Crowther v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Docket Nos. 58108

Decision Date30 September 1957
Docket NumberDocket Nos. 58108,61840.
Citation28 T.C. 1293
PartiesCHARLES CROWTHER AND IVY L. CROWTHER, Petitioners,v.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.CHARLES E. CROWTHER AND IVY L. CROWTHER, Petitioners,v.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
CourtU.S. Tax Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

1. During the taxable years the petitioner was employed in cutting or sawing down timber and sawing it into logs at designated ‘layouts' in woods which were 40 miles or more from his home where he resided with his family. Living accommodations for him and his family were not available at or near the layouts, nor was any public transportation available between his home and the layouts. None of his employers provided him with transportation, nor did any of them impose upon him any requirement as to where he or his family should reside or as to the means that he should employ in traveling between his home and the layouts. Petitioner used his automobiles or his jeep in making daily trips between his home and the layouts, at the same time carrying with him certain tools and equipment he used in his work. Held, that such use of the automobiles and jeep was for the dual purpose of petitioner's commuting between his home and his work and for transporting tools and equipment used by him in his trade or business. Held, further, that to the extent the costs and expenses of operating the automobiles and jeep represented commuting expense, they were personal expenses and not deductible, and that to the extent they represented expense of transporting the tools and equipment, they were ordinary and necessary business expenses. Deductible amounts of ordinary and necessary business expenses determined.

2. Fee paid by petitioners in 1954 for preparation of their 1953 income tax return held deductible for 1954.

3. Respondent's disallowance of a portion of a deduction taken for 1954 for medical expenses sustained.

4. Tax Court is without jurisdiction to determine the propriety of Commissioner's motives in making determinations of deficiencies in tax, or the propriety of the administrative policy and procedures he employs prior to making determinations of deficiencies. Morris M. Grupp, Esq., and Leon Schiller, Esq., for the petitioners.

Thomas M. Mather, Esq., for the respondent.

The respondent has determined deficiencies of $324.76 and $191.40 in the income tax of the petitioners for 1951 and 1954, respectively. Issues presented for determination are the correctness of the respondent's action (1) in disallowing a portion of certain deductions taken for 1951 and 1954 for automobiles, jeep, and other expenses incurred in those years, (2) in disallowing as a deduction for 1954 a fee paid in that year for the preparation of the income tax of the petitioners for 1953, and (3) in disallowing a portion of a deduction taken for 1954 as medical expenses.

FINDINGS OF FACT.

Charles E. Crowther and Ivy L. Crowther are husband and wife and are and were in 1951 and 1954 residents of Fort Bragg, California. They filed a joint Federal income tax return for 1951 with the collector of internal revenue for the first district of California and filed a joint Federal income tax return for 1954 with the district director for the San Francisco district. Since petitioner Ivy L. Crowther is joined here only by virtue of such joint returns, the term petitioner will hereinafter be used with reference to Charles E. Crowther.

During 1951 and 1954 the petitioner was employed as a ‘faller’ in which he engaged in ‘falling’ or cutting or sawing down trees and ‘bucking’ or sawing them into marketable logs at a stated amount per thousand board feet of logs. Upon petitioner's entering the employment of an employer a certain boundary of timberland or ‘layout’ was designated as the site on which he would work. When that was cut over, another layout was designated, and so on until the employer's logging operations were completed or were suspended. The petitioner's employer did not require him to work any specified number of days per week, nor was petitioner required to report for work at any particular hour on the days which he worked. During the years here involved the petitioner's average gross income per day that he worked was approximately $40.

The petitioner provided certain equipment which he used in his employment during 1951 and 1954. This consisted of 1 chain saw, an extra bar and an extra chain for the saw, a gasoline can, springboards, gun sticks, axes, sledge hammers, from 4 to 14 wedges, and minor tools and spare parts for on-the-job repairs. He also provided lubricating oil for his chain saw. In addition he provided a special safety hat and caulk boots for his personal wear.

At the end of a day's work the petitioner would take home with him his gasoline can and any tools or parts of tools that were broken and in need of repair or sharpening. Spare tools such as a spare sledge hammer and a spare axe and spare wedges ordinarily would not be removed from his automobile and consequently were transported back and forth daily. The chain saw and other equipment ordinarily would be left overnight at the layout where petitioner was working.

Beginning about the middle of January 1951 and continuing until its annual suspension of logging operations shortly before Christmas of that year, the petitioner was employed by Rockport Redwood Mills which has offices in Rockport, California. Rockport is on the Pacific coast and is about 29 miles north of Fort Bragg, California, where the petitioner resided with his family in a house owned by him. During 1951 the petitioner worked at three layouts on the site of the company's logging operations. Dependent on how far the cutting of a layout had progressed, the petitioner walked from one-fourth of a mile to two miles from where he parked his car to reach the particular spot on the layout where he was cutting timber. The layouts at which the petitioner worked were between 13 and 15 miles from Rockport. The highway between Fort Bragg and Rockport is paved. For petitioner to reach the layouts at which he worked it was necessary for him, after leaving the highway, to travel over one of two routes. About one-half of one route was a public road and the remainder was an unimproved private logging road. This route required the fording of a creek which was at an impassable depth during the winter months. The other route, which was used during the winter months, was entirely over an unimproved private logging road. The logging roads were rough, winding, and steep. The distance traveled by petitioner in going from his home to the layouts was approximately 40 miles.

During 1951 Rockport Redwood Mills furnished gasoline to fallers and ‘buckers' for their chain saws but did not furnish them any transportation between their homes and the layouts. Nor was there any public transportation available between the petitioner's home and the layouts where he worked.

The petitioner worked as a faller and bucker for two different companies during 1954. He worked for H. A. Christie Company, Inc. (sometimes hereinafter referred to as Christie Company), Ukiah, California, during the first part of 1954 and until July or August of that year when it completed its logging operations under the contract under which it had been operating. The petitioner worked for Christie Company at two separate layouts which were about 4 miles apart. To reach the layouts the petitioner traveled about 30 miles south from Fort Bragg. About one-half of the distance was over a public road and the remainder was over a private logging road. Christie Company did not provide the petitioner with transportation between his home and the layouts, nor was there any public transportation available between his home and the layouts.

Within 2 or 3 days after the termination of his employment with Christie Company, the petitioner began working for Hildebrands, Inc., Ukiah, California, and continued to work for that company through 1 week in January 1955 when he was laid off. During the first 6 weeks of his employment he cut over a layout which he reached from his home by traveling over 35 miles of a paved road and 9 miles of logging road. Thereafter, until in January 1955, he worked on another layout which he reached from his home by traveling over 35 miles of paved road and 6 miles of logging road. Hildebrands did not provide petitioner with transportation between his home and the layouts, nor was any public transportation available between his home and the layouts.

No living accommodations for the petitioner and his family were available at or near the layouts where he worked in 1951 and 1954. None of the petitioner's employers in 1952 and 1954 imposed upon him any requirements as to where he or his family should live or as to the means that he should employ in traveling between his home and the layouts where he worked.

When petitioner was out of work, he used his automobile to drive to various lumber mills in search of employment.

In 1950, the petitioner purchased for $2,805 a 1947 model Cadillac automobile which he continued to own throughout the years 1951 and 1954 and to the time of the trial herein. About July 1951, the petitioner purchased for $125 a 1937 model Plymouth automobile and after using it for about a year junked it. About November 1953, the petitioner purchased for $400 a jeep which he continued to own throughout 1954 and afterwards.

From the time he began working for Rockport Redwood Mills about the middle of January 1951, until about July when he purchased the Plymouth automobile, the petitioner used his Cadillac automobile to drive to and from work. The Cadillac was not suited for driving over logging roads. After purchasing the Plymouth, the petitioner generally used it to drive to and from work, using the Cadillac only when the Plymouth was not in running condition. The petitioner generally worked 6 days a week while working for Rockport Redwood Mills in 1...

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