Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
| Decision Date | 09 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 930236,930236 |
| Citation | 521 N.W.2d 401 |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,062 Curtis CROWSTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY and Kelsey-Hayes Company, Defendants and Appellees. Civ. |
Galen J. Vaa, of Gjevre, McLarnan, Hannaher, Vaa, Skatvold & McLarnan, Moorhead, MN, for plaintiff and appellant.
Duane H. Ilvedson, of Nilles, Hansen & Davies, Ltd., Fargo, for defendant and appellee Goodyear Tire.
M. Daniel Vogel, of Vogel, Brantner, Kelly, Knutson, Weir & Bye, Ltd., Fargo, for defendant and appellee Kelsey-Hayes Co.
Curtis Crowston appealed from a final judgment, entered upon a summary judgment on his post-sale duty to warn claim and a jury verdict on his other claims, dismissing his products liability action against Kelsey-Hayes Company and The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company. We hold that, under negligence principles, when manufacturers learn about dangers associated with the use of their product after it is manufactured and sold, they have a post-sale duty to take reasonable steps to warn foreseeable users about those dangers. We therefore reverse the summary judgment dismissal of Crowston's post-sale duty to warn claim and remand for further proceedings on it. We
affirm the dismissal of Crowston's other products liability claims.
On June 4, 1986, Crowston, a 20 year old employee on the night shift at a Fargo service station, was seriously injured while inflating a 16 inch light truck tire on a mismatched 16.5 inch wheel. Crowston had worked at the service station for only a few weeks and had limited experience repairing tires and operating a tire changing machine. According to Crowston's employer, night shift employees were not authorized to do any repair work. According to Crowston, a customer asked him to repair the tubes in four light truck tire/wheel assemblies, and he repaired two of the tires without incident.
The third tire/wheel assembly was a mismatched 16.5 inch wheel manufactured by Kelsey-Hayes in 1973 and 16 inch tube-type tire manufactured by Goodyear in 1977. According to Crowston, he locked the assembly into a tire changing machine, and removed the tube without taking the tire off the wheel. After repairing the tube and reinserting it into the tire, he inserted the tire bead over the flange of the rim and lubricated the bead area while the assembly remained locked into the tire changing machine. However, as he had with the first two tires, he then removed the assembly from the tire changing machine and began inflating the tire on the floor. According to Crowston, he had inflated the tire to 28 pounds per square inch (psi) when he was interrupted by a customer. Crowston testified that, after helping that customer, he resumed inflating the tire when it exploded, seriously injuring him.
Crowston sued Goodyear and Kelsey-Hayes, alleging negligence and strict liability in tort in the design, manufacture, and sale of their component parts of the tire/wheel assembly. 1 Crowston alleged that, when the component parts of the tire/wheel assembly were sold, they were defective and unreasonably dangerous and failed to include adequate warnings. He also alleged that after the manufacture and sale of the component parts of the assembly, both defendants received knowledge that mismatching 16 inch tires and 16.5 inch wheels created a dangerous condition which could result in explosions during inflation of the tire and that both defendants negligently failed to give adequate post-sale warnings about those mismatching dangers.
Each defendant answered separately, denying that its respective part of the tire/wheel assembly was defective or unreasonably dangerous and alleging that Crowston's injuries were caused by his negligence, assumption of risk, or other contributory fault. The defendants claimed that the explosion was caused by Crowston's failure to follow proper tire repair procedures, including over-inflating the tire to more than 90 psi, and by his failure to follow a warning and instructions for use on a safety label on the tire changing machine.
The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on Crowston's claim that the defendants negligently failed to give appropriate post-sale warnings about the dangers associated with mismatching 16 inch tires and 16.5 inch wheels. They asserted that they had no post-sale duty to warn about the dangers associated with mismatching. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on that claim.
A jury thereafter returned a special verdict for the defendants on Crowston's other claims. In Crowston's strict liability claim, the jury found that Goodyear's 16 inch tire was not defective and unreasonably dangerous because of the design of the bead, or the absence of a warning on the sidewall; that Kelsey-Hayes' 16.5 inch wheel was not defective and unreasonably dangerous because of the possibility of mismatching 16 inch tires with that wheel, the absence of a warning on the wheel not to mount 16 inch tires on it, or the location and legibility of size markings; and that Crowston's misuse and assumption of risk were the proximate cause of his injuries. In Crowston's negligence claim, the Crowston raises several issues which fall into three categories: dismissal of his post-sale duty to warn claim, admission of evidence, and jury instructions.
jury found that Goodyear was not negligent in designing the tire bead, or in failing to provide adequate warnings on the tire; that Kelsey-Hayes was not negligent in designing a 16.5 inch wheel on which a 16 inch tire could be mismatched, or in failing to provide adequate warnings on the wheel; and that his injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of him and his employer. Judgment was entered dismissing Crowston's action, and he appealed.
Crowston asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissal of his claim that the defendants negligently failed to provide appropriate post-sale warnings about the dangers of mismatching 16 inch tires and 16.5 inch wheels. Crowston alleged that, after the defendants manufactured and sold the component parts of this tire/wheel assembly, they learned that users were mismatching the parts, thereby creating a dangerous situation which could result in explosions during inflation of the tire. He argues that the defendants had a post-sale duty to warn the public and the individual purchasers of this tire and this wheel about the dangers of mismatching. He contends that summary judgment was inappropriate because there are genuine issues of material fact about whether the defendants performed their post-sale duty in a reasonable manner. The defendants respond that they did not have a post-sale duty to warn because, under North Dakota law, products liability is determined by the condition of the product at the time it is sold. Alternatively they assert that, assuming a post-sale duty to warn may exist in some circumstances, it does not apply to these products.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if only a question of law is involved. Stewart v. Ryan, 520 N.W.2d 39 (N.D.1994). Although negligence actions are ordinarily inappropriate for summary judgment, Stokka v. Cass County Elec. Coop., 373 N.W.2d 911 (N.D.1985), one of the elements of the tort of negligence is the existence of a duty on the part of the alleged tortfeasor, and whether a duty exists is generally a preliminary question of law for the court. Ebach v. Ralston, 469 N.W.2d 801 (N.D.1991).
Under North Dakota law, negligence and strict liability in tort are separate and distinct theories of products liability, each with a different focus. E.g., Oanes v. Westgo, Inc., 476 N.W.2d 248 (N.D.1991); Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509 (N.D.1989). Strict liability in tort focuses on whether or not the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous, while negligence focuses on whether or not the manufacturer's conduct falls below the standard of reasonable care. Butz, supra; Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Service, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D.1984). Under both theories, liability may be imposed because of inadequate warnings. Butz, supra; see Morrison v. Grand Forks Housing Authority, 436 N.W.2d 221 (N.D.1989); Andersen v. Teamsters Local 116 Bldg. Club, 347 N.W.2d 309 (N.D.1984).
When Crowston was injured, N.D.C.C. § 28-01.1-05(1) 2 provided:
"No product may be considered to have a defect or to be in a defective condition, unless at the time the product was sold by the manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition in the product which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." [Emphasis added].
Under that statute, whether a product is defective is determined by its condition at the time it was sold by the manufacturer or other initial seller. However, N.D.C.C. § 28-01.1-02(3) also provided "If a manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer issues a recall of a product in any state, modifies a product, or becomes aware of any defect in a product at any time, and fails to notify or warn a user of the product who is subsequently injured or damaged as a result of the defect, the provisions of subsection 1 do not bar any action against the manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer based upon, or arising out of, the defect." [Emphasis added].
Although that language dealt with the statute of limitations for products liability actions, it necessarily recognized a duty to warn "at any time" a manufacturer became aware of any defect in a product and did not exclude a duty to warn about potential dangers that manufacturers became aware of after the product was sold.
In Witthauer v. Burkhart Roentgen, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 439 (N.D.1991), we considered an analogous issue about the scope of the products liability...
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