Crowther v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
| Decision Date | 08 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 05-30140-MAP. |
| Citation | 488 F.Supp.2d 10 |
| Parties | Geoffrey CROWTHER, Plaintiff v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP., et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Michael J. McDevitt, Lawson & Weitzen, LLP, Boston, MA, Thomas J. Joyce, III, Law Office of Thomas J. Joyce, III, Mount Laurel, NJ, for Plaintiff.
Michael B. Flynn, Lori A. Wirkus, Flynn & Associates, PC, Quincy, MA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. No. 29)
Plaintiff has filed this personal injury action against Defendants CSX Transportation, Inc., ("CSX") and its predecessor Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail"), under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq., charging that his exposure to excessive noise at the workplace caused bilateral hearing loss. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff, by filing his complaint on June 17, 2005, violated the applicable three-year statute of limitations.1 Because no reasonable jury could reach any conclusion other than that Plaintiff knew both of his injury and of its cause well prior to June 16, 2002, the court will allow Defendants' motion.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the court will view the facts, and all inferences that might reasonably be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has worked for Defendants in various capacities, including trackman, welder, and foreman, since at least 1976.2 During his time working for Defendants Plaintiff was frequently in the vicinity of heavy equipment, power and manual tools, train engines, horns, bells, and whistles. Plaintiff performed most of his duties without adequate hearing protection. Plaintiff was aware that Defendants had in place a hearing conservation program to test employees no later than the mid-1980's. (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A, Pl.'s Dep. at 183:17-22.) Plaintiff recalls having been tested for hearing loss almost on an annual basis; he was aware that co-workers had filed lawsuits against his employer for work-related injuries, including hearing loss, by the mid-1980's. (Id. at 182:17-183:16.) He knew that written information about his rights under the FELA with respect to occupational injuries was "around everywhere" since the time of his hiring. (Id. at 202:5-203:6.)
Defendants contend that Plaintiff first received a diagnosis of hearing loss on August 3, 1989, nearly sixteen years prior to the filing of this complaint. Defendants point to an audiogram (Defs." Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. B), which contains numerical results consistent with hearing loss. This audiogram, however, does not contain any narrative assessment that might provide cognizable evidence that Plaintiff was explicitly notified of the significance of the audiogram results.
On April 5, 2001, Plaintiffs hearing was again tested as part of the hearing conservation program. Following this test, Plaintiff was given a letter, which he signed acknowledging receipt. The letter stated as follows:
Your current and/or previous test results indicate that your hearing is not within normal limits at one or more frequencies. Abnormal hearing levels may be the result of many causes, including noise exposure at work. You should consult an ear doctor to determine the cause of your hearing loss.... This test represents a change (worse) in hearing levels when compared to your previous test.
(Defs.' Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. E.)
Plaintiff was asked about this letter at his deposition and testified as follows:
A. You know what? If I had to sign that, then I don't know how that — I really don't know my signature got on that. I mean because every — when I — the way I recall the hearing test is, if you have a bad — if you have a bad hearing test, or you know, they suspect, you know, severe hearing loss, they kind of hold you back afterwards and talk to you and — you know. That never talked [sic] happened to me.
(Defs.' Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A, Pl.'s Dep. at 219:13-21.)
Although he acknowledged his signature, Plaintiff had no recollection of receiving this letter or of receiving any similar letters as part of the hearing testing program.
On June 19, 2002, Plaintiff attended a Union-sponsored screening in Greenfield. Plaintiffs presence at the screening was prompted primarily by his carpal tunnel syndrome, but he concedes that at this time he was first notified of a potential hearing loss.3 (Pl.'s Resp. in Opp'n Defs.' Statement of Material Facts, ¶ 9.) As noted, Plaintiff filed this complaint on June 17, 2005, just two days shy of what Plaintiff now claims was the outer limit of the statute of limitations.
Under Rule 56, summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. In opposing summary judgment, the non-moving' party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is sufficient evidence "for a jury to return a verdict in his favor. Celotex Corp. v. Catreet, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court's role in this situation is to "pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
The FELA statute states: "No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the date the cause of action accrued." 45 U.S.C. § 56. The method of determining when a FELA action has "accrued" is not set by statute; courts have the obligation to construe this term, keeping in mind the purpose of the provisions and the end to be served by the limitation period. Albert v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 905 F.2d 541, 543 (1st Cir.1990).
Most of the time, it is clear from the circumstances of the injury when the statute of limitations begins to run. At times, however, a plaintiff may be unaware of when the injury actually has occurred and what its cause is. In these instances, courts apply a "discovery rule" to determine when the statute begins to run. Id.
The First Circuit has followed the majority of circuits in holding that the statute of limitations begins to run in a FELA case when the employee becomes aware not only of his injury but also of its cause. Id. at 544. The First Circuit, however, has rejected the proposition that a statute of limitations cannot begin to run until the injured party has "definite knowledge" that his injury is work related. Id. In that vein, once a plaintiff has "reached the conclusion that he believed he had a hearing loss and that he believed the hearing loss was caused by his employment" he has a duty to investigate the situation in order to confirm or deny his belief. Id.
The rationale for this proposition was set forth in Fries v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 909 F.2d 1092 (7th. Cir. 1990), where the Court of Appeals stated that "to allow a plaintiff to unilaterally postpone the running of the statute of limitations by negligently failing to investigate the fact of and cause of his injuries would thwart the legislative intent of 45 U.S.C. § 56." Id. at 1095. The Tenth Circuit has stated this proposition in slightly different language:
[K]nowledge of the specific cause of a work-related injury is not required to trigger the statute of limitations in a FELA action. Rather, a FELA claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know that his injury is merely work related.
Matson v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir.2001).
Specifically in a hearing-loss FELA case, a district court has recognized that "under the discovery rule, a plaintiff's claim could accrue when his hearing loss is minimal, and the statute could expire before the plaintiff judged his hearing loss sufficiently severe to warrant bringing suit." Whitman v. CSX...
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