities opposed to Bates v. Gillett were numerically i......
  • De Korwin v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • February 1, 1950
    ...these, Bates v. Gillett has since been overruled, in part at least; Dustin v. Brown, 297 Ill. 499, 508, 130 N.E. 859; Crowley v. Engelke, 394 Ill. 264, 272, 68 N.E.2d 241, and the extent to which People v. Byrd can be relied upon is somewhat clouded by the fact that the will there involved ......
  • Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Shellaberger
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • March 11, 1948
    ...the remainderman or his heirs the right to immediate possession whenever and however the preceding estate may determine. Crowley v. Engelke, 394 Ill. 264, 68 N.E.2d 241;Murphy v. Westhoff, 386 Ill. 136, 53 N.E.2d 931. Immediate vesting is indicated when the postponement of enjoyment is mere......
  • Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Donovan
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • September 19, 1991
    ... ... Bartlett (1961), 21 Ill.2d 332, 172 N.E.2d 768; Kost v. Foster (1950), 406 Ill. 565, 94 N.E.2d 302; Crowley v. Engelke (1946), ... [163 Ill.Dec. 858] 394 Ill. 264, 68 N.E.2d 241; Bailey v. Koehler (1922), 305 Ill. 25, 136 N.E. 869; Murrell v ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT