Crowley v. LOCAL NO. 82, ETC.

• Decision Date: 13 July 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 80-2680-K.
• Citation: 521 F. Supp. 614
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
• Parties: Jerome CROWLEY, Anthony Coyne, Joseph Fahey, Robert Lunnin, James Hayes, Gerald Owens, John Lynch, Joseph Trask, and Joseph Montana, Plaintiffs, v. LOCAL NO. 82, FURNITURE AND PIANO MOVING, FURNITURE STORE DRIVERS, HELPERS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND PACKERS; Bart Griffiths, Secretary-Treasurer, Local No. 82; George Harris, President Local No. 82; Phillip Piemontese, Chairman of the Election Committee of Local 82; and John Doe, James Doe and Jerome Doe, Members of the Election Committee of Local 82, Defendants.

521 F. Supp. 614

Jerome CROWLEY, Anthony Coyne, Joseph Fahey, Robert Lunnin, James Hayes, Gerald Owens, John Lynch, Joseph Trask, and Joseph Montana, Plaintiffs, v. LOCAL NO. 82, FURNITURE AND PIANO MOVING, FURNITURE STORE DRIVERS, HELPERS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND PACKERS; Bart Griffiths, Secretary-Treasurer, Local No. 82; George Harris, President Local No. 82; Phillip Piemontese, Chairman of the Election Committee of Local 82; and John Doe, James Doe and Jerome Doe, Members of the Election Committee of Local 82, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 80-2680-K.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

July 13, 1981.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kurt Pressman, Mark Stern, Benjamin Hiller, Goldstein, Pressman & Stern, Cambridge, Mass., for plaintiffs.

Kathryn M. Noonan, Noonan and Robboy, Boston, Mass., Gary S. Witlen, Esq., Washington, D. C., for defendants.

Lawrence E. Katz, Newton, Mass., for Honest Ballot Association.

Memorandum

KEETON, District Judge.

I. Introduction and Procedural History of the Litigation

This case arises out of a dispute concerning a meeting of the membership of the Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen and Packers, Local No. 82 ("Local 82"), which is affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America ("the International"), on November 9, 1980, at which the nomination of candidates for the Local's Executive Board was conducted. Plaintiffs, nine members of Local 82, brought this action on behalf of themselves and two classes¹ of Local members against the Local, Bart Griffiths, its secretary-treasurer, George Harris, its president, and Phillip Piemontese, the chairman of its election committee.² Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 ("LMRDA" or "the Act") by denying plaintiffs their rights to attend union meetings and nominate candidates on an equal basis with other Local members, and to speak freely on matters relating to union business without reprisal. In addition, plaintiffs claim that the union rule that only members who have paid their dues on time for the twenty-four consecutive months before the nominations meeting may be candidates for Local office ("the 24 month rule")³ constitutes an unreasonable restriction on plaintiffs' right to seek union office in violation of Title IV of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 481(e). Defendants argue that because the conduct at issue bears upon the procedures for conducting union elections, plaintiffs' exclusive remedy is to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor under Title IV of the LMRDA, and that 29 U.S.C. § 483 and the Supreme Court's decision in Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964), deny this court jurisdiction over this action.

The Local's election was to be completed December 13, 1980. On December 12, 1980, after hearing, the court entered a temporary restraining order to avoid irreparable harm to the plaintiffs and to preserve both the status quo and the court's jurisdiction. See note 12, infra. The restraining order provided that pending further order of the court:

The ballots to be received by Local 82 from P.O. Box 530, East Milton, Massachusetts, on December 13, 1980 at 9:00 a. m. and any other ballots received by Local 82 in any other way shall not be counted but shall be collected, sealed, and delivered immediately thereafter to an officer of this court in whose custody they shall remain until further order of the court. If the court determines, after hearing, that the ballots collected on December 13, 1980 should be counted, they shall be counted under the same conditions and limitations prevailing on December 13, 1980, unless otherwise ordered by this court.

The court conducted evidentiary hearings on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction for five days in December 1980. On January 9, 1981, counsel for defendants wrote to the court stating "that the union is prepared to hold a new nomination meeting and mail ballot election, with the permission of the Court." On January 15 and 22, 1981, defendants filed stipulations⁴ concerning how Local 82 would conduct the new election.

During hearings in January 1981, it became apparent that the parties could not reach an agreement on the terms and conditions under which a new nominations meeting and election would be conducted. On January 30, 1981, plaintiffs filed a "Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to the Evidence,"⁵ which sought to add claims that since September 1976 defendants had increased union dues without complying with 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3), and that defendants had violated the equal rights and free speech provisions of Title I, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) & (2) by applying the 24 month rule in a discriminatory fashion and in retaliation for plaintiffs' expression of views critical of the defendant incumbent officers of Local 82. The motion to amend included an additional prayer for relief requesting that the court declare that

all dues increases by Local 82 since September 1976 are invalid and that any member of Local 82 is eligible for union office if he is in compliance with the 24 month rule once all his dues payments in excess of $9.00 the dues rate in effect before September 1976 are credited prospectively towards subsequent dues payments, and he is otherwise eligible for union office.

Defendants opposed the motion to amend, contending that the issues raised by the motion, in particular the legality of dues increases implemented by Local 82 since September 1976, had not been tried by the parties during the hearings on the motion for preliminary injunction. At a hearing on February 27, 1981, the court found that evidence concerning the dues claim had been offered at the earlier hearings, but that the dues claim had not been fully litigated. Because the relief requested on the dues claim would affect candidate eligibility in a new election, the court allowed the motion to amend, and gave the parties an opportunity to present additional evidence at a hearing which was conducted on March 6, 1981. The court also heard argument on defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint at the March 6th hearing.

After determining for the reasons set forth in part III-B, infra, that a new nominations meeting and election must be conducted under the supervision of a neutral third party, on February 12 and April 21, 1981 the court issued proposed orders concerning the conduct of the election and invited the parties to submit their positions concerning the terms of the order. Extensive discussions on the form of the order were conducted at conferences on February 20 and 27, and April 23, 1981. See part V, infra. At the conclusion of the latter conference, the parties were given additional time to submit their positions concerning defendants' request for a stay pending appeal.

The remainder of this memorandum is organized as follows: Part II addresses the jurisdictional issues raised in this action. Part III sets forth the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the availability of preliminary relief on plaintiffs' claims that the manner in which defendants conducted the November 9, 1980 nominations meeting violated Title I of the LMRDA. The court's findings and conclusions on plaintiffs' dues claim are stated in part IV. Finally, issues relating to the form of the court's order, including defendants' request for a bond and stay pending appeal, are addressed in part V.

II. Jurisdiction

A. The Impact of Title IV on the Court's Jurisdiction

For the purposes of resolving the jurisdictional questions now before the court plaintiffs' claims may be divided into four categories:⁶ (1) claims that by refusing to allow some of the plaintiffs to attend the November 9, 1980 nominations meeting and refusing to allow other plaintiffs to nominate candidates of their choice for union office in retaliation for plaintiffs' criticism of the incumbent officers, defendants violated Title I of the Act by denying plaintiffs their "equal rights ... to nominate candidates and to attend membership meetings," 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1),⁷ and their rights "to meet and assemble freely with other members, and to express any views ... including ... views upon candidates ...." 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)⁸ ("discrimination and free speech claims") (Complaint ¶¶ 43-48); (2) claims that the 24 month rule on its face violates Title I because it has a disparate impact on Local members who pay their dues directly to the Local and claims that defendants applied the 24 month rule in a discriminatory fashion in retaliation for plaintiffs' expression of their views in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) and (2) ("Title I 24 month rule claims") (Complaint ¶ 50, Amended Complaint ¶¶ 54-55); (3) the claim that the 24 month rule constitutes an unreasonable restriction on nominations and eligibility for union candidacy in violation of Title IV of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 481(e)⁹ ("Title IV 24 month rule claim") (Complaint ¶ 49); and (4) the claim that defendants increased local dues without complying with 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3)¹⁰ ("dues claim") (Amended Complaint ¶ 53).

Defendants argue that because plaintiffs' discrimination and free speech claims and their Title I and Title IV 24 month rule claims arose out of a dispute concerning a nominations meeting conducted in preparation for a union election, plaintiffs' exclusive remedy is to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Title IV of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 481 et seq.¹¹ 29 U.S.C. § 483 states that "the remedy provided by this subchapter Title IV for challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive." See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566-67, 95 S.Ct. 1851, 1857, 44 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975); Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528, 530-36, 92 S.Ct. 630, 632-635, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (197...