Crown Packaging Tech. v. Ball Metal Bev. Container

• Decision Date: 08 September 2009
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:05cv281.
• Citation: 662 F.Supp.2d 939
• Parties: CROWN PACKAGING TECHNOLOGY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. BALL METAL BEVERAGE CONTAINER CORP., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

662 F.Supp.2d 939

CROWN PACKAGING TECHNOLOGY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. BALL METAL BEVERAGE CONTAINER CORP., Defendant.

Case No. 3:05cv281.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

September 8, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David Carr Greer James H. Greer Dayton, OH, Chad Ziegler, Eric J. Schaal, Lynn Malinoski, Dale M. Heist, Woodcock Washburn LLP, Philadephia, PA, for Plaintiffs.

John David Luken, Charles Hampton Brown, III, Cincinnati, OH, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING IN PART, OVERRULING IN PART AND OVERRULING, AS MOOT, IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON INFRINGEMENT AND INVALIDITY (DOC. #60); DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' CROSS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON INVALIDITY (DOC. #70); DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING, AS MOOT, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON WILLFULNESS (DOC. # 80); JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT AND AGAINST PLAINTIFFS; TERMINATION ENTRY

WALTER HERBERT RICE, District Judge.

The Plaintiffs bring this litigation, alleging that the Defendant has infringed on certain claims set forth in two patents owned by Plaintiff Crown Packaging Technology, Inc., and licensed to Plaintiff Crown Cork & Seal, Inc.,¹ to wit: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,935,826 ("the '826 patent") and 6,848,875 ("the '875 patent"). These two patents relate to the ends of metal beverage cans used for beer and soft drinks and the method of securing the ends of the cans onto the bodies of the cans,² which the parties and the patents refer to as seaming. In particular, the Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendant is infringing on claim 14 of the '826 patent and claims 50, 52 and 61 of the '875 patent. According to the Plaintiffs, these patents allow a significant saving in the amount of metal necessary for can ends, without requiring an enormous outlay of capital, thus cutting costs for users. See Doc. # 23 at 2-3, 4. Plaintiffs state that the two patents accomplish that end by altering the geometry of the can end and modifying the seaming process. Id. at 4. Plaintiffs indicate that metal is saved, because the new geometry increases the strength of the can ends, permitting them to be thinner. Id. at 6.

In their Amended Complaint (Doc. # 7), the Plaintiffs set forth three claims for relief, to wit: 1) a claim that Defendant is infringing upon claims 50, 52 and 61 of the '875 patent (Count I); 2) a claim that the Defendant is infringing on claim 14 of the '826 patent (Count II); and 3) a claim for declaratory judgment of infringement on claim 14 of the '826 patent (Count III). In addition to denying that it has infringed upon claim 14 of the '826 patent and claims 50, 52 and 61 of the '875 patent, the Defendant has submitted a six-count Counterclaim, setting forth requests for declaratory relief that it has not infringed upon either of the patents-in-suit, that both such patents are invalid and that both are unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. See Doc. # 11.

The typical beverage can is constructed from two parts, a can end and a can body, each of which is manufactured separately.³ Plaintiffs and Defendant are competitors in the business of selling can ends and bodies to fillers.⁴ The can body is filled with beer or another type of carbonated beverage, and the can end is seamed onto the body. As shown by drawings of prior art and explanations contained in the two patents-in-suit, in conventional seaming operations, a chuck holds a can top on a can body against the support provided by a lifter plate. The can body and end are then rotated at high speed. While that rotation is occurring, two seaming rolls are successively moved toward the chuck and can end. The seaming rolls form the seam by bending and compressing the uppermost portion of the can body and the outermost portion of the can end together. The finished seam, which is referred to as a "double seam," is comprised of five interlocking layers of metal, three from the can end and two from the can body. The '826 patent addresses can ends, while the '875 patent is directed at the seaming process.⁵

This case is currently before the Court on the following motions seeking partial summary judgment by the parties, to wit: 1) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Infringement and Invalidity (Doc. #60); 2) Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Invalidity (Doc. #70);⁶ and 3) Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Willfulness (Doc. # 80).⁷ On December 5, 2008, this Court heard two hours of oral argument from the parties on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Infringement and Invalidity (Doc. # 60) and Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Invalidity (Doc. # 70). As a means of analysis, the Court will initially set forth the procedural standards it must apply whenever it rules on a request for summary judgment, partial or otherwise. The Court will then rule upon the first two motions listed above, discussing them together. In the event that some or all of Plaintiffs' claims survive Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Infringement and Invalidity (Doc. # 60), the Court will then turn to the Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Willfulness (Doc. #80).

I. Procedural Standards Applicable to Motions Seeking Summary Judgment

Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Of course, the moving party:

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. See also Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir. 1991) (The moving party has the "burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the record, construed favorably to the nonmoving party, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial.") (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 (6th Cir.1987)). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Thus, "[o]nce the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial." Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir.1995). Read together, Liberty Lobby and Celotex stand for the proposition that a party may move for summary judgment by demonstrating that the opposing party will not be able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a directed verdict motion (now known as a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50). Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir.1989).

Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient to "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). See also Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir.1994) ("The plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."). Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment shall be denied "[i]f there are ... `genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.'" Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). Of course, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must assume as true the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the favor of that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis added). If the parties present conflicting evidence, a court may not decide which evidence to believe, by determining which parties' affiants are more credible; rather, credibility determinations must be left to the fact-finder. 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2726. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment (in other words, in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact), "[a] district court is not ... obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim." InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1839, 108 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990). See also L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT & T Information Systems, Inc., 9 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 1993); Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59...