Cruickshank v. Brockton Agricultural Soc.

• Decision Date: 29 June 1927
• Citation: 260 Mass. 283,157 N.E. 357
• Parties: CRUICKSHANK v. BROCKTON AGRICULTURAL SOC.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

260 Mass. 283

157 N.E. 357

CRUICKSHANK

v.BROCKTON AGRICULTURAL SOC.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

June 29, 1927.

Report from Superior Court, Norfolk County; P. M. Keating Judge.

Action of tort by Lillian A. Cruickshank against the Brockton Agricultural Society for personal injuries from being bitten by dog.On report.Judgment to be entered for plaintiff in accord with opinion.

C. L. Allen and G. L. Barnes, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

Badger, Pratt, Doyle & Badger, of Boston (W. I. Badger, Jr., of Boston, of counsel), for defendant.

BRALEY, J.

[1]The plaintiff on October 8, 1923, having purchased a ticket of admission, entered the grounds of the defendant where it was holding a fair, and passed to a building in which an exhibition of dogs was being held.As an invitee, she could assume that the premises aside from obvious dangers were reasonably safe for the purpose for which they were arranged and adapted for the entertainment of the defendant's patrons.Blanchette v. Union Street Railway, 248 Mass. 407, 412, 413, 143 N. E. 310.The benches or stalls for the dogs were separate.In front of the benches was a rope, outside of which there was a space reserved for the use of those who desired to view them.The plaintiff, standing in this space and in the exercise of due care, as the jury could find, was looking at one of the animals owned and exhibited by one Bogren, who was inside of the rope and held a chain five feet long which was attached to the dog, when it suddenly sprang from the bench striking the shoulders of Bogren with its forepaws, and then bit the plaintiff's lip causing serious and permanent disfigurement.The jury having found for the plaintiff, the defendant contends there was no evidence which warranted this result, and that its motion for a directed verdict should have been granted.

[2][3] The questions, whether the dog was properly guarded and due precautions were taken by the defendant to protect spectators from being molested, were properly submitted to the jury under the second count of the declaration.Sherman v. Favour, 1 Allen, 191.The first count, however, is on G. L. c. 140, § 155, which provides that ‘the owner or keeper of a dog shall be liable in tort to a person injured by it in double the amount of damages sustained by him,’ and the plaintiff cannot recover unless the evidence warranteda finding that at the time the plaintiff was attacked the defendant was the keeper.The owner...