Crowne Investments, Inc. v. Reid
| Decision Date | 06 August 1999 |
| Citation | 740 So.2d 400 |
| Parties | CROWNE INVESTMENTS, INC., and Crowne Management Corporation v. Lisa G. REID, as administratrix of the estate of Arl George, deceased. Lisa G. Reid, as administratrix of the estate of Arl George, deceased v. Crowne Investments, Inc., and Crowne Management Corporation. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Walter J. Price III of Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, Birmingham, for appellants/cross appellees Crowne Investments, Inc., and Crowne Management Corp.
E.J. Saad and James E. Atchison of Atchison, Crosby, Saad & Beebe, Mobile for appellee/cross appellant Lisa G. Reid, as administratrix of the estate of Arl George, deceased.
Crowne Investments, Inc., operator/owner of a skilled nursing facility, and Crowne Management Corporation, a service provider for Crowne Investments, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered pursuant to a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Lisa G. Reid, as administratrix of the estate of her grandfather, Arl George, in an action to recover damages for his alleged wrongful death. We affirm.
On August 31, 1995, Reid sued Crowne Investments, the owner and operator of the skilled nursing facility at which Mr. George resided. Reid alleged that Crowne Investments had negligently caused or allowed Mr. George to be fed by his wife, who was not medically trained to feed someone in Mr. George's condition. Reid alleged that this negligence caused Mr. George to suffer an asphyxiation event and that he died as a proximate consequence of this negligence. On November 6, 1996, Reid amended her complaint to add Crowne Management Corporation as a defendant. Crowne Management was under contract with Crowne Investments to manage the nursing home at which Mr. George resided.
On June 5, 1997, Crowne Investments filed a motion to preclude Reid from calling Marian C. Skinner as an expert witness. On September 2, 1997, the trial court granted that motion. Crowne Investments filed a second motion to preclude, seeking to preclude Reid from calling Melba Jean Findley as an expert witness, and filed a motion for summary judgment. On October 7, 1997, the trial court denied both motions. Crowne Investments then filed another motion, to preclude testimony of Melba Jean Findley and Deborah Allsup. The trial court denied this motion on December 22, 1997, and the case proceeded to trial.
The jury returned a $750,000 verdict against Crowne Investments and Crowne Management, and the court entered a judgment on that verdict. The defendants filed a joint motion for a new trial; to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment; for remittitur; and for judgment as a matter of law ("JML"). On August 17, 1998, the trial court denied this motion; the defendants appealed. Reid cross appealed, but she does not want us to address the issues raised in her cross appeal unless we conclude that the judgment is due to be reversed. Because we affirm the judgment, we do not address the issues presented in Reid's cross appeal.
The defendants, represented jointly on appeal, raise three issues: 1) Whether the trial court erred in denying them a JML or a new trial based on an alleged absence of expert testimony; 2) whether Reid's expert witness qualified as a "similarly situated health care provider"; and 3) whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony concerning other acts and omissions occurring at the nursing home. Because the arguments relating to the first two issues are based on the same statute, we resolve those issues in one analysis, in part I. We address the third issue in part II.
The defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new trial or for a postverdict JML. They point out that this is a medical-malpractice case and required expert testimony. They assert that Reid failed to establish the standard of care applicable to skilled and intermediate nursing-care facilities and, therefore, failed to make a prima facie case of negligence. The defendants argue that Reid presented no expert testimony to support her claims against Crowne Management, and, therefore, that Crowne Management was entitled to a postverdict JML and Crowne Investments is entitled to a new trial.
Crowne Investments entered into a "Management Agreement" with Crowne Management. The contract was effective from June 1, 1988, through May 31, 1998, unless terminated sooner or extended, as provided by the terms of the contract. Under the terms of the contract, Crowne Management agreed to supervise, manage, and operate the nursing home at which Mr. George resided. Crowne Management was responsible for hiring employees; negotiating labor, utility, and concessionaire contracts; purchasing operating supplies; making necessary repairs; obtaining licenses; acquiring insurance; paying taxes (from Crowne Investments' funds); and depositing and disbursing funds.
Reid argues that both Crowne Investments and Crowne Management owed a duty to Mr. George and are subject to liability for his alleged wrongful death. She contends that that duty arose under the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987 ("AMLA"), Ala.Code 1975, §§ 6-5-540 through -552; under the common law; and under Crowne Management's "Management Agreement" with Crowne Investments. She maintains that Crowne Investments and Crowne Management breached their duty of care and that their breach proximately caused Mr. George's death.
The AMLA, at § 6-5-542, defines the term "health care provider" as "[a] medical practitioner, dental practitioner, medical institution, physician, dentist, hospital, or other health care provider as those terms are defined in Section 6-5-481." Section 6-5-481(7) defines "hospital" as "[s]uch institutions as are defined in § 22-21-21 as hospitals." Section 22-21-20 defines "hospitals" as including "long term care facilities such as, but not limited to, skilled nursing facilities [and] intermediate care facilities." See Rosemont, Inc. v. Marshall, 481 So.2d 1126 (Ala.1985). Crowne Investments operates a skilled nursing facility; therefore, it is a "hospital" for purposes of the AMLA.
The AMLA defines "other health care providers" as "[a]ny professional corporation or any person employed by physicians, dentists, or hospitals who are directly involved in the delivery of health care services." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-481(8). Crowne Management is a professional corporation employed by Crowne Investments, a "hospital," and Crowne Management is directly involved in the delivery of health-care services. Therefore, it is a "health care provider" as defined by the AMLA.
Section 6-5-484(a), Ala.Code 1975, reads, in pertinent part:
"In the case of a hospital rendering services to a patient, the hospital must use that degree of care, skill, and diligence used by hospitals generally in the community."
Mr. George was a "patient" and Crowne Investments was a "hospital" for the purposes of § 6-5-484. Therefore, in order to prevail, Reid had to establish at trial that Crowne Investments and Crowne Management, in rendering services to Mr. George, or in failing to do so, did not use that degree of care, skill, and diligence used by skilled nursing facilities generally in the community.
Under the AMLA, in order for a plaintiff to prevail in a wrongful-death action against a nursing home, the plaintiff must establish the appropriate standard of care; must prove that the nursing home failed to comply with that standard of care; and must prove that the nursing home's failure to comply proximately caused the death. See Jackson v. Pleasant Grove Health Care Ctr., 980 F.2d 692 (11th Cir. 1993). Under the AMLA, a plaintiff establishes proximate cause by demonstrating that an injury or death was probably caused by the defendant's conduct. Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-549.
To establish a hospital's and a health-care provider's negligence in an action under the AMLA, the plaintiff ordinarily must offer expert medical testimony as to what is or what is not the proper practice, treatment, and procedure. In such an action, a lack of expert medical testimony results in a lack of the proof essential to establish the plaintiffs case. See Rosemont, supra, 481 So.2d at 1129 (citing Parrish v. Spink, 284 Ala. 263, 224 So.2d 621 (1969); Tuscaloosa Orthopedic Appliance Co. v. Wyatt, 460 So.2d 156 (Ala.1984)).
The defendants argue that Reid's expert witness, Deborah Allsup, was not qualified to offer an opinion about the conduct of Crowne Management because, they say, Allsup had never served in a managerial capacity. The defendants also assert that Reid presented no expert testimony establishing the standard of care and indicating that the actions of the employees of Crowne Management breached that standard.
We must first determine whether Reid established the standard or standards of care she alleges the defendants breached. In her second amended complaint, Reid made these allegations against Crowne Investments and Crowne Management:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Baldwin County Elec. Corp. v. Fairhope
...answered, a motion to strike or to exclude the question and answer should have accompanied its belated objection. Crowne Invs., Inc. v. Reid, 740 So.2d 400, 408 (Ala. 1999) ("If the witness's answer came too quickly for Crowne to object, then Crowne's proper remedy would have been to make t......
-
Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders
...Sanders was entitled to cross-examine the witness about his testimony regarding the collection of premiums. Crowne Investments, Inc. v. Reid, 740 So.2d 400, 408 (Ala.1999), and Brabner v. Canton, 611 So.2d 1016, 1018 (Ala.1992) We find no prejudicial error as claimed in this D.4. Arguments ......
-
Horne-Ballard v. Ballard
...objection such that the wife's argument on this issue is preserved for appellate review. See, generally, Crowne Invs., Inc. v. Reid, 740 So. 2d 400, 408 (Ala. 1999) ("If a question is repeated in a different form after the opponent has objected to the original question, then the opponent mu......
-
Horne-Ballard v. Ballard
...objection such that the wife's argument on this issue is preserved for appellate review. See, generally, Crowne Invests., Inc. v. Reid, 740 So. 2d 400, 408 (Ala. 1999) ("If a question is repeated in a different form after the opponent has objected to the original question, then the opponent......