Crowley v. Johnston

Decision Date23 August 1949
Citation136 Conn. 97,68 A.2d 366
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesCROWLEY et al. v. DIX et al. JOHNSTON v. DIX et al. HETES v. MESSINA et al.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Clifford Crowley and another, and Edward D. Johnston, respectively, sued Louis Dix, Thomas Messina, one Trostonoff and others, and Mary Hetes sued named defendants only, for personal injuries and damage to plaintiff Hetes' automobile as the results of a collision between it and a taxicab at a street intersection.

From orders of the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Cornell, J., denying defendants' motions to set aside a jury's verdicts for plaintiffs against named defendants, and from judgments rendered on the verdicts, named defendants appealed.

The Supreme Court of Errors, Brown, J., found no error, holding that the instructions as to the duties of motorists approaching street intersections were correct and that trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the verdicts for plaintiffs Clifford Crowley and Mary Hetes as excessive.

Samuel Engelman and Robert H. Gould, Bridgeport, for appellants (defendants Dix et al.).

John J. Hunt, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, were Elbert O. Hull, Bridgeport, and Louis George, Danbury, for appellees (plaintiffs Crowley and Johnston).

Joseph G. Shapiro and Johnson Stoddard, Bridgeport, with whom was Milton H. Belinkie, Bridgeport, for appellees (plaintiff Hetes et al.).

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS and DICKENSON, JJ.

BROWN, Judge.

These three cases, tried together, arose out of a collision between a Plymouth coach which was owned by Mary Hetes and operated by her son George Hetes as her agent and in which she, Edward D. Johnston and Clifford Crowley were passengers, and a taxicab owned by the defendants Dix and Trostonoff and operated by the defendant Messina as their agent. In each action negligent operation is alleged. In the first case Clifford Crowley, a minor, and John Crowley, his father, both as his next friend and for himself, sued Mary Hetes, George Hetes, Dix, Trostonoff and Messina. In the second, Johnston sued the same defendants. In the third, Mary Hetes sued Dix, Trostonoff and Messina. In the first two cases the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs to recover of Dix, Trostonoff and Messina and found in favor of Mary and George Hetes. In the third the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff to recover of the defendants. In all three cases the court denied the defendants' motions to set aside the verdicts and the defendants have appealed from the denial of the motions and from the judgments.

We summarize the undisputed material facts. Berkshire Avenue in Bridgeport extends in a general easterly and westerly direction and is intersected at right angles by Brooks Street. Each thoroughfare is straight, level and approximately thirty-one feet in width between curbs. There is a dwelling house on the lot at the northeast corner of the intersection and between it and the southwesterly corner of the lot is an evergreen tree. In the curb at the northeast corner of the intersection is an electric light pole. The house, tree and pole together, in large measure at least, obstruct the view which a driver approaching the intersection on Berkshire Avenue from the east has of traffic approaching it on Brooks Street from the north, and which a driver so proceeding on Brooks Street has of traffic approaching the intersection on Berkshire Avenue from the east. On the evening of February 17, 1946, which was clear and dry, shortly after 10 o'clock George Hetes was driving the Plymouth westerly on Berkshire Avenue. Upon reaching Brooks Street, as the Plymouth proceeded through the northwest quadrant of the intersection it collided with the defendants' taxicab, which Messina was driving southerly on Brooks Street; as a result, the Plymouth spun around and came to rest, headed in an easterly direction, some distance west of the intersection. Crowley was thrown out and seriously injured, Mary Hetes and Johnston also sustained injuries, and the right side of the Plymouth was extensively damaged. The frong end of the taxicab was damaged and it came to a stop headed southwesterly near the southwest corner of the intersection. We shall refer to Dix, Trostonoff and Messina as the defendants.

The defendants have assigned errors in the charge, but at its conclusion they made no objection to it involving any of these claims, and we do not consider the assignments except as portions of the charge referred to in them are involved in claimed errors in the refusal of the court to give two requests to charge. Practice Book 1934, p. 59, § 156; Svenberg v. Subotkouski, 133 Conn. 329, 332, 50 A.2d 441. The latter call for a recital of certain of the parties' claims of proof as set forth in the finding, which is not subject to correction in any respect material to the decisive issues. There was no direct testimony that the taxicab was going forty miles per hour, as the plaintiffs claimed to have proved, but a comparison of distances traversed by the taxicab and another car, as to the speed of which there was direct evidence, justifies a claim of proof by the plaintiffs that the taxicab was going at that speed. In this connection, we note a colloquy between the court and counsel where the court seems to have intimated that testimony that a car was going ‘very fast’ was not admissible. In a series of decisions we have held that such testimony has little weight as indicating any definite speed; Swayne v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 439, 444, 85 A. 634, 737; Martino v. Connecticut Co., 109 Conn. 559, 561, 147 A. 20; Nichols v. Nichols, 126 Conn. 614, 618, 13 A.2d 591; and where, in Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 84, 14 A.2d 713, 715, we said that testimony ‘that the car was ‘going fast’ means little', we were speaking of the particular situation then before us. Testimony that a car is going ‘fast’ or ‘slow’ is admissible, and, while it has little weight as indicating any definite speed, in general the weight to be given it depends upon the circumstances of the particular case and is for the jury.

The following in substance were claims of the plaintiffs and of the defendants George and Mary Hetes. The positions of the house, evergreen tree and pole mentioned above were such as to obstruct, in the case of a driver proceeding west on Berkshire Avenue and approaching the intersection from the east, his view of traffic proceeding south on Brooks Street and approaching the intersection from the north; likewise, they obstructed, in the case of a driver proceeding south on Brooks Street toward the northerly line of the intersection, his view of traffic on Berkshire Avenue coming to the intersection from the east, except for a very limited view afforded through the space between the southwest corner of the house and the evergreen tree. The Plymouth, with its headlights on, approached the intersection from the east at a speed of from twenty to twenty-five miles per hour. As it came to the easterly line of the intersection, the driver's view was obstructed by the conditions recited above and he reduced its speed to about fifteen miles an hour. He looked both north and south on Brooks Street, saw no vehicle approaching, and drove on through at a slightly increased speed. When he had proceeded about halfway, he suddenly saw, approximately twenty-five feet away, the headlights of the defendants' taxicab, which was approaching without signal from the north. To avoid a collision he increased his car's speed somewhat and veered left. The taxicab proceeded at about forty miles per hour until about five feet north of the intersection. There its brakes, applied by Messina, took hold. With the brakes on, it continued into the intersection and its front end struck the rear half of the right side of the Plymouth with great force. Although he knew that the intersection was dangerous, Messina did not look to see whether any car was approaching or entering it from the east until just...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Gorczyca v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • November 29, 1954
    ...forearm with a considerable amount of permanent disability, we ordered a remittitur of $2000 from an award of $12,000. In Crowley v. Dix, 136 Conn. 97, 106, 68 A.2d 366, decided in 1949, and Figlar v. Gordon, 133 Conn. 577, 585, 53 A.2d 645, decided in 1947, we sustained verdicts of $30,000......
  • Blackman v. Miami Transit Co., 60-13
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 8, 1960
    ...v. Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., Ohio App.1945, 65 N.E.2d 879, 880; Warruna v. Dick, 261 Pa. 602, 104 A. 749, 750.5 Crowley v. Dix, 136 Conn. 97, 68 A.2d 366, 368; Consolidated Coach Corporation v. Earl's Adm'r, 263 Ky. 814, 94 S.W.2d 6, 9, 10; Vanosdol v. Henderson, 216 Ind. 240, 22 N.E.......
  • Vecchiarelli v. Weiss
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • May 8, 1951
    ...There is error, the judgment is set aside and a new trial is ordered. In this opinion the other Judges concurred. 1 Crowley v. Dix, 136 Conn. 97, 103, 68 A.2d 366; Prato v. Coffey, 135 Conn. 445, 447, 66 A.2d 113; Squires v. Wolcott, 133 Conn. 449, 455, 52 A.2d 305; Lassow v. Bulkley, 132 C......
  • Levy v. Senofonte
    • United States
    • Connecticut Circuit Court
    • August 19, 1964
    ... ... That Mrs. Tanguay did not see Senofonte does not excuse her from her statutory duty to grant the right of way. Crowley v. Dix, 136 Conn. 97, 103, 68 A.2d 366 ... 2 The other presumption of agency statute, § 52-183, clearly applies only to cases where damages are ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT