Crull v. Sriratana
Decision Date | 23 March 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 4-06-0952.,4-06-0952. |
Parties | Dan CRULL, Special Administrator of the Estate of Novalene Crull, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Pramern SRIRATANA, M.D.; Mid-Illinois Hematology & Oncology Associates, Ltd., an Illinois Corporation; Kenneth N. Jordan, D.O.; and Madison Street Clinic, P.C., an Illinois Professional Corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
In December 2004, plaintiff, Dan Crull, as special administrator of the estate of Novalene Crull, filed a medical-malpractice complaint against defendants, Pramern Sriratana, M.D.; Mid-Illinois Hematology & Oncology Associates, Ltd.; Kenneth N. Jordan, D.O.; and Madison Street Clinic, P.C.
In October 2006, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, upon learning that the reviewing health-care professional's report, which was required by section 2-622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-622 (West 2004)), had been written by a person not licensed to practice medicine.
Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) ordering him to reveal the identity of the author of the section 2-622 report and (2) dismissing the case with prejudice. In October 2007, this court disagreed with plaintiff's arguments and affirmed. Crull v. Sriratana, 376 Ill.App.3d 803, 316 Ill.Dec. 31, 878 N.E.2d 753 (2007).
Plaintiff filed a petition for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court of Illinois. In September 2008, that court denied plaintiff's petition but also entered a nonprecedential supervisory order that reads as follows:
Crull v. Sriratana, 229 Ill.2d 619, 328 Ill.Dec. 66, 903 N.E.2d 726 (2008).
In accordance with the supreme court's directive, we vacate our earlier opinion in this case. After reconsidering this case in light of the supreme court's decision in O'Casek, we determine that a different result is not warranted. Accordingly, we affirm.
When plaintiff filed his December 2004 medical-malpractice complaint, he failed to attach a report of a reviewing health-care professional and, instead, invoked the automatic statutory 90-day extension under section 2-622(a)(2) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-622(a)(2) (West 2004)). However, plaintiff did not file a report of any reviewing health-care professional before the automatic 90-day stay expired on March 17, 2005. The statute of limitations expired on December 19, 2004.
In early March 2005, Sriratana, a specialist in hematology and oncology, and his corporation prematurely filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint based on plaintiff's failure to file a section 2-622 report from a qualified reviewing health-care professional. On March 21, 2005, Jordan, a specialist in orthopedics and muscular osteopathic medicine, and his corporation filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that plaintiff failed to comply with section 2-622, in that he failed to submit an attorney affidavit, health-care professional's report, or a motion for an extension of time to file the report within the 90-day period.
The next day, the trial court held a hearing on defendants' motions to dismiss. At the start of the hearing, plaintiff's counsel, Guy Geleerd, moved for leave to file three identical section 2-622 affidavits and health-care professional's reports instanter and tendered the affidavits and reports he sought to submit. Each of Geleerd's affidavits stated that he had consulted and reviewed the facts of this case with a health-care professional whom he believed (1) to be knowledgeable in the relevant issues involved in this cause of action, (2) had practiced within the last six years in the same area of health care or medicine at issue in this cause of action, and (3) was qualified by experience and demonstrated competence in the subject of this case. Each affidavit also stated that a copy of the health-care professional's report was attached, clearly identifying the reasons for the professional's determination that a reasonable and meritorious cause for filing of this cause of action existed.
The health-care professional's reports, dated March 18, 2005, stated that the author was a "physician licensed to practice medicine in all of its branches, residency trained and board certified in [the] specialty of internal medicine/nephrology." The report was not signed and did not reveal the reviewing health-care professional's name and address.
The trial court recognized that the health-care reports were not signed. When the court asked Geleerd why the health-care reports did not reveal the author's identity, Geleerd responded that "Illinois law does not require that we tender signed [section] 2-622 reports along with our [section] 2-622 affidavit." Sriratana's counsel objected, and the following colloquy between the court and Geleerd occurred:
Let me ask this question. Have these experts signed these opinion letters already?
Geleerd then asked for an...
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