Croxton v. Board of County Com'rs of Natrona County, 5642
Decision Date | 06 May 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 5642,5642 |
Citation | 644 P.2d 780 |
Parties | James R. CROXTON, Mary E. Croxton, Wardwell Development Corporation, and Fort Wardwell KOA, Inc., Appellants (Defendants), v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF NATRONA COUNTY, Wyoming, Appellee(Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Earl R. Johnson, Casper, for appellants.
Michael J. Burke, Chief Civ. Deputy Natrona County and Pros. Atty., Casper, for appellee.
Before ROSE, C. J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.
This appeal is from a district court's entry of a permanent injunction barring appellants from operating a campground on their own property. The district court ordered the entry of the injunction after finding that appellants' use of the land as a campground did not precede the passage of a zoning resolution by the Board of Natrona County Commissioners which prohibited such a use. On appeal, appellants challenge that finding. 1
We will reverse with directions to vacate the injunction.
In early 1979, appellants decided to open a campground on their property with permanent support facilities as well as individual campsites. On January 26, 1979, a contract was signed whereby Custom Pools agreed to build a 20' X 50' swimming pool on the proposed campsite. During the spring, architects were hired to design a campground. In June 1979, appellants obtained a KOA franchise for $14,000 and commenced construction of the permanent facilities. Also, during 1979 appellants paid to have telephone, electrical, and water hook-ups at the proposed site. 2 Plumbing permits were received from the Wardwell Water and Sewer District for various buildings at the campground on July 26 and September 7, 1979. Insurance for Fort Wardwell KOA was purchased on September 18, 1979. A bill, dated September 21, 1979 for leveling work at the campground was also received into evidence.
The permanent facilities, which included a store, laundry room, gas station, restaurant, and game room, as well as the indoor swimming pool, were planned for and built upon land within what the Board had designated as an open district. In these districts, according to the Board's zoning resolution which incorporated the principles outlined in its comprehensive zoning plan, "no zoning regulations (were) in effect." For land so designated no land use restrictions prohibited a landowner from using his property in any fashion he desired. Accordingly, appellant needed neither a permit nor a variance for construction of his permanent facilities, and the Board's later resolution changing the zoning designation of some of appellants' other property did not affect this land.
The problem in this case arose in connection with the land used for the camping facilities. The campsites had originally been planned to be located on lots zoned for general and light industrial uses. Under the Board's zoning resolution, in order to construct the camping facilities on those lots within the light industrial zoning, a conditional use permit was needed, while a zoning change was necessary for the lots zoned general industrial. On January 7, 1980, appellants petitioned the Board for the necessary zoning changes and conditional use permits. The matter was then referred to the Planning and Zoning Commission (Commission) for public hearing. But before any hearings were conducted, appellants announced that if their petition was turned down, they would build the camping facilities on parcels of land located in an area designated as an open district. When the Commission on April 3, 1980 recommended denial of appellants' request for a conditional use permit, appellants in their planning for the campsites assumed that the Board would go along with that recommendation. Plans were formulated to build the campsites on the alternate parcels of land which had received the open district designation.
Meanwhile, a petition had been circulated by neighboring landowners to rezone these alternate parcels from open district to rural business. Though it must be acknowledged that several other lots in the area were affected by the proposal, the principal impact of this rezoning, at least as far as this case is concerned, was to prohibit the construction of the campsites. This petition was presented to the Board on February 25, 1980. It was referred to the Commission, and a public hearing was held. On May 1, 1980, the Commission approved the proposal and forwarded it to the Board with a do-pass recommendation.
During the month of June 1980, appellants commenced renting space to campers at the alternate site even before the construction was completed. On June 20, 1980, the Board officially denied appellants' request for a conditional use permit for the property originally planned to serve as the campground. At the end of June, appellants commenced the installation of 58 electrical pedestals at the alternate site still officially within the open district. This work was completed by the end of the first week in August.
After conducting a public hearing on July 18, 1980, the Board adopted a resolution on August 5, 1980 incorporating the rezoning plan outlined in the petition circulated by appellants' neighboring landowners. Attempts to stop appellants from using their land as a campground culminated with the Board filing suit on July 8, 1981. The Board prayed for an injunction barring appellants' use of their alternate site as a campground. They argued that the use violated the zoning restrictions embodied in the August 5, 1980 resolution. On November 12, 1981, the district court found for the Board and enjoined appellants' use of the alternate parcels of land as a campground.
All of the boards of county commissioners throughout the state were given the power to adopt zoning resolutions for their own counties in order to restrict and control the use of lands located in unincorporated areas. Section 18-5-201, et seq., W.S.1977. Specifically, the boards were empowered to create planning and zoning commissions which would develop comprehensive plans outlining the counties' zoning restrictions. From these plans, zoning resolutions would be drawn which were to provide details describing the zoning restrictions and the procedure necessary to effectuate any zoning changes. The necessity of complying with any particular board's zoning resolution was emphasized in § 18-5-203, W.S.1977. That section provides:
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